



the
Burkhardt
Review



The Burkhardt Review
Conference Edition

Volume 1 | Issue 2

2018

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Submitting to *The Burkhardt Review*

In addition to the annual conference edition, *The Burkhardt Review* publishes a yearly peer-reviewed edition. *The Burkhardt Review* seeks manuscripts dealing with all aspects of the historical past from graduate students currently enrolled in accredited M.A. and Ph.D. programs. The journal is especially interested in work that engages with methods traditionally considered beyond the purview of archive-based historical scholarship, including anthropology, archaeology, and even biology. Each issue strives to offer a mix of traditional and interdisciplinary approaches. Manuscripts are to be carefully edited to follow the Chicago Manual of Style, 17th Edition, word processed using the latest version of Microsoft Word, and should not exceed 8000 words inclusive of footnotes. All manuscript submissions and other inquiries should be directed to the Editor-in-Chief via burkhardtrev@bsu.edu.

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Letter from the Conference Committee

As teachers of history, we often exhort our students to write for an imagined audience of smart, critical readers. Of course, a research paper may stem from a class assignment and, in that case, the professor will read the submission and issue a grade, but the process is more than a dialogue between student and teacher. In conducting research, the author interrogates sources and engages in a conversation with pre-existing scholarship. And the meritorious work of ambitious students will find its way to a larger audience, one way or another.

The Ball State University Student History Conference provides a venue for students to present their work to a larger audience of peers and mentors. For the 2018 conference, the Student History Conference Committee received submissions from undergraduate, MA, and PhD students from local and national institutions. Through a competitive selection process, 20 papers were accepted for presentation. Of those papers, three received awards and are now included in this volume of the Burkhardt Review.

Networks emerge as a shared theme across these three articles. In “Sex and the City: The Women’s Christian Temperance Union and the Mann Act of 1910,” Megan Vohs examines the public policy repercussions of the “white slavery” myth that captured the attention of moral crusaders in the United States at the turn of the twentieth century. Vohs shows how members of the Women’s Christian Temperance Union amplified public anxiety about racialized sexual predators victimizing white girls and white purity. Although the organization stood by a conservative understanding of the domestic sphere as the place for female activity, its members hardly shied away from efforts to promote legislation that impacted both private sexual choices and public perceptions and litigation.

Whereas Vohs focuses on an early twentieth-century organization intent on influencing and policing individual behavior in the United States, Isaac Melhaff brings our attention to networks of trade unionists and intelligence operatives in the Americas during the Cold War. Melhaff’s paper, “Subverting Solidarity: The Role of American Organized Labor in Pursuing United States Foreign Policy Objectives in Chile, 1961-1973,” won the award for Best Undergraduate Paper in World History. His research challenges the usefulness of the U.S.-World divide through a trans-national analysis of Cold War politics. The article traces the flow of money and people across organizations and borders as it explores the covert actions of the Central Intelligence Agency, in concert with the American labor union, to undermine worker solidarity in Latin America in the decade prior to the CIA-sponsored overthrow of Chile’s democratically elected, socialist president Salvador Allende.

Frank Lacopo's article, "A Tale of Two *Templa*: Sacred Spaces, Intercultural Encounter, and the First Jesuits in Italy and Japan," similarly tracks the cross-border activities of networked individuals, in this case the Jesuits who sought converts in Early Modern Europe and beyond. Lacopo breaks the mold of national and regional history by comparing Jesuit conversion houses in Kagoshima, Japan and in Rome. In doing so he not only illuminates the importance of physical spaces to conversion experiences, he also contributes to our understanding of the sixteenth century as an age of movement, displacement, and cross-cultural encounter.

These articles together show the power of networked individuals to effect historical change. The group is generally more powerful than the individual. Even the scholarly network wields more influence than the lone historian amidst her books and documents. It is thus our pleasure to see the imagined audiences of these fine works of scholarship transformed into a network of actual readers, yourself among them.

Simon Balto
Elizabeth Lawrence
Michael Wm. Doyle

**Sex and the City:
The Women's Christian Temperance Union and the Mann Act of 1910**

Megan Vohs
Ball State University

America in the dawn of the twentieth century was a place of increasing liberties and radical social change. While this seemed to be a good change for the younger generation as they were free to emigrate to large cities for work and entertainment, this only heightened the concerns of the older, more conservative crowd. Would American daughters be safe on their own in cities full of immigrants, where they knew no one who would protect them? This fear worked in conjunction with the hyper-exaggerated myth of white slavery to encourage the formation of purity groups that endeavored to save the moral fiber of young girls. The purity groups and their crusaders used the moral panic during this time to promote their own agendas and to extend their own political power.

The moral panic of 1907-1914 was the catalyst for massive social change in a newly modernizing America. An ever-increasing number of immigrants entering the United States led to concerns about the country's future, and American WASPs began to emphasize racial separatism and popular racist ideology. And, the most intense fears centered around the young white women entering the city who could potentially be victimized and sexually dominated by minorities or immigrant men. The popularity of captivity narratives drastically increased. They had existed up to that point in the form of Indian captivity narratives in which savage men captured young white women and had their way with them. The woman's moral fiber was ruined, and civilized society was damaged. These stories became more widespread and broadened to include captors of other races. Groups like the Women's Christian Temperance Union used the narratives to fuel the fear of white slavery in order to assert their influence and further their own agendas.

The Women's Christian Temperance Union in the early twentieth century sought to preserve what they viewed to be traditional American moral values through local action and national legislation as a response to the moral panic. Mostly remembered for being active in the purity crusades movement, the WCTU focused much of its attention on fighting the immorality and debauchery which flowed from liquor's availability in the growing cities. It called for a return to the conservative values which had served the country so well for so long and bought into the anti-white slavery crusades in order to extend its own influence. Members of the WCTU would push to change public policy, resulting in legislation such as the White Slave Traffic Act, otherwise known as Mann Act.

The White Slave Traffic Act of 1910 was the result of increased pressure on the political system to respond to perceptions of increased immorality in newly developed cities. At a time during which urban populations were skyrocketing, and young men and women were meeting in the cities with little to no parental supervision, puritanical sexual mores resurfaced in conservative circles. This led to a nationwide panic over the safety and morality of young white women, who supposedly could not defend themselves against the wit and diabolical nature of sexually aggressive men, especially African Americans and immigrants. The separate spheres ideology of this era argued that men belonged in the public areas of work and politics, while women belonged in the home. This meant that women were the ones expected to enforce established mores with regard to behavior and sex, especially in relation to young women.

This paper is not a full history of the origins of the Mann Act. Instead it will focus on the Women's Christian Temperance Union and its activism around white slavery and the Mann Act in order to more fully understand the motives behind the passage of the law. To a considerable degree, the WCTU was successful in using the public fears of the era to expand its own power and advance its own agenda. It is debatable whether or not the WCTU in particular had a lasting effect on American society, but

their advances in public policy certainly did. The WCTU used the moral panic of 1907-14 and the Mann Act in an attempt to reassert control over the domestic sphere which women naturally inhabited.

The Moral Panic

The Women's Christian Temperance Union and its primary leader, Frances Willard, framed the issues of sexual violence and white slavery in such a way that they both expressed and depended upon a depiction of immigrants and African-Americans as sexual predators.¹ In doing so they relied heavily on white slavery narratives and the fears which they elicited from the parents of country youth emigrating to the city. The fears expressed in these narratives shaped the public response to women's newfound freedoms in the city and their place in urban life. The captivity narratives and the racism they relied on were instrumental to the purity crusades during the moral panic and assisted the WCTU in reasserting conservative values. Both in public discussion and in public policy, the WCTU used the emerging fears of the moral panic to support their own ideology.

The immigrants who the WCTU depicted as sexual aggressors congregated in cities. This pattern played out primarily in the North, due to the massive influx of people looking for opportunity in the growing industrial cities. The stream of people moving into cities included increasing numbers of young, native, white women from the country, who would come to the city for recreation and employment opportunities.² Here was the origin of the "New Woman" of the modern age. Women in the new social spaces of the city, such as dance halls and ice cream parlors, were considered to be temptations to men, and many purity leaders considered those places to be 'dens of iniquity.' These new forms of entertainment were considered by many to be indecent. Religious organizations such as the WCTU were

¹ Brian Donovan, *White Slave Crusades: Race, Gender, and Anti-Vice Activism, 1887-1917* (Chicago, University of Illinois Press, 2006), 43.

² *Ibid.*, 29.

determined to abolish them.³ The dance hall itself was considered to be the source of white slavery and this in turn encouraged the development and dissemination of vice crusades, which shared with the white slave crusades, among other things, the desire to reform new social spaces.⁴ Renovations in courtship (ex. Dance halls, which allowed young men and women to mingle without parental supervision) in the modern cities helped cause the Victorian ideas of female passionlessness and moral purity to lose currency among the working-class.⁵

The myth of the black rapist and African American sexual aggression, which found a lasting home in the New South under Jim Crow, was central to the white slave narrative that informed WCTU thought.⁶ Stories of African American men raping white women became the cornerstone of, and a powerful rationale for, racial violence.⁷ Essentially, this myth fed into racial separatism and was prominent in the public thinking and propaganda of the time, which depicted savage black men forcefully attacking white women. Rebecca Felton, a leader in the Georgia chapter of the Women's Christian Temperance Union, repeatedly stressed lynching as a way to deter sexual violence against white women by black men.⁸ The WCTU considered African American men a sexual threat to native born whites.⁹ This belief, which relied heavily on Southern ideology regarding race relations, created the idea of the black man as a racialized villain within the Anglo-Saxon community. The image of the black rapist was central to the WCTU's campaign against sexual violence.¹⁰ The WCTU relied heavily on the idea that white, female purity was being threatened by black aggressors.

³ David J. Pivar, *Purity Crusade: Sexual Morality and Social Control, 1868-1900* (Westport: Greenwood Press, Inc.), 235.

⁴ Donovan, *White Slave Crusades*, 27.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 47.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 49.

Where Southern culture demonized black men as sexual aggressors, Northerners focused primarily on immigrant men. Anglo-Saxons considered Jews, Italians, and the Irish to be non-white races, meaning that they essentially occupied an intermediate status between white and black.¹¹ There was an obvious link between the ostracization of immigrants and the same treatment of Native Americans and African-Americans-- non-white races that native-born whites considered a threat to white society and to white women. White slave crusaders, those who sought the end of the trade, drew parallels between country and city and between native and foreign in an effort to impart the idea that foreigners were a sexual threat.¹² This was essential to the new narrative.

White slavery narratives, supposedly true stories about white women who were captured and forced into prostitution, echoed long-established Indian captivity narratives. In most of these stories, the victim was a young white woman who had been tricked or fooled. The villain was an immigrant man seeking to take advantage of the naive Anglo-Saxon youth.¹³ The innocence of country girls, and their susceptibility to being duped by salacious men, is a major facet of captivity literature.¹⁴ Writers romanticized captivity culture and their accounts were very firmly rooted in racist and anti-Semitic depiction of the “innocent girl and the alien villain.”¹⁵ It was a common Northern belief that “it was the foreigner who taught the American this dastardly business” and that “[t]he vilest practices are brought here from continental Europe.”¹⁶ These published accounts emphasized the dangers of city life and the threat of new immigrants. In addition, there was a massive emphasis on the equivalence between chattel slavery and white

¹¹ Donovan, *White Slave Crusades*, 15.

¹² *Ibid.*, 31.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 16.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 28.

¹⁵ Mark T. Connelly, *The Response to Prostitution in the Progressive Era* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 92.

¹⁶ F. Cordasco, *The White Slave Trade and the Immigrants: A Chapter in American Social History* (Detroit: Blaine/Ethridge Books, 1981), 34.; D.J. Langum, *Crossing Over the Line: Legislating Morality and the Mann Act* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 19.

slavery, typically drawn by purity leaders.¹⁷ Assistant US District Attorney Harry A. Parkin stated that “there is an actual, systematic and widespread traffic in girls as definite, as established, as mercenary and as fiendish as was the African slave trade in its blackest days.”¹⁸ This led to the trade later being referred to as the “black traffic in white girls.”¹⁹

Within the purity crusades community there was an intense focus on desexualizing black slavery in order to make the mythical white slave trade comparatively worse. In an essay on white slavery and prostitution, E.A. Bell claimed prostitution to be “the most hideous form of human slavery known in the world today,” completely ignoring the sexual slavery of the African slave trade.²⁰ Representative Mann himself once stated that “the white-slave traffic, while not so extensive, [was] much more horrible than any black-slave traffic ever was in the history of the world,” and Representative Coy of Indiana claimed it to be “a thousand times worse and more degrading... than any species of human slavery that ever existed in this country.”²¹ According to David Langum, the term “white slaves” was a reminder to middle-class America that it was not the “lowly Negro” that was being enslaved, but women of their own kind.²²

The discussion of white women being sexually dominated and exploited only referred to a certain type of white woman. During this time there was a prevailing hierarchy of white races that affected those who were in the target group ‘protected’ under the WCTU’s anti-prostitution crusades and later the Mann Act.²³ While the alleged focus of the Mann Act’s protection was all white women, the true emphasis was on native-born Anglo-Saxon women according to that historic definition of true whiteness.

¹⁷ Donovan, *White Slave Crusades*, 18.

¹⁸ Harry A. Parkin, “Practical Means of Protecting Girls,” in *Fighting the Traffic in Young Girls: or, War on the White Slave Trade*, ed. Ernest A. Bell (Chicago: G.S. Ball, 1910), 314-15.

¹⁹ Donovan, *White Slave Crusades*, 31.

²⁰ E.A. Bell, *Fighting the Traffic in Young Girls: Or, War on the White Slave Trade* (Chicago: G.S. Ball, 1910), 62.

²¹ D.J. Langum, *Crossing Over the Line: Legislating Morality and the Mann Act* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 43.

²² Langum, *Crossing Over the Line*, 27.

²³ Donovan, *White Slave Crusades*, 15.

Certainly the WCTU's primary leader, Frances Willard, was clear in what she believed, as she claimed that the world's foremost race was the Anglo-Saxons, even above other white ethnicities.²⁴ Willard used a more racially inclusive category to discuss the villains of sex crimes (non-Anglo-Saxon white men) and a more restrictive category to refer to the potential rescuers of women (Anglo-Saxon men).²⁵ The myth of white slavery was "instrumental in catalyzing anti-prostitution during the moral panic of the Progressive Era... by putting prostitution into a context familiar to Americans: White American women victimized sexually by non-white or non-WASP men."²⁶

The popular understanding of the effects of white slavery on American women tied back to the paternalism of American society. White slavery was a threat to womanhood and American virtue due to the fact that women who were trapped in forced prostitution were viewed by men as damaged goods.²⁷ US Defense Attorney Edward Sims stated that "[white slavery] includes those women and girls who, if given a fair chance, would in all probability have been good wives and mothers and useful citizens."²⁸ Sims also referred to the woman who had been involved in the trade as having a shattered moral fiber. They could not expect to live long. This outlook implies, of course, that women and girls who had been forced into the trade of prostitution were not able to be good wives, mothers, or citizens after they had been desecrated by salacious men. Human rights, support, and care were reserved for those women who had been trapped or tricked into the trade because, according to the distortion of patriarchal thought, they would have been married had they not been trafficked. Therefore they had

²⁴ Donovan, *White Slave Crusades*, 46.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 47.

²⁶ F. Grittner, *White Slavery: Myth, Ideology, and American Law* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1981), 9.

²⁷ Donovan, *White Slave Crusades*, 21.

²⁸ Edwin W. Sims, "Introduction," in *Fighting the Traffic in Young Girls: or, War on the White Slave Trade*, ed. Ernest A. Bell (Chicago: G.S. Ball, 1910), 14.

lost their opportunity to be “good women.”²⁹ Afterward, if these women were freed from the world of white slavery, they were no longer desirable.

The Women’s Christian Temperance Union

American purity crusaders were typically well-off white men and women with time on their hands. Many women involved in the movement were from temperance unions and were focused on reasserting Puritanical social norms amid a modernizing American society that had outgrown them. The new American city allowed purity organizations such as the Women’s Christian Temperance Union to claim a foothold in social politics by using the fears of the more conservative population to promote their agenda. In doing so, the WCTU used its temperance pledge to promote social purity and encourage a return to proper social mores. The white slave trade in particular was of interest to the WCTU, and their focus on it began a nationwide crusade to bring an end to forced prostitution and sexual slavery of the young, native white women seemingly most at risk in America’s new cities. Despite their focus on various issues, the WCTU at the turn of the twentieth century focused primarily on re-marking the social boundaries for America youth, specifically women’s behavior.

British social purity organizations were successful in their attempts to raise the age of consent by combating prostitution, and their successes inspired the American moral reform community.³⁰ The American response to British social purity organizations came primarily in the form of the Women’s Christian Temperance Union. The Women’s Christian Temperance Union, or WCTU, was a group that was originally organized in Hillsboro, Ohio, in December of 1873, and then at a national convention in Cleveland, Ohio in 1874. Still active today, it is a temperance organization that was among the first female groups aimed at social reform. Its membership pledge states: “I hereby solemnly promise, God helping me, to

²⁹ Kathleen Barry, *The Prostitution of Sexuality* (New York: New York University Press), 121.

³⁰ Donovan, *White Slave Crusades*, 19.

abstain from all distilled, fermented, and malt liquors, including wine, beer, and hard cider, and to employ all proper means to discourage the use of and traffic in the same.”³¹ Their primary inspiration was found in the Greek philosopher Xenophon, who argued for total abstinence from all things harmful. Temperance was one of their primary objectives, in addition to suffrage; many of their other crusades were pursued against behaviors that existed in conjunction with alcoholism and other vices.

The idea of the women's movement of crusaders was to reconstruct social and political institutions. Women were to purify every place they entered.³² The white slavery issue entered American public discourse at the encouragement of the WCTU and other American purity reformers.³³ Frances Willard and Katharine Bushnell, the WCTU's National Evangelist of the Department of Social Purity, were largely responsible for introducing the issue to the American reform community. Their concerns reflected the cultural climate of the era while also offering new ways to understand the connections between race and womanhood.³⁴ The WCTU justified its acquisition of political and social rights based on race-based sexual piety and morality, as well as the members' maternal responsibility to protect the Anglo-Saxon family.³⁵ The white slave myth centered on the danger prostitution posed to “the family life of the white race” which was “at stake in its purity, in its healthfulness, and in its fertility.”³⁶ Their interest in the white slavery crusades was in part ingrained racism, xenophobia, and a growing concern for the American populace that was straying from proper and established social boundaries.

Although the Women's Christian Temperance Union's main focuses were temperance and suffrage, its notable focuses on purity and anti-

³¹ “Why We Believe,” National Women's Christian Temperance Union, accessed 19 November 2017, www.wctu.org.

³² Pivar, *Purity Crusade*, 204.

³³ Donovan, *White Slave Crusades*, 19.

³⁴ Donovan, *White Slave Crusades*, 38.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 37.

³⁶ Connelly, *The Response to Prostitution in the Progressive Era*, 60.

prostitution work became representative of the group. The WCTU is most known for establishing a department for the suppression of prostitution; while this originally garnered few volunteers, the efforts of British purity leaders to outlaw “white slavery” gave American reformers cause for hope.³⁷ The use of white slavery as a political tool did not exclude it from the WCTU’s temperance ideology as the trade was often associated with the “immoral debauchery of drink.”³⁸ Since the WCTU was a national group with local branches, its most prominent missions differed from place to place; regardless, its chief aim (aside from suffrage) remained the abolition of alcohol.

Prostitution was one of many sins which flowed from the bottle, and as such was one of many fields in which the WCTU found an interest.³⁹ Their main focus in temperance allowed them to extend their sphere of influence to include other mainstream social issues. The WCTU’s “Do-Everything” policy led to the organization popularizing the white slavery issue and its call for crusades against prostitution since they could claim its direct relation to alcoholism and abuse.⁴⁰ The white slavery issue in particular resonated with the WCTU due to the connection between alcohol and new social areas of the city through which prostitution and white slavery would be born. By combating alcohol and the sins which it caused at the same time, the WCTU would be fully defending American society from both cause and effect. Additionally, the WCTU’s fight against white slavery gained them supporters who would further promote their primary cause and bring public opinion to the side of the purity crusaders.

While the WCTU pursued reform efforts to curtail white slavery and prostitution, the main issue which arose was the lack of consensus about the amount, and categorical definition of, white slavery. The WCTU and other purity reformers, despite the fact that none of them agreed on the most

³⁷ Grittner, *White Slavery*, 43.

³⁸ Barry, *The Prostitution of Sexuality*, 113.

³⁹ Grittner, *White Slavery*, 51.

⁴⁰ Donovan, *White Slave Crusades*, 44.

basic tenets of the white slave trade, agreed that the issue was caused by the cruelty of men to which the only solution was the moral influence of women.⁴¹ Willard claimed that the source of the problem lay primarily in non-white American residents, as she was worried about “immigrants carrying their pervasive immorality of their native lands to American shores.”⁴² The Americanized myth of white slavery, and the WCTU’s use of it as a scare tactic, can help explain in fuller detail the moral panic, because the myth contains a set of social themes in which the fears of many Americans were reflected: the dangers of immigration and immigrants, sexual violence against white women, and the changing social structure of the new cities.⁴³ The idea of forced prostitution was built on the enduring American racism that labeled the traffic “white” slavery and the paternalism that assumed that women were helpless like children and needed protection.⁴⁴ This built on the period-typical idea of women as those to be protected by men since women were near wholly reliant upon men for housing, status, and material upkeep.

As purity crusades continued on into the twentieth century they were dominated by two themes: the immoral destruction of innocent girls’ virtue and the sinful incontinence of men.⁴⁵ For groups like the WCTU, their call was for the purity and preservation of the family. The simplicity of the myth of white slavery proved a powerful tool for crusaders to advance their own agendas, and the myth itself would ignite a nationwide effort to repress prostitution. The development and articulation of the myth disclosed how Americans viewed women, sex, immigrants, and the city.⁴⁶ The critical reasons for the problem of white slavery were race, nationality, religion, poverty, and sexual ignorance.⁴⁷

⁴¹ Donovan, *White Slave Crusades*, 39.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 45.

⁴³ Grittner, *White Slavery*, 64.

⁴⁴ Barry, *The Prostitution of Sexuality*, 117.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 113.

⁴⁶ Grittner, *White Slavery*, 52.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 127.

The Mann Act

The perception that the problem of white slavery was widespread led to federal involvement through the White Slave Trade Act, otherwise known as the Mann Act. It forbade the transportation of a person across state lines or international boundaries for prostitution or other immoral purposes, which was a breakthrough for purity reformers.⁴⁸ While the 1910 law was originally intended to combat forced prostitution and immorality, it has been applied broadly over the years since its passage.⁴⁹ This paper's discussion of the White Slave Trade Act, or the Mann Act, will focus primarily on its enforcement in the early twentieth century after its passage. While it was intended to curb prostitution under the commerce clause, it was eventually used to regulate private behavior.

The definition of “[p]rostitution and the vague category of “immoral purpose” gave federal officials wide-ranging powers to combat what they considered deviant and immoral.”⁵⁰ The Mann Act was a very useful tool to the government in their effort to combat “the social evil.” However, the loose and inconsistent definition of the word “prostitution” according to Connelly “actually included any form of sexual behavior that violated the imperatives of civilized morality.”⁵¹ A 1978 amendment updated the definition of “transportation” and added protection for minors against sexual exploitation; a 1986 amendment protected minors further and replaced “debauchery” and “any other immoral purpose” with “any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense.”⁵² Despite its questionable enforcement and relative obscurity today, the Mann Act remains in place and is still used to convict men and women who engage in interstate transport of minors or prostitutes.

⁴⁸ Grittner, *White Slavery*, 133.

⁴⁹ Eric Weiner, “The Long, Colorful History of the Mann Act,” *NPR*, (2008).

⁵⁰ Cordasco, *The White Slave Trade and the Immigrants: A Chapter in American Social History*, 96.

⁵¹ Connelly, *The Response to Prostitution in the Progressive Era*, 18.

⁵² Weiner, “The Long, Colorful History of the Mann Act.”

The Mann Act was intended to allow legislators to combat forced prostitution and sexual slavery under the commerce clause. As one of the groups that influenced the creation and passage of the law, the Women's Christian Temperance Union saw in the Mann Act a useful tool through which purity crusaders would be able to combat the social evils which had grown in the city. The Mann Act itself was the first clearly successful case of the influence of purity crusaders on public policy, and many government officials supported the purity crusade's ideology. This response encouraged social reformers to continue their efforts to combat the new evils of a developing society on a variety of different levels, both locally, as they had been until that point, and nationally with their influence on public policy. Prior to the passage of the Mann Act, purity organizations such as the WCTU handled vices and immorality on a local level alone. With its passage, the Mann Act theoretically guaranteed the enforcement of stricter punishments for illegal acts which affected those within the private sphere in a public way.

The question of a woman's will during the establishment of the Mann Act was entirely excluded from consideration.⁵³ Women could willingly enter into sexual relationships and, if caught under the Mann Act, still be considered victims while their male counterparts would potentially be prosecuted. Only "the person [presumably male] who sent the woman across state lines was criminally liable."⁵⁴ Justice Lamar claimed in one Supreme Court case that "the Mann Act was aimed only at panderers and procurers and treated women as victims," and that "mere consent of the woman could not change her statutory status from victim to wrongdoer."⁵⁵ Her consent was "immaterial as a defense."⁵⁶ Where originally the law

⁵³ Barry, *The Prostitution of Sexuality*, 115.

⁵⁴ Cordasco, *The White Slave Trade and the Immigrants*, 96.

⁵⁵ Michael Conant, "Federalism, the Mann Act, and the Imperative to Decriminalize Prostitution." *Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy* 5, no. 4 (1996): 110.

⁵⁶ Grittner, *White Slavery*, 96.

sought to repress sexual slavery, it became almost expressly used by legislators to regulate sexual behavior. Section 2 of the Mann Act states:

That any person who shall knowingly transport or cause to be transported, or aid or assist in obtaining transportation for, or in transporting, in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or in the District of Columbia, any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose, or with the intent and purpose to induce, entice, or compel such woman or girl to become a prostitute or to give herself up to debauchery, or to engage in any other immoral practice; or who shall knowingly procure or obtain, or cause to be procured or obtained, or aid or assist in procuring or obtaining, any ticket or tickets, or any form of transportation or evidence of the right thereto, to be used by any woman or girl in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or the District of Columbia, in going to any place for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose, or with the intent or purpose on the part of such person to induce, entice, or compel her to give herself up to the practice of prostitution, or to give herself up to debauchery, or any other immoral practice, whereby any such woman or girl shall be transported in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or the District of Columbia, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment of not more than five years, or by both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court.⁵⁷

The ambiguous language of the original act made it very open to interpretation, and suggests the extent to which the purity movement had succeeded in becoming the lawful guardians of female virtue.⁵⁸

Based on the results of several court cases in which the Supreme Court outlined the intersection of its power and what they claimed to be “immoral activities,” it is obvious that the Mann Act more and more came to be suggestive of policing sexual mores. Seagle claimed, as of the written date of his article, that the Department of Justice had estimated that only about 2 percent of Mann Act cases prosecuted involved noncommercial

⁵⁷ *Coercion and Enticement Act of 1910*, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422 et seq. (1910).

⁵⁸ Barry, *The Prostitution of Sexuality*, 115.

sexual vice.⁵⁹ However, the cases involving noncommercial vice were, more often than not, used to control sexual behavior. Many cases involved married women having affairs or abandoning their children with their husbands to run off with a new beau, individuals who were polygamists or who had mistresses or concubines, and young men and women engaging in the newfound sexual freedom of the big city.⁶⁰ Sexuality was seen as a potentially destructive force, something which required the use of government legislation to combat.⁶¹ As stated by David Langum:

It cannot be said with honesty that noncommercial and nonconsensual violations of the Mann Act ever were prosecuted primarily with a view of addressing the threat of unwanted pregnancies or venereal disease. At least in the years between 1913 and 1928, it was representative of American puritanism, largely religiously inspired, opposed broadly to sexuality outside of marriage, that was at work. It was a demand that people be good.⁶²

While the WCTU did not hold women responsible for entering the trade of prostitution, the prevailing miscommunication regarding what prostitution *was* meant that oftentimes women who willingly engaged in sex were considered victims.⁶³ Where some legislators viewed prostitution as a strict exchange of sexual favors for money, others viewed it as any sexual act outside of marriage; some women prosecuted for prostitution were known as “charity girls,” women who would engage in sexual relations and receive favors (such as gifts, vacation trips, etc.) in exchange. The category of “charity girl” also included women who engaged in sexual relations with men for the sole purpose of pleasure and sexual gratification; these women were also known as “clandestine prostitutes.”⁶⁴ All were likely to be considered victims.

⁵⁹ William Seagle, “The Twilight of the Mann Act,” *American Bar Association Journal* 55, no. 7 (1969).

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 644.

⁶¹ Connelly, *The Response to Prostitution in the Progressive Era*, 8-9.

⁶² Langum, *Crossing Over the Line: Legislating Morality and the Mann Act*, 7.

⁶³ Donovan, *White Slave Crusades*, 48.

⁶⁴ Langum, *Crossing Over the Line: Legislating Morality and the Mann Act*.

The Mann Act has for decades been an interesting case study on the response of social conservatives to the sudden increase in sociosexual liberals-the youth willing to engage in sexuality activity outside of a committed relationship. Its intent was focused on the conservation of traditional, and acceptable, behavior but its rhetoric allowed for both abuse and neglect. Only certain white women were protected under the law, and among those who were, many were not victims but willing partners. An alarming number of cases under the Mann Act focused on relationships between black men and white women, willing as they were, while a very small percentage of cases actually dealt with forced prostitution. In a sense, the Mann Act did in fact continue to preserve American sexual morals, but not the morals which were openly discussed. Instead the letter of the law was pursued rather than the spirit, and the result was a piece of legislation under which America experienced something like a sexual witch hunt. Specific sexual mores were to be demonized, among them the persecution of interracial relationships and the suppression of the newfound sexual freedom of the cities.

The myth of white slavery allowed the WCTU and other purity reformers to reassert their control over women and their sexuality, which was viewed as being within the private sphere-- meaning that it was to be controlled by women. Using white slavery, reformers re-marked moral boundaries that were being trampled on as Americans rushed to embrace the modern era and all of the changes that accompanied it.⁶⁵ The new cities and the “new women” who would inhabit them were unspooling that tightly wound feminine control over the home, and the new dens of iniquity and increasingly salacious nature of immigrant men proved that the matriarchs were needed to protect those women under their care. Cities saw an influx of foreign immigrants and native drifters, particularly young white women from the country for whom the city was a new place of unprecedented freedom. The city was a haven for these women, but for their parents and

⁶⁵ Grittner, *White Slavery: Myth, Ideology, and American Law*, 129.

the purity crusaders of the era, cities represented the seedy underbelly of American society, where young men and women went about unsupervised and away from prying eyes.

Here was the perfect place for the Women's Christian Temperance Union to step in as those benevolent matriarchs and to reassert their control over the modern woman. American paternalism assured that societal expectation of the older generation to protect young women from the dangers of the city and from themselves; in doing so the crusaders harkened back to the earlier days of Puritanical social values. Men and women of the older generations, or of the more conservative crowd, feared the newfound sexual freedoms in American cities and as such promoted the Mann Act as a way in which to control immorality. The government was a tool which could, with the aid of purity crusaders, fight against this immorality and re-establish proper social and sexual mores. The Mann Act itself was the first step toward the society which the WCTU envisioned, where women stayed properly within the home, or at least within their proper sociosexual roles, and men were moral. Abolishing alcohol was an important part of the process, and while the Women's Christian Temperance Union sought that end they would continue to monitor the behavior of men and women in the modern American city. While the WCTU has yet to succeed in the long run in the promotion of temperance or proper morality, their influence over public policy and morality in the era of the Mann Act is apparent.

The broader implications of the Women's Christian Temperance Union and their purity crusade are interesting to consider, to say the least. Self-elected monitors of "proper" morality, the WCTU and their like-minded followers encouraged public policy which would support their own ideology and promote a return to Puritanical values. Where some historians have argued for the beneficial influence that the WCTU and the Mann Act provided twentieth century America, a comparable number have argued that they were harmful to the still-developing social character of American cities and to women's freedoms. Regardless, it is apparent that the WCTU and the

Mann Act did succeed in controlling women's roles for a considerable period of time during the early twentieth century. One thing is certain: the Women's Christian Temperance Union was a driving force behind the reconsideration of American values, and its influence extended to public policy in ways that are still in place today.

Subverting Solidarity: The Role of American Organized Labor in Pursuing United States Foreign Policy Objectives in Chile, 1961-1973

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“The pressing need in Latin America is to promote the middle-class revolution as speedily as possible... If the possessing classes of Latin America make the middle-class revolution impossible, they will make a ‘workers-and-peasants’ revolution inevitable... they will guarantee a Castro or a Perón.”

– Arthur M. Schlesinger, Special Assistant to President Kennedy¹

In the formative days of a nascent Kennedy presidency, Arthur M. Schlesinger revealed – perhaps unwittingly – the core issue that would define United States policy toward Chile for the next two decades. The ostensible goals of that policy were not markedly different from those pursued elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere or, indeed, the rest of the world: expelling Communism from neutral or U.S.-influenced regions, promoting favorable economic environments for U.S. financial interests, and showcasing American military and ideological superiority. Exacerbating and preying upon existing socioeconomic class tensions in Chilean society to further these goals were not, however, commonly deployed tactics. They display a level of sophistication and societal integration not always seen in Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operations. U.S. covert action in Chile is an example of a long-term, forward-thinking strategy that does not often arise in the CIA’s playbook; a strategy in which the CIA was content to bide their time for over a decade while slowly and meticulously developing a social and institutional foothold in the country. Perhaps their most critical tools for constructing this type of infrastructure were labor unions or, more specifically, American organized labor working parallel to and sometimes in concert with Chilean trade unions. By spending

¹ Arthur M. Schlesinger, *Report to the President on Latin American Mission: February 12-March 3, 1961* (Washington: March 10, 1961), 12.

years subverting these labor unions and laying the groundwork for a future war of ideology, the CIA pried open existing inter-class fissures and used them as inroads to enforce U.S. foreign policy objectives in the period preceding the overthrow of Salvador Allende.

The academic literature concerning the nature of foreign policy in the labor movement has evolved considerably over the last half century. The most generally acceptable theory is that interest in foreign affairs is inherent within the labor movement, but American organized labor worked in tandem with the U.S. government to achieve mutually desirable aims.² That is, the American Federation of Labor – Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) – the domestic institution through which the CIA funneled their labor influence in Chile – developed foreign policy objectives independent from the government for the benefit of their members and the furtherance of their general mission. The government did not define AFL-CIO foreign policy but, since the two policies often coincided, the CIA worked through the organization to conduct its work covertly – work that benefitted both institutions. An excellent example of this is articulated by the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD); “both the AFL-CIO and the State Department favor strengthening democratic labor unions in Latin America... which can redistribute income and bring about structural reforms in the ownership of the means of production.”³ This was meant to be a retort against an accusation that the AIFLD is little more than a tool operated by the State Department to promote its short-term goals. Instead of convincingly disproving the accusation, the AIFLD inadvertently provided an example that can be interpreted to support the accusation’s truth. None other than “Assistant Secretary of State Charles A. Meyer said that the American Institute for Free Labor Development is a reflection of the United States policy of cooperation ‘with the free and democratic trade unions of

² Kim Scipes, *AFL-CIO’s Secret War Against Developing Country Workers: Solidarity or Sabotage?* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010), xxi.

³ American Institute for Free Labor Development, *Analysis of Pamphlet on AIFLD by Fred Hirsch* (April 22, 1974), 2.

the hemisphere.”⁴ Direct CIA funding of AFL-CIO efforts began long before the effort in Chile. The AFL (before merging with the CIO) established the Free Trade Union Committee to oppose Communist efforts, primarily in Europe. The scope of the AFL’s involvement on the continent after World War II involved, among other things, participating in electoral manipulation in France and Italy, an endeavor funded and directed by the CIA.⁵ In Latin America, AFL/CIA operations initially included the *Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores* (ORIT), an anti-Communist regional trade union that played a role in the CIA effort to overthrow Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz in 1954 before being declared effectively defunct after the successful Cuban revolution.⁶ ORIT’s influence in the region continued to wane due to being perceived by Latin Americans as a subsidiary of the U.S. State Department after its role in the coups of both Arbenz in Guatemala and João Goulart in Brazil. The need for a reliable, competent operational arm in Latin America led the AFL-CIO to form the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD).⁷

The AIFLD was formed in late 1961, ostensibly to be a training institute for Latin American union officials. At the organization’s ten-year anniversary in 1972, six prominent Latin American and Caribbean labor leaders anticlimactically declared the AIFLD’s mission to be “bread, peace, and liberty for all in the Americas and the Caribbean.”⁸ What the AIFLD lacked in convincing public relations it made up for in bureaucratic infrastructure; it removed the need for the AFL-CIO or CIA to divide their temporal and monetary resources between myriad international

⁴ American Institute for Free Labor Development, *The AIFLD Report* 7, no. 12 (December 1969), 1.

⁵ Scipes, *AFL-CIO’s Secret War Against Developing Country Workers*, 31.

⁶ Heraldo Muñoz and Carlos Portales, *Una Amistad Esquiva: Las Relaciones de Estados Unidos y Chile* (Santiago: Pehuén Editores, 1987), 56. Serafino Romualdi, *Presidents and Peons: Recollection of a Labor Ambassador in Latin America* (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1967), 241-245. Scipes, *AFL-CIO’s Secret War Against Developing Country Workers*, 32.

⁷ U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Survey of the Alliance for Progress: Labor Policies and Programs*, July 15, 1968, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., 1968, S. Rep. 87-782, 9.

⁸ American Institute for Free Labor Development, *The AIFLD Report* 10, no. 6 (June 1972), 1.

organizations or trade unions in foreign countries.⁹ In this way, the AIFLD served as a clearinghouse of sorts; a one-stop shop for grassroots infiltration and propaganda in Latin America. As some scholars have argued, it has also served as a covert-operational arm of the AFL-CIO.¹⁰ By 1972, the AIFLD had trained over 190,000 Latin American labor leaders including 9,000 in Chile and 79 Chileans at U.S. facilities.¹¹ This vast network of potential propagandists in a region increasingly susceptible to Communist influence quickly caught the attention of the U.S. government; early in the 1960s, the AIFLD was already “becoming the organizational basis for American labor’s participation in the Alliance [for Progress].”¹² The concrete link between the CIA, AFL-CIO, and AIFLD was the cast of characters that served in AFL-CIO and AIFLD leadership positions, most of whom boasted prior or concurrent employment by various branches of the U.S. foreign policy apparatus, including the CIA.

Julius Mader, author of an extensive dossier allegedly exposing over 3,000 CIA agents, claims that the CIA, State Department, Peace Corps, Agency for International Development (USAID) and other foreign affairs branches integrated their personnel regularly. He estimates that approximately 2,200 active agents were working abroad under official diplomatic pretenses.¹³ Forty-four of these agents had worked in Chile by 1968, still five years before the coup to unseat Allende. Mader identified George Meany¹⁴ and Emmanuel Boggs¹⁵ as key CIA operatives working

⁹ Fred Hirsch “The Labour Movement: Penetration Point for U.S. Intelligence and Transnationals” in Fred Hirsch and Richard Fletcher, eds., *The CIA and the Labour Movement* (Nottingham: Spokesman Books, 1977), 7.

¹⁰ Dan Kurtzman, “Lovestone’s Cold War: The AFL-CIO Has Its Own CIA,” *The New Republic* (June 25, 1966), 21.

¹¹ American Institute for Free Labor Development, *Annual Progress Report: 1962-1972 – A Decade of Worker-to-Worker Cooperation* (Washington: AIFLD, 1972), 1. Hirsch, “The Labor Movement,” 11.

¹² American Institute for Free Labor Development, *AIFLD: Twenty-Five Years of Solidarity with Latin American Workers* (Washington: AIFLD, 1987), 2.

¹³ Julius Mader, *Who’s Who in CIA: A Biographical Reference Work on 3,000 Officers of the Civil and Military Branches of the Secret Services of the USA in 120 Countries* (Berlin: Julius Mader, 1968), 10-11.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 354.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 63.

within the labor movement; Meany as AFL-CIO president and Boggs as a rather transient, shadowy figure who held multiple leadership positions in local and national labor unions before becoming AIFLD's director in Chile. One of Boggs' protégés, Leon Vilarin, is credited with leading the 1972 Chilean truckers' strike that began as a group of mine supervisors striking to protest the nationalization of the Kennecott and Anaconda copper mines – both American-owned and AIFLD members.¹⁶ The mine strike itself owed its existence to Julio Bazán, a mine administrator and fascist who called for “an authoritarian government” to execute a “massive massacre of Communists and leftists.”¹⁷ Bazán worked in concert with the National Command for Gremio Defense, a confederation of myriad professional unions funded by the AIFLD with CIA funds.¹⁸

The first person to suggest the formation of the AIFLD, Joseph A. Beirne, served as President of the Communications Workers of America – an AFL-CIO affiliate – and was a member of Postal, Telephone, and Telegraph International (PTTI), a union identified as having received CIA funds.¹⁹ Beirne was also Secretary-Treasurer of the AIFLD. The communications unions became crucially important in 1962, when AIFLD executive director William C. Doherty, Jr., a regional representative of PTTI, attempted to seize control of them after their leadership called for the nationalization of the American-owned International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, also a CIA collaborator.²⁰ Doherty, for his own part, was the figurehead of corporate interests in the AIFLD. He famously claimed that the AIFLD executive board – bursting at the seams with business leaders – showed the benefits of worker-executive cooperation and encouraged the decline in hostility toward U.S. corporate interests

¹⁶ Hirsch, “The Labour Movement,” 27.

¹⁷ North American Congress on Latin America, “Collision Course: Chile Before the Coup,” *NACLA's Latin America and Empire Report* 7, no. 8 (October, 1973), 16-25.

¹⁸ Hirsch, “The Labour Movement,” 26.

¹⁹ Ronald Radosh, *American Labor and United States Foreign Policy* (New York: Random House, 1969), 419.

²⁰ Hirsch, “The Labour Movement,” 19. Committee on Foreign Relations, *Survey of the Alliance for Progress*, 10.

throughout Latin America.²¹ This is widely regarded as a Freudian slip of sorts, revealing as a possible ulterior motive for the AIFLD's existence the goal of dispelling "hostility of Latin American workers toward U.S. corporations."²² These links to business leaders and government agents are key to understanding the monetary flows within and through the AIFLD.

As with most government-business joint enterprises, one need only follow the money to find the influence. The paradigm of AIFLD operations is that of a tripartite alliance: government, labor, and business.²³ The funding records between the State Department and the AIFLD are particularly curious. The State Department openly provides the majority of AIFLD funds "when labor's goals and U.S. foreign policy goals coincide."²⁴ However, much of this funding comes in the form of large, vaguely written proposals that allow the AIFLD to use the money for initiatives that could not be signed off on or plausibly denied by the State Department.²⁵ Some scholars have surmised that the combination of large sums of money for which the AIFLD is held only minimally accountable and weak State Department control of the AIFLD has resulted in a foreign policy essentially being crafted by the AFL-CIO.²⁶ Funds for the AIFLD have increased each year even in the presence of documented "deficiencies in financial matters, such as misappropriation of funds... cash shortages... overdrafts... and lack of accounting records."²⁷ These fly-by-night accounting practices are characteristic of CIA activity; accounts payable are kept in only very general terms when the object of the expenditures is extralegal or publicly damning. A common government conduit of CIA funds and project contracts is the USAID, a government agency which also came to use the AIFLD as an

²¹ William C. Doherty, Jr., "AIFLD and Latin Labor Building a Modern Society," *AFL-CIO Free Trade Union News* (July 1966), 3.

²² Radosh, *American Labor and United States Foreign Policy*, 418.

²³ *Ibid.*, 416. Committee on Foreign Relations, *Survey of the Alliance for Progress*, 16.

²⁴ AIFLD, *Analysis of Pamphlet on AIFLD by Fred Hirsch*, 2.

²⁵ Hirsch, "The Labour Movement," 16.

²⁶ Radosh, *American Labor and United States Foreign Policy*, 433.

²⁷ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, *Annual Report of the Comptroller General of the United States for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1968*, January 3, 1969, 91st Cong., 1st sess., H. Doc. 14, 189-191. Radosh, *American Labor and United States Foreign Policy*, 16.

operational arm for many of its social welfare projects. In fact, of the \$15.4 million in total labor expenditures by the USAID, two-thirds finds its way into the pockets of the AIFLD.²⁸ By 1967, 89% of AIFLD funds had come from USAID contracts.²⁹ Using these USAID-facilitated procurement methods, the U.S. foreign policy apparatus has harnessed the AIFLD as its primary mechanism “for supplying technical assistance – education and training and social projects – to Latin American trade unions.”³⁰ The CIA/USAID link extends to Chile as well; the USAID designated to the CIA responsibility for representing their interests in business transactions and complementing their programs in the countryside via the *Confederación Nacional Campesina*, a national trade union of rural workers and farmers.³¹

The CNC was not the only trade union subverted by the AIFLD/CIA cooperative. The AIFLD attempted to form a confederation of labor unions to parallel the *Central Única de Trabajadores* (CUT), the Marxist-oriented confederation of blue-collar labor unions. The product was the *Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores* (CNT). The CNT failed early on and was not revived until the junta took power in 1973, but it amassed a small but significant following that would prove critical to future AIFLD operations in Chile, including COMACH, a union of maritime workers.³² The interlocking directorates characteristic of AIFLD operations are seen in the CNT as well; its president, Bernardo Ibañez, moved to Washington to become the AIFLD’s Professor of International Labor³³ and two of its founders, Hector Durán and Ernesto Miranda, came to be employed by the AIFLD in Chile.³⁴

²⁸ Committee on Foreign Relations, *Survey of the Alliance for Progress*, 6.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 11.

³⁰ Committee on Foreign Relations, *Survey of the Alliance for Progress*, 9.

³¹ Eduardo Labarca Goddard, *Chile Invadido: Reportaje a la Intromisión Extranjera* (Santiago: Editora Austral, 1968), 182.

³² Hirsch, “The Labour Movement,” 19.

³³ American Institute for Free Labor Development, *The AIFLD Report* 1, no. 5 (November 1963), 2.

³⁴ Labarca Goddard, *Chile Invadido*, 179.

Completing the tripartite alliance were private business interests. George Meany submitted to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations a list of 78 private corporations and businesses that contributed money to the AIFLD from 1962-1968.³⁵ Several of these, including United Fruit Company and ITT, are known CIA collaborators. In addition, as previously referenced, the AIFLD brought in undisclosed sums of money from private foundations to found and maintain the organizations. Many of these organizations are cross-referenced by *The New York Times* in a partial list of institutions cooperating with the CIA and the subsidiaries funded by those institutions.³⁶ This is the template of AIFLD/CIA operations in Latin America in the 1960s. Working through this infrastructure, the CIA could tap into existing tensions between Chilean socioeconomic classes and manipulate them for their own gain.

By the time Allende won a presidential election in 1970, these class tensions had been festering for over fifty years. Throughout the twentieth century, the Chilean economy was generally defined by typical, three-class structure. The small upper class was wealthy but unable to achieve exorbitant wealth because American corporations dominated the economy; the middle class was sizable but not overwhelmingly large and was unable to develop in terms of wealth; and the vast lower class was exceptionally poor by comparison and bore the brunt of all economic shocks.³⁷ When Allende was elected in 1970, the bottom 50% of the population accounted for only 12% of Chile's total consumption.³⁸ Chilean political history from 1920-1964 was a crucible of power struggle between these classes, with each subsequent election showcasing the gradual decay of the upper class oligarchy in favor of the middle and, eventually, lower classes. The exact

³⁵ U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *American Institute for Free Labor Development: Hearing with George Meany, President, AFL-CIO*, August 1, 1969, 91st Cong., 1st sess., H. Doc. 33-948, 21.

³⁶ "Units Linked With CIA," *The New York Times* (February 19, 1967), 27.

³⁷ *ITT-CIA Subversion in Chile: A Case Study in US Corporate Intrigue in the Third World* (Nottingham: Spokesman Books, 1972), 5-8.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 5.

development of this power struggle is beyond the scope of this paper, but the argument demands a brief chronological overview. Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, the *latifundium* system of rural wealth stratification caused the unprotected *campesino* (peasant) class to be controlled by wealthier landowners.³⁹ Dissatisfaction with this system, among other things, motivated the 1920 election of Arturo Alessandri, who challenged the landowning elites by showcasing the rise to power of the middle class.⁴⁰ Following economic collapse, Alessandri was followed by two decades of political upheaval before stability returned to Chile and his son, Jorge Alessandri, was elected president in 1958. Alessandri the younger was not the middle-class champion as was his father; his coalition was that of landowners and businessmen, some small entrepreneurs and merchants, and middle class members who feared social change lest Allende be elected.⁴¹ Alessandri's popularity precipitously declined during his tenure and he was replaced in 1964 with Eduardo Frei amid calls for structural reform. Frei was elected by a largely middle-class vote; the lower class sided with Allende, who saw a marked increase in support compared to 1958.⁴² Frei enacted reforms but did not engage in economic revolution, piquing the interests of the lower class but leaving them disappointed.⁴³ This disappointment finally drove the electorate to Allende, who won the presidency in 1970 over a deeply unpopular Christian Democrat candidate and the scandal-plagued Alessandri, capping the rise to power of the Chilean lower classes and fulfilling Arthur Schlesinger's prophesy to President Kennedy made nine years prior.

This is the environment in which the AIFLD and CIA set their operations in the pre-coup years. The most important of these operations was

³⁹ Armando Uribe, *The Black Book of American Intervention in Chile* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975), 18.

⁴⁰ Lois Hecht Oppenheim, *Politics in Chile: Socialism, Authoritarianism, and Market Democracy* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2007), 11.

⁴¹ Oppenheim, *Politics in Chile*, 22.

⁴² U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, *Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973*, 1975, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 5.

⁴³ Oppenheim, *Politics in Chile*, 26.

education. Traditional AIFLD education programs (two to three months in length) originally took place only at their facility in Front Royal, Virginia, but shorter programs were eventually established at AIFLD outposts in many Latin American countries, including Chile in the late 1960s. Meany claimed the Front Royal courses were “designed to train trade union teachers and technicians who can take their skills back to their respective countries to train other trade unionists.”⁴⁴ The hope was that those receiving the training would return to their unions and instill in their comrades the information with which they had been imbued in Front Royal (or in their respective countries’ “in-house” program), thereby creating a propagandist pyramid scheme of sorts. The raw numbers exhibit what appears to be a massive influence; by 1977, through these domestic and international programs, the AIFLD had trained 243,668 unionists in Latin American and the Caribbean alone, 1,600 of them in U.S. facilities. As previously referenced, approximately 9,000 Chileans were trained in these types of programs.⁴⁵ Scholars have yet been unable to reliably estimate how many Chileans were affected through secondary or tertiary interactions with these program veterans. These American-educated unionists provided the AIFLD and CIA with vast numbers of ideological subordinates already embedded within the very institutions necessary for exploiting Chilean class tensions. They had no need to forcefully insert their operatives into Chilean society; they had created a veritable army of ideological sleeper cells. They had only to organize their sympathizers into an infrastructure which they could activate and work within when necessary.

This infrastructure was the Chilean Confederation of Professionals (CUPROCH), formed in May 1971.⁴⁶ CUPROCH, in and of itself, was not a union; it shared members with other unions and was more of a

⁴⁴ Committee on Foreign Relations, *American Institute for Free Labor Development*, 7.

⁴⁵ Fred Hirsch, *An Analysis of Our AFL-CIO Role in Latin America or, Under the Covers with the CIA* (San Jose, CA: Fred Hirsch, 1974), 33. Hirsch, “The Labour Movement,” 11.

⁴⁶ Thomas F. O’Brien, *Making the Americas: The United States and Latin America from the Age of Revolutions to the Era of Globalization* (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 2007), 255.

confederation of like-minded workers from across diverse industries.⁴⁷ It was, in essence, the AFL-CIO's second attempt at a confederation of workers after the CNT failed many years prior. It was also the administrative core of the National Command for Gremio Defense, the group responsible for organizing the truckers' strike that brought the Chilean economy to a screeching halt in August 1972. That strike was a significant step for the CIA in constructing an environment conducive to promoting a change of Chilean leadership.⁴⁸ In a classic example of interlocking personnel, the Secretary of the National Command for Gremio Defense, Jorge Guerrero, was one of the 79 Chileans trained at Front Royal.⁴⁹ He, along with Julio Etcheverry and José Estrada of ORIT, personify the AIFLD's efforts to place former students in union leadership positions in which they can be of direct service to the AIFLD and CIA; Etcheverry was the first director of the AIFLD Chilean program and Estrada served as a paid operative for the AIFLD.⁵⁰ Upon the installation of the junta, no union meetings were allowed in Chile save for those among the 26 groups connected to the AIFLD and CUPROCH.⁵¹ It is possible General Pinochet's government allowed CUPROCH to continue operations simply because its members largely joined the fight against Allende, but the connection between the CIA-supported junta and AIFLD/CUPROCH operations is convincing.

Applying this operational knowledge to the issue of class tension, a divide begins to emerge between blue- and white-collar unions and the political influences under which they existed. As Schlesinger predicted, the "workers-and-peasants revolution" was inevitable and culminated in the election of Allende. Attempting to subvert these lower-class workers would have been fruitless for the AFL-CIO and CIA; their support for Allende had

⁴⁷ Hirsch, "The Labour Movement," 26.

⁴⁸ Peter Kornbluh, *The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability* (New York: The New Press, 2003), 110.

⁴⁹ American Institute for Free Labor Development, *The AIFLD Report* 11, no. 8 (October 1973), 6.

⁵⁰ American Institute for Free Labor Development, *The AIFLD Report* 1, no. 4 (October 1963), 5. AIFLD, *The AIFLD Report* 11, no. 8, 6. Hirsch, "The Labour Movement," 15.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 31.

become nearly unwavering by 1970 and the confederation of unions with which most of them allied themselves, the CUT, was Marxist-leaning and firmly pro-Allende.⁵² The logical strategy, therefore, was to focus their energies on non-CUT unions and professional workers which, in this case, generally meant the white-collar, middle- to upper-class workers who had consistently opposed Allende in his bids for the presidency. Of course, not all CUPROCH members fit this definition, but certainly enough to justify the generalization did comply. The AFL-CIO tacitly admitted in 1974 that CUPROCH was composed of wealthier, white-collar workers; “CUPROCH is composed mainly of technicians and professional personnel, who have as much right to organize as do blue-collar workers.”⁵³ The implication, then, is that CUPROCH was not composed of blue-collar workers, otherwise the distinction would be not only unnecessary but also misleading.

A prime example of this dichotomy is the LAN Chile airline strike of October 1972, which occurred roughly concurrently with the truckers’ strike.⁵⁴ About 90% of LAN Chile employees were represented by SEOLAN, a CUT-affiliated union, while only 10% were affiliated with CUPROCH. This 10%, however, were the pilots and “professional” workers who occupied the more highly-paid, white-collar positions. Not only was the LAN Chile strike not supported by the vast majority of employees, but it had to be forced upon them by subversive means. The AIFLD and CUPROCH used three of their LAN Chile employees to organize a pilots’ strike in which they flew LAN Chile planes into the Santiago Air Force base, thereby preventing their commercial use.⁵⁵ This was a case of a comparatively small number of professional workers using their power and resources (and CUPROCH/AIFLD affiliation) to exact an effect, disregarding the protests of the blue-collar masses. This is where the rubber meets the road; quite

⁵² *The AIFLD Report*, 20.

⁵³ AIFLD, *Analysis of Pamphlet on AIFLD by Fred Hirsch*, 8.

⁵⁴ Salvatore Bizzarro, *Historical Dictionary of Chile*, 3rd ed. (Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press, 2005), li.

⁵⁵ Hirsch, “The Labour Movement,” 29.

literally, in the case of the LAN Chile strike. After more than a decade of patience and coalition-building, the AIFLD and CIA were finally able to utilize the ideological army they had been amassing since 1961, turning the battle for control of Chilean organized labor into a proxy war over the future of the Allende administration.

Allende leveraged the Marxist-leaning CUT throughout the latter portion of his presidency to pursue his political objectives; namely, staying in office. Examples abound from both before and after the coup that exhibit the close ties between Allende and CUT-affiliated, generally blue-collar industries. Fearing the impending military uprising, Allende called on workers to “take to [the] streets” to defend his government on June 29, 1973.⁵⁶ Like a well-oiled machine, CUT mobilized its workforce, issuing a “call for ‘total mobilization of workers’ to defend” the government and “appeal[ing] for international solidarity from other workers organizations.”⁵⁷ CUT even worked directly with the media arm of Allende’s political party, *Unidad Popular* (UP), to broadcast and advertise pro-government and pro-labor messages over UP-controlled Radio Candalaria. One of these was a call to attend a rally in support of Allende on August 28. The only announced speaker was CUT Secretary General Rolando Calderón and the slogan of the rally was to be “no to a coup and in defense of the constitutional government.”⁵⁸ On September 12, the day after the coup, CUT took to Radio Candalaria once more to implore workers and *campesinos* to “occupy factories and farms” while awaiting further orders from CUT, which had seemingly turned into a paramilitary command center

⁵⁶ United States Embassy, Santiago to Secretary of State, *No to Dialogue?*, July 12, 1973, 2, http://search.proquest.com/dnsa_cl/docview/1679138900/FCDA45BA456B43CFPQ/1?accountid=465.

⁵⁷ United States Embassy, Santiago to Secretary of State, *Still Waiting*, September 10, 1973, 24, http://search.proquest.com/dnsa_cl/docview/1679139556/DCF475D95A0F4A8FPQ/1?accountid=465.

⁵⁸ United States Embassy, Santiago to Secretary of State, *Merchants Strike Again*, August 28, 1973, 2, http://search.proquest.com/dnsa_cl/docview/1679140021/1F3F8D277E6141F2PQ/1?accountid=465.

by this point. In a moment of unintended and limited comic relief, the same radio broadcast kindly asked the soldiers to refrain from shouting at the workers.⁵⁹ After the coup had concluded and Allende found dead, examples continued to arise that evidenced lower-class union support for a Socialist government in Chile. Almost immediately, CUT was declared illegal by the junta, corroborating suspicions that it was behind the blue-collar worker demonstrations in support of Allende.⁶⁰ The junta also took special measures to pacify and placate these classes of workers; the tenuous new government could not afford to have the large lower class organizing to undermine the already ravaged economy. These measures ranged from simple “assurances that ‘you and yours’ have nothing to fear from [the] military” to more involved, bureaucratic maneuvering.⁶¹ The government understood the “need to protect the lower income groups in the face of the inevitably steep price increases” and, to that end, promised to pay the equivalent of five monthly wages over a three-month period, blaming the economic collapse “on the previous regime.” They additionally continued their harsh crackdown on what they considered “illegal strikes,” that being any showcase of organized labor outside that of CUPROCH and AIFLD-affiliated unions.⁶²

Allende alluded to CUPROCH and its professional membership in his final words to Chile, broadcast over Radio Magallanes, one of the few remaining leftwing radio stations left untouched by the Chilean Air Force. Quoth Allende; “I address professionals of Chile, patriotic professionals,

⁵⁹ United States Embassy, Santiago to Secretary of State, *Chilean Military Uprising: SITREP No. 3 – 1010 Hours*, September 12, 1973, 1, http://search.proquest.com/dnsa_cl/docview/1679139822/E9B8AB2C34E14D6APQ/9?accountid=465.

⁶⁰ Hirsch, “The Labour Movement,” 31.

⁶¹ United States Embassy, Santiago to Secretary of State, *SITREP #26 – 1300 Hours*, September 12, 1973, 1, http://search.proquest.com/dnsa_cl/docview/1679139792/415FCCC512EC463EPQ/1?accountid=465.

⁶² United Kingdom Embassy, Santiago to PGPD Fullerton, Esq., *Chile Internal*, October 12, 1973, 1, http://search.proquest.com/dnsa_cl/docview/1679061073/366AD6514EE947B4PQ/2?accountid=465.

those who days ago continued working against the sedition sponsored by professional associations, class-based associations that also defended the advantages which a capitalist society grants to a few.”⁶³ The “professional, class-based association” to which he refers is CUPROCH, the primary union conglomerate of the opposition movement. His frustration with these professional workers is merited; leading up to the coup, “nearly all major white-collar, merchant, and professional guilds [were] on strike, most on an indefinite basis,” with “little blue-collar support.”⁶⁴ As evidenced by the successful LAN Chile strike, white-collar workers did not need the cooperation of their blue-collar coworkers to bring the Chilean economy to a grinding halt. This is indicative of the highly stratified, class-based political environment exploited by the AIFLD and its affiliated unions. One of the most prolific of these affiliated unions was the Confederation of Maritime Workers (COMACH), which had also been an important member of the short-lived CNT. Its director, Wenceslao Moreno, also served on the AIFLD executive board.⁶⁵ The AIFLD worked with COMACH repeatedly over several years leading up to and immediately following the coup, providing their members with funding for numerous housing and professional development projects.⁶⁶ On one of these occasions, the AIFLD provided COMACH officers stationed in Valparaiso with material gifts and equipment, including a modern ship-to-shore radio system to enhance their communication abilities.⁶⁷ The Chilean coup of September 11, 1973 began

⁶³ Salvador Allende, “Last Words to the Nation,” *Marxists Internet Archive*, accessed April 23, 2017, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/allende/1973/september/11.htm>.

⁶⁴ United States Embassy, Santiago, *Still Waiting*, 24. United States Embassy, Santiago, *Merchants Strike Again*, 1.

⁶⁵ Hirsch, “The Labour Movement,” 30.

⁶⁶ American Institute for Free Labor Development, *The AIFLD Report 5*, no. 10 (October 1967), 6. American Institute for Free Labor Development, *The AIFLD Report 6*, no. 7 (July 1968), 4. American Institute for Free Labor Development, *The AIFLD Report 7*, no. 2 (February 1969), 6. American Institute for Free Labor Development, *The AIFLD Report 9*, no. 8 (August 1971), 4.

⁶⁷ Labarca Goddard, *Chile Invadido*, 87. American Institute for Free Labor Development, *The AIFLD Report 6*, no. 10 (October 1968), 3.

with two naval units offshore at Valparaiso, allegedly with U.S. Navy vessels present.⁶⁸

Thus ends the narrative of AIFLD/CIA cooperation in the Chilean coup. Nevertheless, the implications of this cooperation for U.S. foreign policy were far-reaching, reverberating across the region. The AIFLD, sponsored in varying capacities by the U.S. foreign policy apparatus, used training programs to institutionalize American political and social mores and eventually drew upon those ideological ties to enforce their own vision for Chilean political economy, further defining Chilean class consciousness in the process. Fred Hirsch, who began investigating these types of operations before they were even completed, concluded that “what we are dealing with is the Latin American, and specifically Chilean, directed portion of a worldwide effort to penetrate and control labour movements. This is an indispensable arm of... U.S. intelligence and covert activity.”⁶⁹ Although Latin America was a veritable theater of Communist influence in the late twentieth century, this type of strategy was implemented across the globe. Kim Scipes, a protégé of Hirsch, cites two additional examples of American covert activity dependent upon organized labor subversion: the conflict at Atlas Mines in the Philippines through the late 1980s and an attempted coup against President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela in the 1990s.⁷⁰ Consequently, an operational paradigm begins to emerge to describe the cooperation between organized labor and U.S. foreign policy officials. This paradigm hypothesizes that “American union leaders work in Latin America explicitly for the purpose of building institutions... by which the State Department can neutralize Latin American working classes who otherwise might work for revolutionary movements.”⁷¹ In Chile, it may have been the working classes themselves who were ultimately harmed by these operations, as their reward

⁶⁸ Richard Gott, “Allende’s Last Hours – Fighting to the End,” *The Guardian* (New York, NY), September 14, 1973.

⁶⁹ Hirsch, “The Labour Movement,” 10.

⁷⁰ Scipes, *AFL-CIO’s Secret War Against Developing Country Workers*, 67.

⁷¹ Radosh, *American Labour and United States Foreign Policy*, 373.

for their efforts was a genocidal dictator who outlawed the union confederation that represented 90% of Chilean workers.⁷² Gimmicks such as selective industry denationalization and five months' wages over a three-month period were likely insufficient to buy back impassioned support of the masses, especially when the junta knew full well that skyrocketing inflation would almost certainly negate any benefit derived by these cash handouts.⁷³ Ironically, situations such as this demonstrate the need for labor unions in developing countries.

Macroeconomic implications aside, unions represent power for both those in their ranks of membership and those against whom the unions stand. While this power is their strength, it is also their vulnerability. Power makes them an attractive target for institutions looking to subvert such power in pursuit of their own goals. In Chile, the American foreign policy apparatus, including the CIA, spent over a decade locked in a long-term battle for control of Chilean workers. Bolstered by operations of the AIFLD, this long-term battle turned into a short-term proxy war between white- and blue-collar workers fighting for the presidential palace and, ultimately, the political soul of Chile.

⁷² Scipes, *AFL-CIO's Secret War Against Developing Country Workers*, 67.

⁷³ United States Central Intelligence Agency, *Security Situation in Chile; Attached to Cover Page and Table of Contents; Alternate Version Dated September 21, 1973 Appended*, September 19, 1973, 3, <http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/dnsa/docview/1679140085/DA9EF75B33E54054PQ/6?accountid=465>. United Kingdom Embassy, Santiago, *Chile Internal*, 1.

A Tale of Two *Templa*: Sacred Spaces, Intercultural Encounter, and the First Jesuits in Italy and Japan

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Jesuits in Japan: Interaction and Connectivity

The Portuguese sailor and trader Mendes Pinto, later a companion of the Jesuit Francis Xavier, claimed to have “discovered” Japan in 1542.¹ Although he had an expedient personality, his description of Japan and the South China Sea trade is strikingly accurate and gives his claim credibility. Even if he was not the very first European to tread Japanese soil, he was undoubtedly “one of the earliest Portuguese travelers to that country, which he visited three or four times between 1544 and 1556.” This potentially earliest European voyager to Japan was an associate of Francis Xavier both before and during the Jesuit leader’s early missionary efforts in Japan, a fact that that prolific member of the Society of Jesus’ own reliable correspondence corroborates. Pinto indeed helped to finance one of the first Jesuit churches in Japan in 1551 and seems to have taken the Society’s *Exercises* and become a Jesuit himself in 1554.² European trade, exploration, and missionary activity in the South China Sea were demonstrably intertwined during the mid- and late-1540s. The Jesuits were thus at the forefront of intercultural interaction between Reformation Europe and warring states-period Japan.

Xavier and his small retinue initially met benign circumstances in Japan – surprising since the islands hosted ongoing internecine war during what has been called its “warring states” or *Sengoku* period (c.1467-c.1603). Xavier’s landing spot in the Satsuma region of Kagoshima prefecture was enjoying a respite from violence in 1549.³ Xavier noted of the initial landing:

¹ C. R. Boxer, *The Christian Century in Japan 1549-1650* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951), 20-23.

² Boxer, *The Christian Century in Japan*, 20.

³ *Ibid.*, 41.

By the favor of God we all arrived at Japan in perfect health on the 15th of August, 1549. We landed at Cagoxima [Kagoshima], the native place of our companions. We were received in the most friendly way by all the people of the city, especially the relations of Paul, the Japanese convert, all of whom had the blessing to receive the light of truth from heaven, and by Paul's persuasion became Christians. During our stay at Cagoxima the people appeared to be wonderfully delighted with the doctrines of the divine law, so entirely new to their ears.⁴

This fortuitous alignment allowed Xavier to begin negotiations immediately with local notables for permission to establish a center of missionary operations. An early Japanese adherent to and personal translator for Xavier named Yajirō informed the Jesuits that, at least according to some interpretations, the Buddhist deity Dainichi takes a three-in-one form, and thus seemed similar enough to the Christian god to allow for a syncretic argument that existing Buddhist cosmologies in fact fit with Christianity.⁵ Xavier embraced this coincidence as an opportunity to argue for syncretism.⁶ Despite the extreme tenuousness of the Dainichi-Christian god parallelism, the Jesuits seem to have enjoyed early success: “[B]y means of daily sermons and disputes with the bonzes [Xavier’s term for local Buddhist scholars], the sorcerers, and other such men, we converted to the religion of Jesus Christ a great number of persons, several of whom were nobles.”⁷

⁴ Francis Xavier, “Letter from Japan, to the Society of Jesus in Europe, 1552,” on Fordham University History Sourcebook, accessed November 17, 2017, <https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/mod/1552xavier4.asp>.

⁵ Michael Cooper, “A Mission Interrupted,” 395.

⁶ While the Jesuits are traditionally portrayed as especially syncretic in all contexts, Xavier and his band were isolated apologists in this early period. Francisco Javier Clavigero, the first notable Jesuit syncretist in Latin America, wrote the authoritative (that is, doctrinal) account of the Virgin of Guadalupe’s appearance in 1782, more than two centuries after Xavier’s death. See Stafford Poole, *Our Lady of Guadalupe: The Origins and Sources of a Mexican National Symbol, 1531-1797* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1997), 201-202. José de Acosta (c. 1540-1600), the first prominent Jesuit in Latin America spent his tenure abroad condemning the “idolatry” of native peoples and even criticizing local secular priests of being too accommodating of indigenous spiritual practices. This became a Latin American Jesuit project from their arrival in Brazil in 1549. See Francis X. Clooney, “Roberto de Nobili’s Dialogue on Eternal Life and an Early Jesuit Evaluation of Religion in South India,” in *The Jesuits: Cultures, Sciences, and the Arts, 1540-1773*, ed. John W. O’Malley, Gauvin Alexander Bailey, Steven J. Harris, and T. Frank Kennedy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 408.

⁷ Francis Xavier, to the Society in Europe, January 29, 1552, in *The Life and Letters of St. Francis Xavier*, ed. Henry James Coleridge, vol. 2 (London: Burns and Oates, 1872), 336.

Unsurprisingly, Xavier attributes his and the Jesuits' success to a combination of divine favor and their own rhetorical prowess. In the face of Jesuit preaching, the bonzes allegedly "could not defend [their religious claims]."⁸

The Jesuits' opportunity to establish a physical base of Japanese operations came in 1551 when duke Ōuchi Yoshitaka of Yamaguchi granted to Xavier an abandoned temple that could serve as a mission. The Jesuit leader's good fortune was most likely a result of his revised approach to presenting himself and his companions. In mid-1551, Xavier appeared before duke Ōuchi in silken robes becoming not of a poor mendicant, but a Portuguese emissary from Goa.⁹ As Michael Cooper explains, the Jesuit project in Japan "offers an instructive case study in missiology" that featured a "break from traditional missionary methods employed in India, Africa, and Latin America."¹⁰ While Cooper refers principally to the Japanese Jesuits' methods for ascertaining financial resources through trade – deemed uncouth in other Jesuit missionary contexts – the order's display behavior constituted an additional opportunity for them to break tested European frameworks. Richard Trexler shows that Mediterranean Europeans steeped in Latin Christianity often recognized public humility as a means for clerics to express status and garner acknowledgement. The duke of Yamaguchi, on the other hand, responded positively (and charitably) to the gifts and the trappings of diplomatic formality.¹¹

Tracking the Jesuits' first physical establishment in Japan is difficult, but not impossible. The Jesuits, normally prolific writers, were

⁸ Ibid., 336.

⁹ Boxer, *The Christian Century in Japan*, 27.

¹⁰ Cooper, "A Mission Interrupted," 393.

¹¹ Richard Trexler, *Public Life in Renaissance Florence* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991) remains the central text in the field of early modern public display. Pages 49-50 are particularly revelatory of clerical display customs as concerns sacred space. Churches built for and maintained by the mendicant orders (Franciscans, Dominicans, and Augustinians) contained architectural features that suggested their status as dispensers of public goods, including crypts for local peoples' burial. By suggesting a mission of selflessness and humility for the commonweal, European clerics (somewhat oxymoronically) aggrandized themselves.

more concerned with the theological debates that occurred within their second-hand temple and spilled almost no ink describing the structure itself. If there are any sources in Japanese that describe the building as a venue for Jesuit interaction with Japanese religious and lay people, they remain in early modern Japanese and thus inaccessible to most Western scholars, including myself. The best source for the temple's existence and its period of Jesuit occupation is the Portuguese interpreter and sailor Rodrigues Tçezza's account of the relevant events, which he must have received at second-hand owing to his very young age at the time of the relevant events. Tçezza reproduces the text of the deed allegedly granted to the Jesuits from duke Yoshitaka: "[W]e, the duke of the kingdom of Suwō [a contemporary place name], hand over through this deed signed by us the site of the monastery of Daidōji of this city of Yamaguchi of the kingdom of Suwō to the priest [Xavier]...so that he may build a monastery and temple on it..."¹² Daidōji temple, as is suggested in the deed, came with land that Xavier and his companions deemed suitable as the site for a college.

The first months of Daidōji's Jesuit occupation must have seemed to the Jesuits in residence like their days at university and a fulfilment of their evangelical mission all at once. The local bonzes, undoubtedly men of equal intellect as the cream of the University of Paris' crop (and they do all appear to be men according to Xavier's accounts), frequented Daidōji's chambers for theological conversation, always through translators such as Yajirō. Xavier related that "[t]he Japanese are led by reason in everything more than any other people, and in general they are all so insatiable of information and so importunate in their questions, that there is no end either to their arguments with us, or to their talking over our answers among themselves."¹³ In other words, their open minds made the Japanese ideal

¹² Reproduced in Georg Schurhammer, *Francis Xavier: His Life, His Times*, trans. M. Joseph Costelloe, vol. 4 (Rome: The Jesuit Historical Institute, 1982), 220.

¹³ Francis Xavier, to the Society in Europe, 337-338.

candidates for conversion.¹⁴ The bonzes, for their part, relished in what Xavier called, in his Latin Christian parlance, “disputation,” or theological conversation and argument.¹⁵ Xavier’s band and Yamaguchi’s bonzes discussed creation, the plausibility of the immortal soul, and the relation of the human self to the divine. Though the bonzes adhered to Buddhist fundamentals that taught the mutability of the self – and thus the impossibility of a personal soul in the strictest sense – the superficial similarities between Dainichi and the Trinitarian Christian god gave the Jesuits hope that Japanese recognition of a three-in-one divinity spoke to some natural law that imparted knowledge of “true” religion to the Japanese despite geographical isolation.¹⁶

For its short history, this first Jesuit conversionary space in Yamaguchi thus served as the setting for one of the most fascinating and dramatic events of intercultural encounter in world history. Daidōji was dedicated to none other than the deity Dainichi. This first locus of “conversion” in Japan seemed to Japanese, both scholarly and lay, to be a venue where foreigners evangelized some new message of Dainichi, with no serious conceits of overthrowing Buddhism. Xavier and his companions only discovered after extended discussion with the Yamaguchi bonzes that Dainichi was in fact the creator deity in the Shingon Buddhist sect, an esoteric school of Japanese Buddhist thought stemming from Mahayana thought in India and transplanted to Japan via Chinese esoteric theology.¹⁷

¹⁴ As early as 1549, Xavier wrote to his fellow Jesuits at Coimbra that the “Japanese nation appeared to be extremely well disposed to receive the preaching of the Gospel. It is very circumspect and prudent, judging of things by motives of reason, and also wonderfully curious to learn anything new that is brought to it. For this reason I for my part have conceived a great hope, relying on the assistance of God, that very considerable fruit will result among some of the Japanese, perhaps in all of them, and that a great number of those wandering souls will join themselves to the fold of the holy Church, unless indeed our own sins hinder our Lord God from vouchsafing to use us as the instruments of his glory.” Xavier, to the Fathers and Brothers at the College of Coimbra, June 22, 1549, in *The Life and Letters of St. Francis Xavier*, 178-179.

¹⁵ Schurhammer, *Francis Xavier*, 220-222.

¹⁶ Neil S. Fujita. *Japan’s Encounter with Christianity: The Catholic Mission in Pre-Modern Japan* (New York: Paulist Press, 1991), 40-41.

¹⁷ Fujita. *Japan’s Encounter with Christianity*, 395. For more on Shingon Buddhism and Dainichi’s place within it, see *Ibid.*, 29-30.

Though tripartite, Dainichi had no son incarnate and did not exist before the world in the same way that the Christian god was absolutely eternal. The idea that Dainichi could be crucified was preposterous. Given more efficient and accurate interlocution, this revelation may have come to the scholars of Daidōji much sooner. In the Yamaguchi monastery's decidedly Buddhist setting, the Jesuits merely appeared to many as especially strange missionaries from India. Considering that their base of operations was in Goa, this was not an entirely misleading impression. There are, indeed, reports of well-to-do Japanese offering alms to Xavier and his company as if the Jesuits were poor holy men from India, not an uncommon sight in sixteenth-century Japan.¹⁸

Upon this unfortunate discovery of theological incompatibility, Daidōji became to the Jesuits a fortress against less accommodating non-Christians. The temple became the site of what Georg Schurhammer calls a "war" between the Jesuits and the bonzes.¹⁹ Soon before leaving for new evangelical pursuits in China (where he would die), Xavier ordered the rest in his company to stop equating Dainichi with the Christian god, who was to go by the name *Deus* or *Deusu* thenceforth.²⁰ To the Japanese bonzes, Daidōji's sacred space had been defiled by distorters and exploiters of Shingon Buddhism. Unarmed bonzes were not the greatest danger to the Jesuits, either. Though Yamaguchi seemed peaceful upon the Jesuits' arrival, Japan was embroiled in a period of warring states. The Mōri clan, one of the period's greatest naval powers, took a strong stance against Christianity and thus made Daidōji into a locus for xenophobic behavior and a flashpoint in a military and political history in which spirituality was of secondary concern. The new religion that the Jesuits proffered from Daidōji meant little to the Mōri, who were principally occupied with taking over Yamaguchi and its hinterlands from the weakening Ōuchi clan and their

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 25.

¹⁹ Schurhammer, *Francis Xavier*, 226.

²⁰ Schurhammer, *Francis Xavier*, 222-226.

allies, with whom the Jesuits numbered.²¹ Knowing Japanese politics better than the Jesuits, the conservative Buddhist contingents of Yamaguchi aligned with Mōri Motonari. In return for their support, Daidōji was forcibly turned over to the Shingon bonzes.²²

Surprisingly, the abrupt arrival and strangeness of the Jesuits in combination with the political and military unrest that plagued their mission did not deter some inhabitants of Yamaguchi from converting to Catholicism and remaining Catholic despite the revelation that Dainichi had nothing to do with Christ. Even in the face of persecution at the hands of warring *daimyō* unsympathetic to Christianity, including an increasingly hostile Toyotomi Hideyoshi, the converts of Daidōji remained Christians decades after the temple's confiscation. In 1586, the high-ranking Jesuit Luis Frois recorded the appearance of Christians who approached his ship at sea near Japan. They reported that they were "Christians from Yamaguchi, baptized by that most holy father, Master Francis [Xavier], who came to Japan. It is now some thirty-seven years that we [the Japanese converts] have been Christians."²³ It is difficult to say how many converts Xavier and his companions actually accumulated, since Jesuit reports are suspect to exaggeration. Georg Schurhammer, perhaps still the foremost authority on Francis Xavier, hazards a guess of over two thousand.²⁴ Xavier himself claims to have converted five hundred by July 1551, but his reports are inconsistent and there is no suggestion that he kept an accurate record at Daidōji.²⁵ For Frois to happen upon some of Daidōji's converts by chance as late as 1586, though, Xavier's converts must certainly have been about.

²¹ Jurgis Elisonas, "Christianity and the Daimyo," in *The Cambridge History of Japan*, ed. John Whitney Hall, vol. 4 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 315.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ Luis Frois, Letter of October 4, 1586, reproduced in Schurhammer, *Francis Xavier*, 233-234.

²⁴ Schurhammer, *Francis Xavier*, 235, n. 100.

²⁵ Francis Xavier, to the Society at Goa, July 1551, in *The Life and Letters of St. Francis Xavier*, 301.

The Roman *Casa dei Catecumeni*: Papal Power over Conversionary Space

The histories of conversionary spaces are inextricable from their broader political and social contexts. While the Jesuits' headquarters resided in Rome, even the eternal city and seat of the papacy comprised a precarious environment for the earliest Jesuits' conversionary activities. Thanks to the reigns of strong popes such as Alexander VI, born Rodrigo Borja (r.1492-1503), the papacy established firm political influence over the city of Rome. To say that the papacy consolidated power over Roman secular authorities is a misled perspective, since the papal throne, the College of Cardinals, and other papal advisors very often belonged to one of the leading Roman families – the Medici, the della Rovere, or the Colonna. Papal power in early modern Rome was inextricable from secular power and all of the vying that came with it. Mid-sixteenth-century Rome was, like contemporary Yamaguchi, a politically and socially turbulent place that remained benign just long enough for the nascent Jesuit Order to establish a house of conversion.

The idea of setting up a house of conversion for Jews and Muslims in Rome was older than the Society of Jesus itself (founded 1540). On April 7, 1533, Pope Clement VII (r.1523-1534) issued a bull entitled *Sempiterno Regi* that called for institutions to be established across Christendom for non-Christians to convert “ex Judaismo, et Mahometica...ad fidei Christi,” or “from Judaism and Islam (lit. ‘Muhammad-ism’) to the faith of Christ.”²⁶ Clement's bull is thoroughly an artifact of the Catholic church during the early Reformation, as it mainly concerned *conversos* – Jews compelled to convert to Christianity in Spain c.1492 in order to avoid expulsion from Iberia.²⁷ The Protestant Reformation, which historians generally concede began with Martin Luther's 1517 protests against the Church's abuses of indulgences, instilled within papal circles new paranoia over the supposed

²⁶ Clement VII, *Sempiterno regi* (April 7, 1533), in *The Apostolic See and the Jews*, ed. Shlomo Simonsohn (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1990), 1856-1864.

²⁷ Clement VII, *Sempiterno regi*.

machinations of heterodox Christians and non-Christians in Europe. Even those who had visibly received baptism were not to be trusted.²⁸ The papal and broader Catholic conversionary agenda existed only on paper for a decade. From 1533 to 1543, the Papal See was reeling within a context of early Reformation, preoccupied with coordinating Catholic expansion into the Americas on the heels of Spanish *conquistadores*, and absorbed in the first stages of urban restoration and recovery projects after the 1527 Sack of Rome.

Rome was in no shape to host a functional conversion house, or *Casa dei Catecumeni*, until the mid-sixteenth century, for after the siege,

Plague and famine seized the city, and in the winter of 1527-1528 doors, windows and woodwork in the city, even to many of the roofbeams, had been burned, every piece of ironwork torn out even to the nails...The victims were cardinals and nobles at one end of the social scale; at the other were the wretched Jewish rabbis who had “no shirts on their backs, no bread, no wood in the house.”²⁹

The city’s infrastructure – architectural, administrative, and spiritual – fell into disarray for years and *ad hoc* social and political organization became the norm. In 1540, for instance, when the Jesuits’ principal founder Ignatius of Loyola began taking in young Roman Jews interested in conversion, he and his companions had to rent an apartment from their personal funds to house the catechumens.³⁰ After three years, on February 19, 1543, Pope Paul III finally issued a bull that permitted the creation of a conversion house in a building adjacent to the church of St. John de Mercatello in an area of the city between the medieval population core to the north near the Vatican and

²⁸ For an excellent discussion of *conversos* and *moriscos* (recently converted former Muslims), the extent to which those groups may or may not have genuinely adhered to their new faith, and the social and political problems surrounding them, see Mark D. Meyerson, *The Muslims of Valencia in the Age of Fernando and Isabel: Between Coexistence and Crusade* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).

²⁹ Peter Partner, *Renaissance Rome 1500-1559: A Portrait of a Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976).

³⁰ Lance Gabriel Lazar, *Working in the Vineyard of the Lord: Jesuit Confraternities in Early Modern Italy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 112.

the Jewish quarter to the south.³¹ Paul III called for the foundation of a monastery, a hospital (meaning in in the early modern context simply a place for individuals' improvement), and a confraternity (a group of charitable laymen) to conduct the house's daily functions.³² The monastery was to be set up "pro puellis," or "for the little [Jewish] boys."³³ While this phrase is imprecise and somewhat up to interpretation, it seems relatively clear that from the beginning Paul intended the house to send non-Christian boys on the path to priesthood. How far the choice to pursue the priesthood was left to the volition of young converts is unclear based on the available documentation. Isolated accounts such as one that reports a teenage girl named Anna del Monte's forced matriculation into the house, however, gives a glimpse into the abusive and coercive behavior that surely took place.³⁴ The extent to which the papacy intended conversion in the *Casa* to be voluntary as a matter of all-encompassing policy nevertheless remains obscure.

Whatever the case was precisely along those lines, the Papacy had much more control over the conversion house in Rome than the one in Yamaguchi owing to the Roman house's proximity to the Vatican and the Popes' jurisdiction over Rome and its charitable institutions. Paul chose Ioannes de Torano, the Jesuit proprietor of St. John de Mercatello, as the *Casa*'s director. Like the Yamaguchi house founded eight years later, the Roman *Casa dei Catecumeni* was to be a Jesuit house. The house was also similar to Daidōji in that it acted as an unlikely locus of activity for some of the period's most important political and religious actors.

Through ecclesiastical actors' activities, it is easier to determine how compulsory conversion was intended to be for the *Casa*'s residents. Ignatius of Loyola pressured Paul III in 1542 to allow Jews to retain the

³¹ Paul III, bull of February 19, 1543, in Simonsohn, ed., *The Apostolic See and the Jews*. 2329-2334.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Lazar, *Working in the Vineyard of the Lord*, 117.

property that they held as Jews after their conversion. The pope obliged and in the same year issued the bull *Cupientes Iudeos* to confirm the allowance.³⁵ By 1558, the confraternal organization originally associated with the conversion house supported around 200 catechumens.³⁶ While catechumens such as Anna del Monte, a young woman, may have been coerced to convert, the papacy did ensure some benefits for landowning converts who were principally male and older.

The original conversion house under the jurisdiction of Ioannes de Torono did not last. The papal bulls passed over the next several years show developing papal preference for the laymen of the *Casa*'s confraternity over the Jesuit administration. On February 15, 1544, Paul III redistributed the house's tasks and granted more administrative power to the confraternity.³⁷ After the bull's implementation, the Jesuits were relegated to evangelism to the Jewish community – just to the *Casa*'s west – and the more mundane work of ministering directly to the catechumens.³⁸ Though the house's structure sat adjacent to a Jesuit church, the Jesuits were stripped of most major decision-making responsibilities. The pope seems to have been happy with the house's performance and mission, but not necessarily the Jesuits within it. A May 14, 1546 bull demonstrates this continued papal favor in that it exempts the *Casa* of all taxation.³⁹ If papal bulls can be taken as indicators of the *Casa*'s success, the house was thriving thanks to its high profile in the papacy's purview and its accumulation of privileges.

Those privileges continued after Paul III's death. His successor, Julius III, issued two bulls – on August 25, 1550 and September 14, 1551 –

³⁵ Robert Aleksandyr Maryks, *The Jesuit Order as a Synagoge of Jews: Jesuits of Jewish Ancestry and Pure-of-Blood Laws in the Early Society of Jesus* (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 62.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 63.

³⁷ Paul III, *Ad monasteria* (February 15, 1544), in *The Apostolic See and the Jews*, 2398-2400.

³⁸ The bull also guaranteed all non-Christians the ability to convert through the house even if they had been convicted of a crime or sentenced to death.

³⁹ Paul III, bull of May 14, 1546, in *The Apostolic See and the Jews*, 2534-2535.

confirming the house's exemption from taxes.⁴⁰ This twofold repetition of a previous papal edict can be read either as needed enforcement against civic authorities who were attempting to tax the *Casa* or simple assurances to the house of continued papal support at a juncture of administrative change. Either way, the papacy was emphatically on the *Casa*'s side.

The confraternity was clearly the target of and the audience for of these bulls, as the documents explicitly designate the confraternity (or, as we learn in the bull of 1551, the recently promoted archconfraternity) as the subject. The Jesuits are marginalized considering their (possibly intentional) absence from the bulls. The final straw in papal-Jesuit relations seems to have come on or immediately before October 7, 1553, when Julius III called for the immediate removal of Ioannes de Torano and the transfer of all Jesuit property in the *Casa* – including the structure itself – to the lay archconfraternity.⁴¹ What was the reason for the dramatic demise of the Jesuits in their *Casa* by papal fiat? Published primary sources give little clue while available secondary sources have little to say. Lance Lazar and others paint a picture of the house's history in which Jesuit clerical authority smoothly transitions into confraternal administration while neglecting what must have been a turbulent if obscure transition.⁴² The truth of the matter on Ioannes is hard to detect and calls for further research.

Conclusions: Sacred and Political Spaces

The geographical separation and divergent cultural contexts of Daidōji Temple and the *Casa dei Catecumeni* should not hinder their comparison. While from one perspective the houses' two histories are Japanese and Roman – the manner in which they have been treated in the extant literature – those histories are also comparable as spatially-oriented and connective

⁴⁰ Julius III, bull of August 25, 1550, in *The Apostolic See and the Jews*. 2748-2749; Julius III, papal confirmation of *motu proprio* of September 14, 1551, in *The Apostolic See and the Jews*, 2797.

⁴¹ Julius III, *Ex superne dispositionis* (October 2, 1553), in *The Apostolic See and the Jews*, 2895-2898.

⁴² Lazar, *Working in the Vineyard of the Lord*, 114-116.

through their common Jesuit association. Though on opposite sides of the world, two principal actors in the conversion houses' histories – Ignatius of Loyola and Francis Xavier – were close associates at the University of Paris and later in their earliest ministries in the 1530s.⁴³ As this research has hopefully shown, these conversionary histories run deep with many tributaries and rivulets, some well-documented and others profoundly obscure. While the principal historical figures involved – Jesuits, bonzes, and popes – were principally concerned with matters of theology and the aggrandizement of their religious factions, political, social, and even economic forces were inextricably bound to these Jesuit spaces. Impersonal historical forces along with spiritual convictions were present across the globe in the fascinating loci of intercultural interaction that were Jesuit conversionary spaces.

Beyond the fascinating stories that they tell, what is the purpose of studying global conversionary spaces in the sixteenth century? The answer may lie further afield than the bounds of the spaces themselves. Nicholas Terpstra has recently suggested that the European age of Reformation is best conceptualized not as a principally religious set of phenomena, but rather as a time of increased movement of peoples and ideas across Europe.⁴⁴ Early modern Europe saw the appearance of religious refugees on a massive scale. In order for people to be refugees, they must move from one place to another and must do so owing to forces outside their control. Religious refugees, following this rather simple line of reasoning, are reluctant travelers for religious reasons. Within early modern Europe, confessional struggles compelled devoutly religious people unwilling to convert whenever politics demanded it to move to a more hospitable kingdom or state, especially after the Peace of Westphalia cemented the principle of *cuius regio, eius religio* (roughly “to whom the territory belongs, so his religion will reign”). English

⁴³ For an excellent treatment of the earliest Jesuits from a biographical perspective, see John O'Malley, *The First Jesuits* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993).

⁴⁴ Terpstra, *Religious Refugees in the Early Modern World*, *passim*.

Catholics moved to the Low Countries, French Protestants moved to America, and Jews moved wherever they could find temporary respite from extremist purgators of the Christian community.⁴⁵ In the sixteenth century, Jesuit clerics could be refugees from their spaces as well. With a comparative perspective on Rome and Japan, this phenomenon is clearly global.

The European age of Reformation drove both refugees and evangelists to travel further and under more extreme conditions than they had at any time during the Middle Ages.⁴⁶ Individuals who were previously considered principally religious figures look much more subject to political and social concerns when one takes a perspective on the spaces into which they moved, which they changed, and from which were forced. The increased movement of and clash between peoples was a global sixteenth-century phenomenon articulated in Iberian Jewish refugees to Italy, transatlantic *conquistadores*, and warring *daimyō*. Religion comprised only one of many reasons people moved, though a focus on the places where that movement precipitated political and social history is a good place to start understanding the structural undercurrents that made sixteenth-century history happen.

⁴⁵ For a striking example of the sudden harm that could befall Jewish communities, even before the reformation, see R. Po-chia Hsia, *Trent 1475: Stories of a Ritual Murder Trial* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).

⁴⁶ For a more extreme example of religious orders' movement to new territories in the Middle Ages, see, for example, Frank Lacopo, "Reform and the Welsh Cistercian Houses: Colonialism and Postcolonialism," *Hortulus* 13 (2018) (forthcoming).