TY - JOUR AU - Langseth, Jonathan PY - 2019/09/06 Y2 - 2024/03/28 TI - Wittgenstein's Account of Rule-Following and Its Implications JF - Stance: an international undergraduate philosophy journal JA - stance VL - 1 IS - 1 SE - Articles DO - 10.33043/S.1.1.38-43 UR - https://openjournals.bsu.edu/stance/article/view/1703 SP - 38-43 AB - <p>In this paper I present an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s account of rule-following, including what implications he suggests this account has for philosophy. The account suggests that neither one’s interpretation nor the rule itself are criteria by which we may conclude a rule was followed correctly or not. Rather it is through training, regularity, habit and social expectation-in short, by the consequences of action-that an action is considered in accord with a rule. I argue that even if we accept Wittgenstein’s account of rule-following, certain philosophically important implications follow.</p> ER -