

readings. "Peoples and States," "Society," "Government," and "War" are examples of a few chapters that contain succinctly analyzed information unavailable elsewhere.

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**J.M. Roberts.** *Europe 1880-1945*. London and New York: Longman, 1989. Second edition. Pp. xv, 631. Cloth, \$35.50; paper \$20.50.

J. M. Roberts has written a traditional history, the sort of history for which Jacques Barzun pleads with wit and eloquence in *Clio and the Doctors* (Chicago, 1974). *Europe 1880-1945* is a narrative built on a chronological frame with the author's comments and analysis included as digressions. As Barzun says the historian should, Roberts has eschewed graphs and tables and charts, preferring to use words to explain even economic trends. Though the methodology might be thought, by some, old fashioned, the book is filled with not only facts but also astute comments about what those facts meant for the development of European society.

Although it is unlikely that author and publisher predicted the recent revolutionary events in Eastern Europe, their timing for the issuing of this book could hardly have been better. Confusion about these changes is widespread, and Roberts—who seems to have a taste for diplomatic history—provides a good foundation for understanding not only the regional problems with the Soviet system but also the ethnic problems that have produced violence in a number of places. He is able to give due attention to the Great Powers before, during, and between the World Wars without allowing the Lithuanians and Bulgarians (or for that matter, the Sanjak of Novi Bazar) to get lost. This volume is certainly appropriate for anyone who wants to understand the current situation in Europe.

Roberts's chapters about social and cultural development and change are also very good. He is deft at pulling together pieces of national history into discussions of Continental trends and attitudes. Literature, science, families, sex, religion, all aspects of human life, in fact, are grist for his mill, and the reader is left with an appreciation of the similarities and differences among Europe's regions and peoples. His breadth of knowledge and understanding is impressive indeed.

It is unfortunate, after so much praise, to have to warn those who might consider using *Europe 1880-1945* in the classroom that they may be disappointed. Roberts assumes a degree of historical literacy rarely found outside well-read graduate students. For instance, in one sentence he refers to *errages* and Blanqui, giving no identification at all. Those studying mid-nineteenth century French radicalism will, to torture a phrase of Marx's, find the slender, black-clad figure of Auguste Blanqui haunting their pages. An undergraduate, however, could have a pretty fair knowledge of European and even French history without even recognizing the name. Roberts has written a very good book, but it is a work that demands much from the reader. For students who have the background or who—if there are any—will look up references they do not understand, this will be an excellent text. For the average student, caution is advised.

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**Richard Cust and Ann Hughes, eds.** *Conflict in Early Stuart England: Studies in Religion and Politics 1603-1642*, London and New York: Longman, 1989. Pp. ix, 271. Paper, \$17.95.

**Roger Lockyer.** *The Early Stuarts: A Political History of England 1603-1642*. London and New York: Longman, 1989. Pp. ix, 411. Paper, \$17.95.

On January 30, 1649, the diminutive Charles I of England became a head shorter than all his contemporaries. Historians agree on that fact, but they disagree on nearly all others, especially on the causes of that decollation. "Whit," historians on the English Civil War proved that the early Stuart kings illegally resisted the natural development of liberty in England. Marxists on the English Revolution proved that it was a matter of class warfare during the transition from feudalism to

capitalism. Both "schools" found conflict to be the axis on which the drama of the 1640s turned. Both perspectives were then criticized by "revisionists" who discovered the theme of consensus. Now those revisionists are themselves being revised, in the eternal game of historians staking their territory with the "correct" interpretation over the bodies (many of which are still alive) of the previous regime. Their new game is an old one: conflict.

Let me begin with the book that I know I cannot use, the one that revises the revisionists. *Conflict in Early Stuart England* is a collection of essays that grew out of Conrad Russell's Early Modern England Seminar at the Institute of Historical Research at London University. Richard Cust (Birmingham) and Ann Hughes (Manchester) provide a forty-page introduction that justifies and links the various articles. They thank the revisionists for their invaluable contributions to the debate, particularly Russell's *Parliaments and English Politics 1621-1629* (1979), but argue that the proper approach is to look for disharmony rather than harmony. Cust and Hughes's pre-war England is a country on the edge, with two diametrically opposed spheres playing out their differences at all levels, local, national, and international. The Whigs were closer to the truth than the revisionists in seeing a series of fundamental conflicts: Court vs. Country, Arminians vs. Puritans, Monarchists vs. Parliamentarians. Though opposed, the spheres are not unconnected. Rather, they overlap at crucial points.

It is these points that are discussed in the seven original essays: Johann Sommerville (University of Wisconsin-Madison) on the insecurity created by the maltreatment of representative government and unparliamentary taxation; Peter Lake (Royal Holloway and Bedford New College) on the prejudice of anti-popey and the conspiracy theories of both Catholics and Protestants (which were not theories but realities to contemporaries); Thomas Cogswell (Kentucky) on the failed Spanish match for Prince Charles; Cust on the effects of political news on rural electorates in the 1620s; Christopher Thompson (research consultant) on parliamentary conflicts early in Charles I's reign; Andrew Foster (West Sussex Institute of Higher Education) on "Church Politics of the 1630s" (focusing on the Archbishop of York, Richard Neile); and Hughes on local history.

The reason that I cannot use this collection for undergraduates is the high degree of knowledge necessary to even begin to understand the historiographical issues and proposed solutions. It is a debate by experts carried on for the benefit of experts. I benefited greatly by—and am sympathetic with—the effort to revise the revisionists, but I would only give these essays to advanced graduate students who are about to become initiated into the secrets of the profession.

Perhaps, though, I need first only give my fledgling scholars a comprehensive text for the historical knowledge necessary to appreciate *Conflict in Early Stuart England*. A candidate for that task is Roger Lockyer's recent political history of the four decades before the war. Lockyer is a distinguished early modern historian and Reader in History at Royal Holloway and Bedford College, University of London. Previous publications include a biography of the Duke of Buckingham (1981) and an excellent period survey, *Tudor and Stuart Britain* (2nd ed., 1985). His latest offering is a marvelous book—learned, stimulating, and written in a clear style supported by extensive quotations from primary documents.

Lockyer provides perceptive summaries of complicated events and an excellent chapter on "The Nature and Functions of Parliament in Early Stuart England." I found it the most valuable part of the book, explaining both James's attitude toward his uncooperative new subjects and the doings of parliament (bills, redress of grievance, supply, jurisdiction, and governing). Coupled with a brief section on "Charles's Attitude Towards Parliament," this chapter should be required reading for anyone toiling in the political fields of early seventeenth-century England. Three maps, an appendix listing the principal office holders (not cross-referenced in the index), seventeen pages of suggestions for further reading, and an index complete the volume. *The Early Stuarts* is a masterful work that makes for rewarding reading. Alas, I cannot use this one either.

My difficulty with the book as a teaching tool lies in its difficult topical structure. Lockyer forgoes an introductory chronological overview and leaps into an England torn by internal and external tensions. After two chapters on the economics and international backgrounds, Lockyer spends the remaining thirteen on the constitution (assumptions and issues), royal finances (sources and expenditures), religion (Protestants and Catholics), and the early and later parliaments of James I and Charles I. There are two separate chapters on each of these topics, one each for the first Stuart

and for his son. What this means is an extensive duplication of material. I have two pages of notes of some of the more common repetitions. Here is one: Salisbury's Great Contract, the proposal to swap purveyance for a guarantee of more stable parliamentary support of the crown's financial needs in 1610. Lockyer refers to the scheme briefly on seven early pages before finally analyzing it at length. His long piece on Salisbury's innovative plan is splendid, but the topical treatment (with few cross-references to the full explanation) would make difficult going for a reader who already did not have a fair idea what happened. And to complicate the matter more, an informative essay on "Government and Society in Early Stuart England" appears very late as the eleventh chapter. It could have served as the basis for the needed overview.

*The Early Stuarts* is aimed at an informed audience. For teaching, it is best suited for a graduate seminar on the origins of the Civil War. Before giving it to advanced undergraduates I would first make sure they had read a more general survey, such as the relevant parts of Lockyer's *Tudor and Stuart Britain*. As a classroom text the parts of *The Early Stuarts* are greater than the whole. Perhaps for many of us it is better mined for information than assigned.

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Edward Royle. *Modern Britain: A Social History, 1750-1985*. New York: Routledge, Chapman & Hall, 1987. Pp. xiv, 434. Paper, \$19.95.

T. O. Lloyd. *Empire to Welfare State: English History, 1906-1985*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1986. Third edition. Pp. xv, 558. Cloth, \$45.00; paper, \$17.95.

Both of these books illustrate the failure of a society to solve the problems that have plagued it ever since the industrial revolution. England has never, except for the few years after World War II, possessed the will even seriously to try to confront those problems. Inequality and misery have not been the result simply of temporary malfunctions of English capitalism but rather have been necessary and inevitable features of it.

Edward Royle's *Modern Britain: A Social History, 1750-1985*, should give pause to those enthusiasts for economic change who believe that displaced workers can easily be absorbed into new industries. The wealthiest classes have always "benefited disproportionately" from economic change. They have always moved into the suburbs and left an inner city of "deteriorating housing . . . and a rash of cheap, speculative . . . building." The cities have provided "scenes of human degradation" above which hang "palls of smoke and industrial fumes" and "the inescapable stench of animal and human excrement."

The best "solution" for its problems that nineteenth-century Britain could come up with was to export some of its poor children to Canada, Australia, and the Cape of Good Hope, if necessary through "philanthropic abduction" and "pre-emptive rescue," both euphemisms for kidnapping. Children who remained in England were put to work in the textile mills or the coal mines at the age of three or four. The ruling elite believed that for these people—the majority—education was dangerous. Keeping them ignorant "was the safest policy."

The standard of living of agricultural laborers similarly deteriorated after the 1780s. Earnings were less than half of what was required to feed a family of five, and as the population increased the assumption that there were jobs "for all of the able-bodied became patently unrealistic."

The Labour government after World War II did reduce the inequity and did remove some of the uncertainty from the lives of the poor as well as of the middle class. But anybody who was so optimistic as to claim victory would have been very naive. Steps toward equality that took two hundred years to accomplish have been lost in a decade, and after ten years of Margaret Thatcher it would be difficult to challenge Royle's conclusion "that the economic opportunities and social legislation" of the period after World War II "have not moved Britain any nearer the goal of a classless society." "The class foundations of British society, laid in the first industrial revolution, remain—however inappropriate their survival in the later twentieth century."