and for his son. What this means is an extensive duplication of material. I have two pages of notes of some of the more common repetitions. Here is one: Salisbury's Great Contract, the proposal to swap purveyance for a guarantee of more stable parliamentary support of the crown's financial needs in 1610. Lockyer refers to the scheme briefly on seven early pages before finally analyzing it at length. His long piece on Salisbury's innovative plan is splendid, but the topical treatment (with few cross-references to the full explanation) would make difficult going for a reader who already did not have a fair idea what happened. And to complicate the matter more, an informative essay on "Government and Society in Early Stuart England" appears very late as the eleventh chapter. It could have served as the basis for the needed overview.

The Early Stuarts is aimed at an informed audience. For teaching, it is best suited for a graduate seminar on the origins of the Civil War. Before giving it to advanced undergraduates I would first make sure they had read a more general survey, such as the relevant parts of Lockyer's *Tudor and Stuart Britain*. As a classroom text the parts of *The Early Stuarts* are greater than the whole. Perhaps for many of us it is better mined for information than assigned.

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Edward Royle. *Modern Britain: A Social History, 1750-1985*. New York: Routledge, Chapman & Hall, 1987. Pp. xiv, 434. Paper, $19.95.

T. O. Lloyd. *Empire to Welfare State: English History, 1906-1985*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1986. Third edition. Pp. xv, 558. Cloth, $45.00; paper, $17.95.

Both of these books illustrate the failure of a society to solve the problems that have plagued it ever since the industrial revolution. England has never, except for the few years after World War II, possessed the will even seriously to try to confront those problems. Inequality and misery have not been the result simply of temporary malfunctions of English capitalism but rather have been necessary and inevitable features of it.

Edward Royle's *Modern Britain: A Social History, 1750-1985*, should give pause to those enthusiasts for economic change who believe that displaced workers can easily be absorbed into new industries. The wealthiest classes have always "benefited disproportionately" from economic change. They have always moved into the suburbs and left an inner city of "deteriorating housing . . . and a rash of cheap, speculative . . building." The cities have provided "scenes of human degradation" above which hang "palls of smoke and industrial fumes" and "the inescapable stench of animal and human excrement."

The best "solution" for its problems that nineteenth-century Britain could come up with was to export some of its poor children to Canada, Australia, and the Cape of Good Hope, if necessary through "philanthropic abduction" and "pre-emptive rescue," both euphemisms for kidnapping. Children who remained in England were put to work in the textile mills or the coal mines at the age of three or four. The ruling elite believed that for these people--the majority--education was dangerous. Keeping them ignorant "was the safest policy."

The standard of living of agricultural laborers similarly deteriorated after the 1780s. Earnings were less than half of what was required to feed a family of five, and as the population increased the assumption that there were jobs "for all of the able-bodied became patently unrealistic."

The Labour government after World War II did reduce the inequity and did remove some of the uncertainty from the lives of the poor as well as of the middle class. But anybody who was so optimistic as to claim victory would have been very naive. Steps toward equality that took two hundred years to accomplish have been lost in a decade, and after ten years of Margaret Thatcher it would be difficult to challenge Royle's conclusion "that the economic opportunities and social legislation" of the period after World War II "have not moved Britain any nearer the goal of a classless society." "The class foundations of British society, laid in the first industrial revolution, remain--however inappropriate their survival in the later twentieth century."

In *Empire to Welfare State: English History, 1906-1985*, T. O. Lloyd deals with British foreign as well as domestic policy. He writes with an occasional touch of humor: "The fashion of the decade [of the twenties] was to look at Victorian prudery with disgust, at Victorian literature with amusement, and at Victorian architecture as little as possible."

Lloyd clearly illustrates the greatness of the Labour government after World War II, and he also illustrates the outrage of the privileged at the legislation of those years. Conservative governments did reluctantly accept the welfare state and nationalization for the next thirty years, but with Margaret Thatcher reactionaries--who call themselves Conservatives--who were waiting their chance to destroy both finally got their chance. Many Conservatives had always believed that it was a waste of money as well as dangerous to educate the working classes--"It made children less willing to work and intensified the servant-problem, and there were people who thought that if the poor were educated they would no longer be content to work hard at boring jobs"--and of course many Conservatives believed that other social legislation was equally misguided.

Lloyd also illustrates the restiveness of the middle class during the years after about 1950. That restiveness must help to explain why many of the middle class would vote to make Margaret Thatcher prime minister and then allow her to remain for ten years. They have forgotten, or they never knew, what life was like before World War II.

Lloyd is as good on foreign policy as he is on domestic policy. He challenges the notion that after World War II Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill "gave" Eastern Europe to Joseph Stalin. By the time Churchill and Stalin agreed in 1944 that Greece was to be in the British sphere of influence, that Hungary and Yugoslavia were to be open to both countries, and that Rumania and Bulgaria were to be in the Russian sphere of influence, the Russian armies were already established in the areas that Russia would get. In April of 1945 few sane people in either England or the United States would have supported a war against Russia even if the two countries had not been all but exhausted and even if Japan had been already defeated.

One of the people who comes off worst in this book is Winston Churchill. Whether or not he was a great leader in wartime, in peacetime he was a disaster waiting to happen. He was a demagogue, as when as war minister after World War I he was convinced that the Labour Party was "riddled" with Bolshevism and when Lloyd George had to "restrain him from sending the army to Russia to overthrow Lenin and the Bolshevik revolution." As chancellor of the exchequer he proposed during the general strike of 1926 that the government escort a convoy of food "through the streets of London with troops carrying loaded rifles." Others had more sense, and Sir John Anderson, an under-secretary at the home office, told him to stop talking nonsense.

During most of the 1930s Churchill "was regarded as dangerously right-wing." During World War II he considered locking up Niels Bohr, the nuclear physicist, for security reasons. During the political campaign of 1945 he charged that if Labour won the election "it would set up a Gestapo to run the country." Surely such a charge in the very year in which World War II ended goes beyond simple irresponsibility. He opposed the independence of India, and if he had been in power he might have "involved England in an attempt--almost certainly hopeless--to resist the change."

Churchill, like other Conservatives, was not only anti-Labour but also anti-labor, and in his opposition tó neither was he always careful about the truth. He was also sexist, as he illustrated in 1944 when he threatened the resignation of his government if Parliament included a provision for equal pay for female teachers in the Education Act.

Lloyd points out other important and interesting features of English history almost in passing: the Conservatives' fairly consistently cavalier attitude toward the British constitution, the Englishman's definition of Bolshevism as "anything from Leninist revolution to a reduction of the social and economic gap between the upper and middle classes and the working class," the willingness of the Thatcher government "to tackle existing institutions" together with its unwillingness "to think about constructive measures to replace them."

Although a reader might disagree with some of Lloyd's conclusions, such as that there can be such a thing as democratic totalitarianism or that Margaret Thatcher "added conviction to common sense," his book is a very informative history of Britain since 1906. Like Royle's, it illustrates the solidity of the English class structure and the stubborn resistance of the ruling elite to any change

that might threaten its position in England, as well as England's position in the world. In the first resistance it has succeeded far better than in the second.

Either of these books would be too much for most students in introductory courses in European history or western civilization in most colleges. Teachers either in high school or in college should find them useful for themselves, and each would serve very well as a basic text in an upper-level college course on the period it covers in English history. Honors students in high school could also be able to handle them.

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Alan Sked. *The Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire, 1815-1918*. London and New York: Longman, 1989. Pp. viii, 295. Cloth, $29.95; paper $17.25.

In a densely packed book, Alan Sked of the London School of Economics offers what he calls an extended essay on the decline of the Habsburg Empire in the nineteenth century. Sked, who has already published a number of specialized works on the Habsburg Empire, here tries to present an accessible study of the causes for its collapse. The basic question he is attacking, Sked says in his introduction, is to determine at what point the collapse became inevitable. He suggests, too, that the Austrian experience might help in solving problems emerging as Europe moves toward integration; looking at how the Habsburgs ruled a large number of quite different peoples, often peoples hostile to each other, can guide today's politicians.

With chapters on Metternichean Austria, 1848, the years between the revolutions of 1848 and the Compromise of 1867, the Compromise, the Dual Monarchy, and the last days, Sked maintains a good chronological balance in his treatment. His judgments are defensible and defended, if not always the majority viewpoint. With substantial recent research on the Habsburg Empire, a new history of the empire's final century is certainly welcome, but Sked's study is not one for the classroom. It will leave most undergraduates in a fog of confusion. The book is full of names familiar only to a specialist, and he identifies few of them. In Sked's discussions of Habsburg historiography, a major element of the book, he assumes his readers are familiar with the major writers on the Habsburg Empire: Paul Schroeder, F. Engel-Janosi, Hans Kohn, and the like, although he excludes Enno Kraehe.

He concludes that the empire's fall did not become inevitable until 1918, when the Central Powers lost World War I. Moreover, it was not the nationalities problem, precisely, that did Austria in: It was the failure of Habsburg statecraft over a number of years to deal effectively with the interconnections between the nationalities problem and foreign policy. An excellent study, Sked's book is one that instructors who lecture on the Habsburg Empire will gain from reading.

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Adam Westoby. *The Evolution of Communism*. New York: The Free Press, 1989. Pp. 333. Cloth, $22.95.

This is a book that has been overtaken by history. British historian Westoby has written a theoretically supple and critically subtle analysis of how Communism has evolved as a uniquely successful political species at a time when that success is most in doubt. And although Westoby makes tantalizing allusions to seeing the Soviet Union operating somewhat like the Roman Empire, successful adaptation and not slow collapse is clearly his central model. He does mention Gorbachev, but who but a journalist could keep up with the crises that have engulfed the communist world in the last year? Still, the book is useful in helping readers understand how communism dominated the political life of a large part of the world for most of this century.

For most college or secondary students, the book's strengths and weaknesses are intertwined. Westoby integrates a great number of studies and theoretical material in a concise way, so that he