understanding of historical methodology. *Rethinking the Russian Revolution*, therefore, may be suitable only for senior history majors enrolled in an advanced seminar. The book is not suitable for the non-specialist, nor is it likely to have much value or appeal in an introductory survey course.

Alan Wood's *Stalin and Stalinism* is a fine complementary volume to Acton's historiographical essay, for its focus is on the single most significant consequence of the 1917 revolution—Joseph Stalin and his impact on the U.S.S.R. Wood's purpose is not to survey western and Soviet historiography on Stalinism (surely the central problem of Soviet history) but to offer undergraduate students a short biographical sketch of Stalin that covers the entire span of his career, with emphasis upon the nearly thirty years (from 1924 through 1953) during which he led the Communist Party and thoroughly and violently transformed the party, the state, the economy, and the nation. This small book is clearly written, well organized, and includes all the essentials necessary for a quick survey of Stalin and his place in Soviet history. As one volume in a series of pamphlets, the book is of necessity superficial; it simply does not provide enough detail or depth on any of the central issues of the Stalin era. It is a good but very sketchy outline of more than fifty years of turmoil, revolution, terror, war, civil war, and personal intrigue. Given its brevity, it is difficult to imagine that it will (as it is intended) "stimulate critical thought." It may be a useful guide or outline for undergraduate students or even secondary students (e.g., it includes a glossary of terms and a chronology), but it does not have nearly enough humanity, drama, or complexity to engage or provoke.

Fitchburg State College
Pasquale E. Micciche


A substantial amount of scholarship on the origins of World War II has been published in the two decades since the first edition of this work appeared. Aside from some minor modifications, however, this study retains the same organization and interpretation as the 1969 edition.

Keith Eubank has published several works in twentieth-century diplomatic history and is thoroughly familiar with the variety of interpretations about the origins of the Second World War. His Heath series anthology on the subject is known to a generation of college students. In this volume, Eubank seeks "to explain the origins of the world war that began in 1939 and ended with 30,000,000 people dead and unbelievable devastation over much of the world."

The period from the Treaty of Versailles to Hitler's rise to power is briefly surveyed, the bulk of the volume being devoted to the six years preceding the war's commencement. Eubank reminds the reader that the Treaty of Versailles was hardly as severe as that of Brest-Litovsk, imposed by Germany upon Russia. Indeed, as a result of the First World War and the various treaty arrangements following it, Germany was in an ideal position to exploit a power vacuum created in eastern Europe. Moreover the diplomacy of the allies in the twenties was ineffective, a grave mistake being committed by evacuating the Rhineland. "Had the occupation forces remained there until 1935, as the Versailles treaty had planned, the Nazi threat might have been averted." The "spirit of Locarno" and the Kellogg-Briand Pact merely provided an illusion of peace.

The depression facilitated Hitler's triumph in Germany and set the stage for German expansion on the continent. Eubank argues that Hitler was an opportunist, not a systematic planner. He intended to acquire German "lebensraum" through a series of short wars and did not envision a conflict of the magnitude he finally precipitated. Eubank discusses Hitler's destruction of the Versailles restrictions governing German rearmament, and the inability of western statesmen to deter him from his expansionist goals. He was "a man unlike anyone they had ever had to deal with."

It is in this context that Eubank treats appeasement, a policy derived from the British experience of the First World War, and based on the assumption that that conflict had been avoidable and that Britain shared responsibility for it with Germany. When Hitler achieved power, the appeasers were thoroughly entrenched and considered Communist Russia to be a greater threat than
Nazi Germany. Even after Hitler seized Prague in March, 1939, Chamberlain "still wanted to practice appeasement if only Hitler would let him." By that late date, Europe had already witnessed the remilitarization of the Rhineland, German support for Franco in the Spanish Civil War, and Anschluss and, of course, the sacrifice of Czechoslovakia at Munich. Eubank does not condemn appeasement. Indeed, he is convinced that Hitler's remilitarization of the Rhineland could not have been easily resisted by France and Britain, that Stalin was duplicitous from the start and an alliance of the western powers with him improbable, and that resisting Hitler's demands over Czechoslovakia would not necessarily have been a wiser decision than was the appeasement at Munich.

Still, the reader is left with the inescapable conclusion that at a time when courage and decisiveness were required, the leadership of Britain and France devolved upon a series of mediocrities. Chief responsibility for the war, nevertheless, is placed squarely on Hitler. Given recent scholarship with which the author is familiar, Eubank might well have addressed the question of whether the war from 1939 to 1945 was as much a German war as it was Hitler's war.

This work serves as an admirable introduction to the diplomatic background of the war for the college level student. The author provides an excellent and current bibliography.

Memphis State University
Abraham D. Kriegel


*War at Any Price* is a general history of the Second World War in Europe written by a participant. M.K. Dziewanowski was a diplomatic correspondent stationed in Berlin when the war broke out. During the war he served as a platoon commander in the Polish army, an instructor-interpreter for parachutists and saboteurs near London, an editor of a secret radio station that maintained contact with the Polish resistance movement, and a military attaché at the Polish embassy in Washington. After the war he studied history at Harvard and later taught at the University of Wisconsin. His first-hand experience, his excellent academic credentials, and a lifetime of reading and research on the war enabled him to produce an excellent one-volume synthesis of World War II in Europe.

The title *War at Any Price* states clearly the author's position that this was not a war that Hitler accidentally stumbled into, as A.J.P. Taylor advocates in *The Origins of the Second World War*, but rather that it was the outcome of Hitler's planning and objectives. Not only was this Hitler's war in terms of causation but also in terms of its character and impact on the future of Europe and the world. Hitler's stubborn refusal to admit defeat after all hope of victory vanished brought about Germany's utter defeat and shaped the post-war world for the next fifty years. One of the strengths of this work is the way the author integrates the intelligence war and the resistance movements with the more familiar battles of the war. Dziewanowski gives due credit to his own countrymen for the discovery and deciphering of "Enigma," the German cipher machine. This discovery allowed Allied war leaders to know what the enemy was going to do often before German and Italian commanders in the field obtained the information. The author points out the crucial role that intelligence played in key phases of the war, such as the Battle of Britain and the invasions of North Africa and Normandy.

The story of the war is told in twenty chapters, the first three dealing with the war's origins from World War I to the invasion of Poland and the last two covering the war's aftermath, including the Nuremberg Trials and the consequences of the war for Europe. The last chapter has been rewritten in the second edition to include the significant events of 1989 in an analysis of the war's impact. Seven chapters are devoted to the period 1939 to 1942/43 when the Axis powers were on the offensive, and eight chapters cover the Axis retreat from 1942/43 to the end of the war in 1945. This history of World War II also includes a chronology of the war, a selected bibliography, many helpful maps and