

the "ramshackle empires of eastern Europe," were determined to bolster the waning status of their empires as great powers; the ruling cabal in Berlin, frustrated by thwarted international ambitions, saw war on Germany's timetable as the only way out of a political and diplomatic stalemate. Germany took advantage of the crisis caused by the assassination at Sarajevo in order to go to war before Russia and France completed their preparations. Maintaining the balance of power in Europe gave Britain and France no choice but to fight.

Henig does an excellent job at clarifying the convolutions of European diplomacy and alliances as well as in explaining the objectives of the belligerents. The final segment of the book, "The Historical Debate," is devoted to a discussion of the many opposing views of Germany's responsibility. The result of Henig's careful explanatory style and even-handed approach is a book that should prove enormously useful as an introductory source for college-level students.

The fifth edition of *The Outbreak of World War I*, from D. C. Heath's Problems in European Civilization series, has been completely overhauled by Holger H. Herwig, an authority on German naval history, who currently teaches at the University of Calgary. Unfortunately, the revision process appears to have disposed of the baby, along with the bath water. In earlier editions, the editor, Dwight E. Lee, included excerpts from such authors as Count Max Montgelas (who helped to draft Germany's response to the accusations of war guilt), Camille Bloch, G.P. Gooch, and A.J.P. Taylor, as well as the fascinating results of a concerted attempt by French and German historians, in 1951, to "agree upon the views to be expressed in history texts." The updated version eliminates all of these sources in favor of more recent scholarship, focusing upon the controversy raised by Fritz Fischer's assertions, in 1961, that the German leadership had maneuvered the European countries into a state of war. The new book certainly is more attractive than the old, but the selections included would make difficult reading for most college students.

Still, Herwig's compilation includes good material, as well as his excellent introduction. In one fascinating essay, "Austria-Hungary Opts for War," written by Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., the author explains that the Habsburg empire, resorting to a military campaign out of "exhaustion of patience and imagination," was unable to move more quickly in July 1914, since a large number of troops were on harvest leave. Their immediate recall would have attracted the attention of the rival powers, as well as leaving the crops unharvested.

Another useful essay is "The Liberals Muddle Through to Continental Commitment," by Zara Steiner. Steiner explains that during the days preceding Great Britain's entry into the war, Germany's assault upon Belgium gave the British public a long-awaited outlet for years of "latent anti-German feeling" and ensured that the British public would accept a decision for war with jubilation. During the dilemma, however, the vacillating cabinet ministers "felt that they were living in a world created by H. G. Wells."

A combination of new scholarship with some of the earlier sources might have provided excellent material on the war guilt controversy to instructors and advanced students. Instead, Herwig's edition has turned a few decades into centuries, relegating the events of 1914 to the distant past.

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R. A. C. Parker. *Struggle for Survival: The History of the Second World War.* New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. Pp. 328. Cloth, \$23.50; paper, \$9.95.

Over fifty years have passed since Hitler sent his legions into Poland, thus initiating a conflict that would ultimately consume somewhere between forty and sixty million lives.

Recently a number of authors, including John Keegan, Martin Gilbert, John Ellis, and H. P. Wilmott, have tried to grasp the essence of that event in their one-volume histories of World War II. The British historian R. A. C. Parker now joins that group, and he does so with success.

Parker writes with a knowledgeable and lucid hand. His judgments are keen, his opinions direct, and his mastery of the material smooth. Seemingly without effort, he covers a vast tableau in less than 350 pages. Of necessity, he directs his emphasis throughout to the people, battles, events, and factors that were decisive. The result is a volume that can be read for both illumination and pleasure.

Parker begins his work with a chapter on Hitler, whose thinking was dominated by his determination to solve "the Jewish problem" and to gain "living space" for Germany. Beyond those two compulsions, however, Hitler never developed a rigorous or coherent strategy to attain his goals. His basic "laziness and intellectual incoherence" worked against any such effort. Instead, Parker correctly asserts, Hitler relied on a strategy of improvisation.

Of all the decisions of the war, Hitler's resolve to invade the Soviet Union was the most crucial. For all its great prowess, the German military proved unable to bring the Soviet Union to its knees. That fact, Parker points out, ultimately determined the war: "This was the decisive campaign; more than anything else the survival of the Soviet Union determined the pattern of the Second World War and of the post-war world."

Although Britain had been the first to resist Hitler, it would ultimately be the manpower of the Soviet Union and the economic production of the United States that would prove to be the keys to victory. Thus, within the Anglo-American alliance in the West, it would be Roosevelt who would come to dominate, not Churchill. The Prime Minister had been crucial in sustaining Britain in those terribly dark days of 1940—"Churchill made exhilarating the prospect of peril"—but inevitably his influence waned as the preponderance of American power asserted itself. Parker correctly understands Roosevelt's role: although the President never boasted of it and, indeed, often concealed it, "until his death, Roosevelt decided what Anglo-American strategy should be." It was well that he did, for his determination to give priority to the defeat of Germany by the most direct manner possible helped to deflect what the author calls "the erratic flippancy of British strategies."

Parker is often blunt in his assessments, including that of British general Bernard Montgomery: "Close acquaintance with 'Master,' as his staff called him, evoked resentment except among his British courtiers and among some officers in clearly subordinate positions. He excelled in conceit, complacency, and arrogance of demeanour." The author is equally forthright in his opinion of some of his fellow historians: "Montgomery insisted that 'his' battles . . . followed his prefabricated master plan. The British official historian, and Montgomery's approved biographer, afterwards followed his lead . . . in rearranging facts to fit Monty's 'master plan,' with confusing results."

In comparison to Montgomery, Parker reflects, Eisenhower "was not only tactful and emollient, he was an intelligent soldier." What Eisenhower understood, and Montgomery refused to understand throughout the campaign for Western Europe, was the determinant of logistics. It was the lack of sufficient ports, especially the crucial facilities of Antwerp, and not Eisenhower's alleged caution, that insured that the war would not end until 1945. The author concludes that, "in practice, the only weakness in Eisenhower's strategy proved to be that it deprived Montgomery of a monopoly of military success."

The book is not without flaws. Occasionally a glaring typographical error jumps forth, such as when the text gives September 16 as the beginning of the Battle of the Bulge, or a sentence misleads, such as with the author's too-quick summary of the American RAINBOW 2 plan. These problems, however, are few and minor. More bothersome is the book's failure to assess fully the role and impact of signals intelligence on the war, especially considering the impressive amount of new material on the subject that has been published over the last decade. Limitations

of space might have been the culprit here, but the book needs more than its rather cursory and scattered treatment of ULTRA and MAGIC.

Despite this shortcoming, this is a book to read, enjoy, and then read again. For the professor who is looking for a concise, intelligent, and readily understood survey of World War II, a wise choice might be to go no further than *Struggle for Survival*.

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John W. Young, *Cold War Europe, 1945-1989: A Political History*. London: Edward Arnold (Hodder & Stoughton), 1991. Pp. xx, 236. Paper, \$17.95.

One of the pitfalls of contemporary history is that events outrace even the most facile of writers. John W. Young's *Cold War Europe* is a case in point, a book that is out of date even before it is published.

Young, a lecturer in International History at the London School of Economics, has written and edited several books on international relations in post-war Europe. Reviewers praised his *Britain, France and the Unity of Europe* (1985) for opening new perspectives on the politics of European unification. Young has also edited a book on Churchill's foreign policy.

In his introduction, Young suggests that post-war European political history can be divided into four broad periods: a period of recovery between 1945 and 1952; one of a "stable post-war settlement" from 1952 to about 1965; a period of instability from 1965 to 1980; and finally a period of searching for new answers from 1980 to 1989. His chapters on individual nations generally conform to this scheme; however, Young fails at times to develop this periodization clearly, and this will confuse some student readers.

After two general chapters, one on Cold War politics and one on European unity, Young devotes separate chapters to Britain, France, Germany, and the Soviet Union, with a single chapter each for Southern and Eastern Europe. Not surprising, given his previous works, the chapters on European unity and on Britain are the strongest in the book. In the chapter on Britain, Young more clearly integrates domestic and foreign affairs than in the chapters on Germany and France. Young also provides an excellent, even-handed survey of the political history of the Soviet Union from the 1930s to 1989. He is particularly good on both shifting economic policies and the internal politics of the Kremlin; the only weakness in this otherwise strong chapter is Young's failure to show clearly the relations between domestic politics and foreign affairs in the Soviet Union. The chapters on Southern and Eastern Europe both suffer from Young's attempts to do too much in too little space. A further weakness in the chapter on Eastern Europe is the choice of a chronological rather than country-by-country approach.

There are several positive features of Young's book in terms of its usefulness as a textbook. *Cold War Europe* is considerably shorter than its most comparable rival, Walter Laqueur's *Europe Since Hitler* (2nd ed., 1982). The organization of the book makes sense in terms of organizing a course on post-war Europe. And Young provides a balanced account, with no discernable ideological axe to grind.

But there are some drawbacks to the book as well. Most obviously, Young unavoidably misses out on the crucial post-1989 developments, including the collapse of the Soviet Union, the reunification of Germany, and recent revelations about the role of CIA-backed right-wing terrorist groups in Italy and elsewhere. There is relatively little discussion of decolonization and of Europe's role in world events. And Young's dry writing style and narrow focus on political events will not hold student interest.

Cold War Europe would be a suitable choice as a textbook in a course on post-war European political history. It would be of little use, however, in broader courses, such as