

This book is a useful tool for the non-specialist, who can glean material for lectures, topic by topic, or assign it to students, for whom the repetition is helpful rather than tedious. It is clearly written, a glossary explains technical terms, and a substantial index allows cross-referencing among chapters. There are also some useful illustrations of church interiors and clerical dress. Some of this information about the church could be incorporated into classes on Western civilization and the book could be used as an additional text in a course on the Reformation. But its greatest utility lies in courses on early modern England, a longer span of English history, or Christianity and the church. It is a thorough and insightful book that provides a firm foundation of knowledge and an invitation to further study.

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Charles Cruickshank. *Henry VIII and the Invasion of France*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990. Pp. xi, 193. \$35.00. (Originally published as *Army Royal*, 1966.)

This is the story of young Henry VIII's first major venture into international diplomacy on the battlefield in 1513. In 1511 Henry joined the Holy League to force the French out of Italy. The next year Henry sent a useless expedition of 18,000 troops into Navarre. And the next, armed with the Pope's blessing as the legitimate king of France and 2000 Imperial soldiers from Maximilian I, he led 25,000 Englishmen across the Channel to seize some French territory and win royal honor. Henry achieved that small honor after a four-month campaign, staging the invasion from English-held Calais, destroying Therouanne rather than the more strategic Bologne, winning the ill-named Battle of the Spurs (so-called for the speed at which the French cavalry ran away), and capturing the city of Tournai after a long siege. The price of princely honor was high: over £900,000—nearly six times his usual royal revenue. And only five years later Henry returned Tournai to the French king Francis I.

Cruickshank analyzes the campaign of 1513 in twelve chapters corresponding to the stages of Henry's military operation: Objective, Beach-head, Movement, Camp, Supply, Siege, Discipline, Battle, Prisoners, Negotiations, Capitulation, and Occupation. Each chapter provides a fine mix of theory and practice, describing how English actions fit within or perhaps modified traditional military practices over the previous two centuries and into the Elizabethan age.

Cruickshank's tale is told with a mastery of detail, insight, and wit. We learn that Henry divided his forces into three waves, which facilitated better movement across the Channel but retarded his effectiveness at mustering a striking force. We learn that Henry was accompanied by a personal retinue of 873 and bodyguard of 3500—14% of his total army. And we learn in the end that the great Harry did not win much here beyond making a mild honorific splash and fulfilling certain obligations to the Holy League and the Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian I. The real winners, Cruickshank concludes, were Henry's supply master, Thomas Wolsey, who gained the title of the Bishop of Tournai and proved himself worthy for higher positions at the English court; and Maximilian I, who benefitted from Henry's distracting France's attention from Italy.

Henry's invasion of France in 1513 was a mistake. Certainly the misguided effort to take and hold Tournai, even for a brief time, drained resources that should have been applied to strengthening the more strategic Channel port. And, while highly critical of their military leaders (including the king), Cruickshank praises the quality and discipline of the English common soldiers. "They might well have been devoted to a better cause," he writes.

This is an interesting and well-written book full of penetrating insights into early Tudor society. But if you have *Army Royal* you need not purchase the new version for three reasons. First, the quality of the illustrations is uneven at best, with many quite muddy. "The Battle of

the Spurs, 1513," for instance, suffers the fate of many contemporary prints in this edition, being too small and too dark to distinguish any details. Second, the additional notes at the end of each chapter are largely unnecessary if one has a good dictionary. Many of the notes are definitions of terms, taken out of the *Oxford English Dictionary*. And third and most importantly, *Henry VIII and the Invasion of France* is too expensive and specialized to service any but the most specialized course in Early Modern England. However, if you do not yet possess a copy of Cruickshank's masterly study and cannot find a used one, buy it.

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John Brewer. *The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English State, 1688-1783.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988. Pp. xxii, 290. Paper, \$11.95.

In *The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English State, 1688-1783*, John Brewer traces the emergence of what he calls "the fiscal-military state" in a period "more famous for its praise of liberty."

The military successes of the English in the eighteenth century were made possible by the government's increased effectiveness in raising money. The "sinews of power" were the government's increasingly effective devices for enforcing the collection of revenue or raising money through loans and for administering those revenues and loans. The English successes depended less on the heroism of generals and admirals and their troops and tars than on the steady competence of clerks and bookkeepers, customs collectors, and excise officers. The English "heroes, if any there are, are clerks in offices."

The bureaucracy not only expanded in numbers but also increased in efficiency. Civil administrators became as professional as military officers. Responsibilities as well as procedures became more clearly defined. Standardized methods of bookkeeping were adopted.

Economic expansion alone did not provide enough additional revenues to support the growing military-fiscal machine. The increased revenue came less from economic expansion than from the imposition of new taxes and from increasing the rates of existing taxes. Excise taxes and import duties became more important than taxes on land.

Borrowing became easier as new sources of taxes, with a vast and conscientious bureaucracy to guarantee their collection, increased the confidence of creditors. The government's applying specific taxes to specific debts further increased their confidence. The national debt came to be considered inevitable, and the holders of public securities, who were guaranteed regular incomes, considered it a good thing. The "financial interest," with all of its power and knavery, was born.

The increased power of the state made it as potentially dangerous to Englishmen at home as it was immediately oppressive to people overseas. Authority was far more concerned about the fiscal needs of the state than with what were supposed to be the traditional rights of the people. In cases involving the excise, authority considered the suspect guilty until he could prove himself innocent, and usually the law denied him any appeal to a higher court.

One might wish that Brewer had done more on this repression, though that is peripheral to his real interest. He does not point out that such an approach to prosecution was not unusual in eighteenth-century England and its colonies. In spite of the claims of such complacent apologists as Sir William Blackstone, protections for suspects and defendants were very weak. Suspects were almost always considered guilty until they could prove themselves innocent.

The danger from the government as well as the potential loss from the imposition of new taxes made it essential for merchants and craftsmen to know what Parliament was up to before it even did it. Lobbyists became important not only to plead the positions of their employers