provides a comparative basis for understanding the context in which individual Latin American countries developed.

Following an excellent prologue, "Why Latin America?", Skidmore and Smith devote a chapter to the colonial period and national periods, and a sequence of global periods, to developing their modernization/dependency theme. They then analyze comparatively the historical development from 1880 to the present of six specific countries: Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Peru, Mexico, and Cuba. Special chapters treating the Caribbean, Central America and the international relationship of Latin America to the United States and the world precede the epilogue, "What Future For Latin America?" In this last chapter, Skidmore and Smith again look at the dimensions of economic, social, and political change, concluding, "In the future, as in past centuries, the fate of Latin America will depend largely on its relationship to the centers of international power."

Although many now seriously question the viability of the dependency theory, it, in conjunction with this sequential pattern of economic, social, and political change, functions nicely as a structural framework for historical and comparative analysis. Students of recent Latin American history must question, however, the decision to leave out consideration of Venezuela/Colombia. The second edition does bring the specific histories up to date and adds the chapter on the Caribbean. Yet this glaring omission would require that this text be supplemented.

The work, nonetheless, operates splendidly for several reasons. It is easily read, includes a number of political cartoons as well as pictures, and is a reasonably balanced and objective piece. Instructors, if they so choose, would have ample opportunity to impose an interpretation. They could even use the text's thematic approach to challenge the dependency theory. Maps, graphs, a number of interesting illustrations of political and social coalitions, and some valuable statistical appendices complement a nicely written narrative. A rather extensive list of all the various heads of state is nice but of questionable value. The bibliographical statements for each chapter should be especially helpful. The text, as well, offers special insight into the present Latin American situation. The organizational themes introduced in the second chapter provide a framework for understanding contemporary affairs and for putting people like Daniel Ortega and Manuel Noreiga into historical context. This would allow instructors to divert student interest in current affairs to inquiries about how things got to be the way they are. Finally, its thematic approach works in a centripetal sense, pulling student minds toward those patterns and processes of change common to the Latin American historical experience.

This book might be appropriate for a specialized offering on the high school level. It, however, is ideally suited for the college undergraduate, for, in spite of its omissions, its use of a modified dependency approach provides an outstanding vehicle to deliver a coherent picture of Latin American history.

New Mexico Military Institute


Professor Bennett has written an overview of American nativism that will rival John Higham's classic Strangers in the Land. It is characterized by erudition and breadth. The book's arresting cover depicts its major thesis. It shows the Statue of Liberty holding the torch of freedom high while peering out from behind a Ku Klux Klan hood. As Bennett sees it, right wing political activists, from the Know Nothings of the pre-Civil War period to the "hard" rightists of the 1970s and 80s have seen themselves as sentinels defending America and her precious dream from dangerous enemies. Throughout his study, Bennett analyzes the nativist impulse in American history with an eye to its own assumptions and dynamics. Further, he provides convincing historical context for each nativist movement and its followers.

Bennett argues that the nativist movements of the 19th century, the Know Nothings and the American Protective Association in particular, were each driven by fear of massive numbers of immigrants and the alien Catholic (and to a lesser extent Jewish) religious institutions that accompanied them. Their fears may have been misplaced and their solutions irrelevant to the problems they only vaguely understood, but the nativists saw themselves as the nation's protectors against alien invaders who would destroy the promise of American life. The Red Scare of 1919, by contrast, represented the confluence of two virulent forms of nativism: one directed against alien people, the other against alien ideas. As the former disintegrated in the aftermath of immigration...
restriction, depression, and war, the latter reemerged with a vengeance after World War II. But McCarthyism barely outlived its namesake, according to Bennett, and the "New Right," "Hard Right," and Moral Majority movements of the 1970s and 1980s proposed an entirely different focus than their nativist predecessors. The nativist impulse is dead, argues Bennett, and in its place the right wing has discovered new enemies, home grown rather than imported, from which the nation must be delivered.

As a tool to teach American history, particularly nativism, The Party of Fear is likely to be unexcelled for some time. Know Nothingism, the American Protective Association, populism, the Red Scare, the Ku Klux Klan, the New Deal and its detractors, Fascist and neo-Fascist movements, McCarthyism, the John Birch Society, the religious right and televangelists, the "Hard Right" of zealots such as Richard Viguerie, even the debate over the Simpson-Mazzoli bill in the 1980s—all of these topics receive impressive attention and careful analysis. Thus, the book provides a panoramic coverage of nativism and its successors. Yet, there will be plenty of room for debate and disagreement. Bennett’s thesis that Father Coughlin’s followers represented "inverted nativism" wherein erstwhile outsiders wreaked their vengeance upon new enemies is unsatisfying. His assessment of the conflicting interpretations of McCarthyism will be difficult to follow except for the expert. His omission of the progressive reformers, Americanizers and restrictionists alike, is curious. Almost nothing appears describing the heated debate over immigration restriction from the 1880s to its triumph in the 1920s. But these are minor problems which are more than overcome by the author’s balanced and convincing analysis of so many episodes in the history of American nativism. With conviction and grace, Bennett provides a superb overview of a bewildering complex topic.

Bennett’s Party of Fear will be exciting to teach in intellectual history, immigration history, or the era of Joseph McCarthy. Its central use will be in immigration courses where it offers more sweeping and updated analysis of nativism than John Higham’s Strangers in the Land. However, it would be interesting to begin a seminar on McCarthyism with Party of Fear to demonstrate the deep historic roots of the fear of alien influence, both cultural and ideological. Obviously, a study of 500 pages is appropriate primarily in upper level courses or seminars and the classroom will have to await an affordable paperback edition.

Ithaca College

Paul W. McBride


In my reading of the history of American diplomacy by such authors as John H. Latane, Samuel Flagg Bemis, Robert H. Ferrell, and others, I have observed that there has been a reluctance on the part of American Chief Executives to dramatically alter the foreign policy of their predecessors. Perhaps this is what has given American foreign policy the appearance of continuity. President Woodrow Wilson is an exception to this. Due to dramatic changes in international relations when he was in office (1913-1921) and shifting global circumstances, he was forced to abandon a policy of non-intervention which had been the foreign policy of the country since the days of the Washington administration and pursue a policy of intervention, which for better or worse has been the policy of the country ever since, despite timid attempts to his immediate successors to change course. President Wilson at the time declared that the forces of history had made non-intervention odious anyway.

Professor Lloyd C. Gardner’s revisionist study, Safe for Democracy: The Anglo-American Response to Revolution, 1913-1923 was first published in 1984, and concerns itself with this dramatic alteration in American foreign policy that occurred during the Wilson years and Wilson’s agonizing over it. Gardner devotes most of the book to Wilson’s posture towards the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the tumultuous events that followed in its wake, and less with the Mexican Revolution brewing in this hemisphere and the Chinese Revolution of 1911-1912 in the Far East, both of which he inherited from his predecessor Taft. This ground has been gone over before the great Wilson scholar of our time, Arthur S. Link, and by Arno J. Mayer and others, so there is not anything new in the recounting of these events. What is germane in Gardner’s commentary is in terms of exposing the inherent contradictions in Wilson’s interventionist policies, not so much as regards the Mexican Revolution, with which he reached an accommodation, nor with the Chinese Revolution in which the objective was to maintain the "Open Door," but with the way he handled the Russian Revolution and