restriction, depression, and war, the latter reemerged with a vengeance after World War II. But McCarthyism barely outlived its namesake, according to Bennett, and the "New Right," "Hard Right," and Moral Majority movements of the 1970s and 1980s proposed an entirely different focus than their nativist predecessors. The nativist impulse is dead, argues Bennett, and in its place the right wing has discovered new enemies, home grown rather than imported, from which the nation must be delivered.

As a tool to teach American history, particularly nativism, The Party of Fear is likely to be unexcelled for some time. Know Nothingism, the American Protective Association, populism, the Red Scare, the Ku Klux Klan, the New Deal and its detractors, Fascist and neo-Fascist movements, McCarthyism, the John Birch Society, the religious right and televangelists, the "Hard Right" of zealots such as Richard Viguerie, even the debate over the Simpson-Mazzoli bill in the 1980s—all of these topics receive impressive attention and careful analysis. Thus, the book provides a panoramic coverage of nativism and its successors.

Yet, there will be plenty of room for debate and disagreement. Bennett's thesis that Father Coughlin's followers represented "inverted nativism" wherein erstwhile outsiders wreaked their vengeance upon new enemies is unsatisfying. His assessment of the conflicting interpretations of McCarthyism will be difficult to follow except for the expert. His omission of the progressive reformers, Americanizers and restrictionists alike, is curious. Almost nothing appears describing the heated debate over immigration restriction from the 1880s to its triumph in the 1920s. But these are minor problems which are more than overcome by the author's balanced and convincing analysis of so many episodes in the history of American nativism. With conviction and grace, Bennett provides a superb overview of a bewildering complex topic.

Bennett's Party of Fear will be exciting to teach in intellectual history, immigration history, or the era of Joseph McCarthy. Its central use will be in immigration courses where it offers more sweeping and updated analysis of nativism than John Higham's Strangers in the Land. However, it would be interesting to begin a seminar on McCarthyism with Party of Fear to demonstrate the deep historic roots of the fear of alien influence, both cultural and ideological. Obviously, a study of 500 pages is appropriate primarily in upper level courses or seminars and the classroom will have to await an affordable paperback edition.

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In my reading of the history of American diplomacy by such authors as John H. Latane, Samuel Flagg Bemis, Robert H. Ferrell, and others, I have observed that there has been a reluctance on the part of American Chief Executives to dramatically alter the foreign policy of their predecessors. Perhaps this is what has given American foreign policy the appearance of continuity. President Woodrow Wilson is an exception to this. Due to dramatic changes in international relations when he was in office (1913-1921) and shifting global circumstances, he was forced to abandon a policy of non-intervention which had been the foreign policy of the country since the days of the Washington administration and pursue a policy of intervention, which for better or worse has been the policy of the country ever since, despite timid attempts to his immediate successors to change course. President Wilson at the time declared that the forces of history had made non-intervention odious anyway.

Professor Lloyd C. Gardner's revisionist study, Safe for Democracy: The Anglo-American Response to Revolution, 1913-1923 was first published in 1984, and concerns itself with this dramatic alteration in American foreign policy that occurred during the Wilson years and Wilson's agonizing over it. Gardner devotes most of the book to Wilson's posture towards the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the tumultuous events that followed in its wake, and less with the Mexican Revolution brewing in this hemisphere and the Chinese Revolution of 1911-1912 in the Far East, both of which he inherited from his predecessor Taft. This ground has been gone over before the great Wilson scholar of our time, Arthur S. Link, and by Arno J. Mayer and others, so there is not anything new in the recounting of these events. What is germane in Gardner's commentary is in terms of exposing the inherent contradictions in Wilson's interventionist policies, not so much as regards the Mexican Revolution, with which he reached an accommodation, nor with the Chinese Revolution in which the objective was to maintain the "Open Door," but with the way he handled the Russian Revolution and
the ideological implications of it for the world of that time. The events of World War I precipitated the Russian Revolution of 1917, and had the revolution not been betrayed by Lenin and the Bolsheviks, President Wilson and the other leaders of the Western democracies might have been able to reach an accommodation with Russia as had been the case in China where the ideological implications were less stressful. The problem was how to keep the contagion of revolution in check. Wilson's lofty liberal idealism dictated that this could be done through a form of international organization which eventually materialized in the League of Nations in the early 1920s. Under the guiding principle of "self-determination of peoples" which he enunciated in the "Fourteen Points" as a rebuttal to Lenin's "April theses", legitimate nationalistic aspirations within the dismembered colonial empires at the end of World War I could be vented. This he and his "National Security Advisor", Colonel Edward House, mistakenly thought would lessen the appeal of Bolshevism in these areas. But did it? As the events in Russia between 1919-1923 show, Wilson's ideological warmaking did not square with his policy of military intervention. How could the world be made "safe for democracy" with American troops on Russian soil fighting to bring the Bolsheviks down from power in the Russian Civil War? This is the essence of the contradiction.

This book, as with all of Gardner's books that I have read, is pretty deep-wading, even for those versed in the history of American diplomacy. I found the going quite difficult in places and feel therefore that only students in upper level courses and graduate courses would be able to comprehend the sweep of this highly acclaimed study. It would be useful in my estimation in a course in Twentieth Century American history or perhaps in an advanced course in the history of American diplomacy. The book is beautifully suited for a course in international relations in the Twentieth Century, but there are few colleges and universities that offer such a course, that I know of. Students should follow up Safe for Democracy with Gardner's highly acclaimed, A Covenant with Power: American and World Order from Wilson to Reagan (1984) for an answer to Wilson's probing statement that he made towards the end of his fateful presidency. "The world has been made safe for democracy ... . But democracy has not yet made the world safe against irrational revolution. That supreme task, which is nothing less than the salvation of civilization, now faces democracy, insistent, imperative. There is no escaping it, unless everything we have built up is presently to fall in ruin about us; and the United States, as the greatest of democracies, must undertake it." It would appear, given the recent changes in the Soviet Union and the East bloc, that the revolutionaries themselves, seventy or so years after the Bolshevik takeover in Russia, are becoming parties to making the world safe for democracy. President Wilson's vision has been redeemed.

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