Randall M. Miller has edited the letters well, with copious footnotes and explanatory introductions explaining the variety of anomalies expected in any set of letters. The first letter was written in 1834, the last in 1865. There is a sound bibliography, updated from the first edition in 1978. An updated preface and eight letters and an introduction are added to the new edition. The text is so well compiled that I had no need to try out the eleven-page index, which looks superb.

Enhancing the value of standard English and United States patriotism is appropriate at both undergraduate and graduate levels. Where the need exists, Dear Master serves especially well to enhance those values.

Thomas Nelson Community College

Raymond J. Jirran


In a succinct book, James P. Duffy relates the commonly accepted and not-so-commonly accepted errors Adolf Hitler made that could have and possibly did cause Nazi Germany to lose the Second World War. With the plethora of monographs covering the causes of World War II, the Nazi era in Germany, and the numerous other topics surrounding the conflict, Duffy's work is refreshing. Duffy prepared this work to rebuff the many popular novels of the 1970s and 1980s that preyed upon the "what if" syndrome relating to Hitler's errors. He attempts to academically answer the question, "How close did Hitler really come to victory?"

Hitler's errors are divided into two basic areas: Hitler's failure to develop a long-range plan and his ideas as to the importance of his personal will as a tool for victory. With these two basic "faults" in military leadership, Duffy chronologically traces Hitler's blunders from underestimating the resolve of France and Britain to support Poland in 1939 to the lack of financial and scientific support for the development of the atomic bomb and jet aircraft in 1944. Throughout, Duffy relates the widely accepted views of Göring's failures to crush the enemy at Dunkirk and to rid Britain of its airfields early during the conflict. The advance into Russia and Hitler's stubbornness not to retreat from the Soviets led to the destruction of the Eastern army. Because "Hitler slept late" and would not receive "news" until after he breakfasted, the Allies gained a strong foothold at Normandy that the reserve Panzer units could not shake loose. The not-so-accepted "blunders" focus on the development of "miracle weapons," or better yet, the non-development of the proper miracle weapons. This chapter was most interesting, even if argumentative.

The bibliography is adequate but support relies heavily upon secondary sources, especially Ronald Lewin's *Hitler's Mistakes* to discern the ill-fated blunders. I would like to have Duffy discuss Hitler's timing for the invasion of Poland, not from the standpoint of Anglo-French resolve but more from the preparedness of Germany to fight an extended conflict. This is briefly mentioned, but would be better served if covered more thoroughly with primary sources for support. I also wanted more on Hitler's psychological maladjustments, which led to his megalomania, stubbornness, and many of his irrational decisions. This idea underlies much of Duffy's implications as to why Hitler acted as he did, but is never fully treated.

How close was Hitler to winning the war? I would like to think Hitler was never very close. But James Duffy provides convincing argument to support his belief that Hitler was close, extremely close to victory, especially if he had not slept late.

L. V. Berkner High School

William Scott Igo