
Onetime Reader in International Relations at the University of Sussex, Peter Calvocoressi has written extensively on recent history, diplomacy, and international politics. This volume is an engaging, if sometimes polemical, interpretive essay that sets forth the advantages for Europe of proceeding with further development of the European Community to replace the older, divisive sovereign state system, itself a European invention. Calvocoressi considers the sovereign state an instrument of fragmentation, its regulation by shifting alliances over the centuries designed to preserve the independence of the several states by maintaining a balance and preventing domination by any one unit. In the European state system "the parts were more important than the whole."

Nonetheless, the preponderance of a united Germany became the principal feature of European history after 1870. Temporarily overcome by the First World War, Germany resumed its dominance in the 1930s. The "German Menace" was succeeded by the "Russian Menace" after the Second World War, with Central and Eastern Europe enveloped within the Soviet orbit. The Cold War, spreading from an initial conflict over Germany to embrace much of the world, introduced an ideological element into a contest dominated by two superpowers, one that left western Europe seemingly a creature of the United States. The "depreciation" of both superpowers, especially that of the Soviet Union, is considered by the author as an unalloyed good in affording to Europe a splendid opportunity to solidify the European community.

The last and most interesting section of this study addresses the new patterns that have become evident since the Second World War. Among the most felicitous, the author argues, is the rapprochement between France and Germany, a development whose desirable results were grasped by De Gaulle and, belatedly, Adenauer, followed by Giscard d'Estaing and Helmut Schmidt. This mutually advantageous reconciliation lay at the crux of a reinvigorated Europe. The integration of German power in a larger Europe appears to the author to be the best hope for both the preservation of German democracy and the prevention of a resumption of German domination.

Calvocoressi devotes an excellent chapter to Britain's failure to grasp the first opportunities afforded for European integration and its wrongheaded attempt to stake its future on "two will-o-the-wisps"—one the Commonwealth, an intriguing but artificial connection, the other the alleged "special relationship" with the United States which, the author contends, was based on little beyond the personal connection forged between Churchill and Roosevelt. Reliance on the United States, moreover, led the British, once they did join the European community, to behave in an "embarrassingly petulant" manner. Margaret Thatcher's confrontational style coupled with her allegedly simplistic monetarist thinking further delayed the maturing of the European community.

That community, Calvocoressi argues, is a peculiarly western European phenomenon. Created in 1957 and expanded from the European Coal and Steel Community of 1951, the original six became nine in 1973 and then added Greece, Spain, and Portugal in the eighties. The author argues the community risks weakening if it accedes to temptations to incorporate additional central and eastern European countries, and contends that the concept of a Europe split into two parts long preceded its traditional attribution to the Second World War and the Cold War.

The "resilience" referred to in the title is intended as a measure of Europe's adaptability to new conditions, surely not to any moral quality that, the author suggests, has sometimes hampered American foreign policy. This is a sophisticated study that would be suitable for

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advanced undergraduates and graduate students, but assumes a background in European history that less advanced American students will ordinarily lack.


This collection of essays focuses on that period of history from 1890 to 1945 that other publishers refer to as the end of the European era, or something to that effect. Such texts usually concluded a series in the history of modern Europe, but as the post war/cold war wore on, another volume was needed to cover events since 1945. And now the events of the late eighties and nineties seem to demand another concluding volume. This volume, edited by Paul Hayes of Oxford University, is part of the Themes in Modern European History series that is targeted at an undergraduate audience. Hayes does more than edit, since he and Philip Bell of the University of Liverpool wrote eight of the twelve entries in this book that thematically treats a period of tremendous change and upheaval in Europe.

Since the work seeks a university audience (primarily upper-level history majors), the authors provide a standard fare of interpretations based on current secondary literature. Each essay contains a very useful annotated bibliography that will be of immeasurable help to students. The essays by Hayes do have a common theme. Whether discussing pre-1914 Germany, France, Austria-Hungary, and Russia, or, later, Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, he keeps returning to the idea of the changed relationship between the individual and the state: Was the state an expression of individual or collective wills? While certainly not original, Hayes does bring out nicely the idea that the absorption of the masses into politics goes far in explaining such movements as Fascism and Nazism. And now even Leninism can be seen as nothing more than a bizarre excess of intellectual modernism and/or an outcrop of early twentieth-century idealism and revolutionary puritanism. Philip Bell competently covers the origins of World War I and World War II, although in the latter case he does not go beyond what he previously wrote in the *Origins of the Second World War in Europe* (1986). Michael Biddess, the general editor of the series for Routledge, covers the cultural history of the period in two selections. He presents the Valhalla of modernism in a clear, unpretentious style: Einstein, Freud, Nietzsche, Durkheim, Weber, Woolf, Ibsen, Proust, Picasso, Stravinsky, Wittgenstein, and Joyce, concluding with H. G. Wells's pessimistic last work of 1945, *Mind at the End of its Tether*, where he predicted the extinction of mankind. Biddess uses Wells's journey from an earlier scientific utopian optimism to his final gloomy assessment as a trope for the history of Europe from 1890 to 1945. What I do find extraordinary is the lack of any mention of cinema, arguably the most influential and popular art form of the twentieth century. Essays by Edward Acton on the state and society under Lenin and Stalin, a particularly important theme given the reassessment now taking place in the new post-Soviet Russia, and by Nicholas Atkin on France in the years 1918-1945, complete this useful anthology. Instructors can not only assign the book as supplemental reading for courses in modern European history, but may themselves find it useful for its synthesis, bibliographies, and as a source for that pithy phrase or anecdote so sought after to enliven a lecture.

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