introduction, really a bibliographic essay, is incisive as are the introductions to each section. Every narrative contains bibliographic notes indicating where each section can be found in its entirety.

If *Voices of the Old South* has a failing, it is simply that of over-abundance. The ten sections and 404 pages contain a total of 78 selections, with the sections on religion and foreign voices being the most repetitive. Instructors assigning this volume will undoubtedly wish to assign only specific essays rather than the entire book. The absence of an index and concluding statement, not unusual in works of this type, should not deter its use. On the contrary, its generally sparkling selections and refreshing lack of factual and typographical errors should enable readers to, in Gallay's words, "enter a dialogue with those who lived in the past and observed these events for themselves. They speak to us in their work, and we speak to them in ours."

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Frank Warren's *Liberals & Communism,* originally published in 1966, still remains a valuable contribution to scholarship on the interrelationship between communism and liberalism during the depression decade of the 1930s. In the intervening years since its publication, the world has changed remarkably. The Vietnam War, which was escalating in 1966, culminated by the mid-1970s in the moral defeat and withdrawal of American troops. With the decline of the antiwar-based New Left after the war's conclusion, continued conservative domination of the White House, and the collapse of Communism, an author may be tempted to be either more accepting of the relationship between liberalism and Communism or more critical. This book is unrevised with the exception of a preface to the new edition in which Warren basically stands by his views of 27 years ago.

*Liberals and Communism* remains a volume staunchly critical of "liberal apologists" for Stalinism, albeit from what the author terms a "democratic left perspective." However, this perspective is undefined, nor is it made clear how his growing up in a family whose politics was "war-time popular frontism" informed his interpretation of the liberal-communism relationship. Clarity, however, is not lacking in Warren's demonstration of liberal failure to apply the same critical democratic standards to the Soviet Union that they apply to the United States. Liberals writing in such journals as *The Nation,* *New Republic,* and *Common Sense* often rationalized or denied the brutalities of Stalin's regime from forced collectivization and the Moscow purge trials to the hypocritical Nazi-Soviet Pact. Warren, however, avoids reducing complex political developments to simplistic generalizations such as a "monolithic liberal capitulation to Stalinism" found in the writings of Eugene Lyons and Irving Kristol. Warren employs three broad classifications of liberal attitudes toward the Soviet Union and Communism: (1) Anti-communist liberals; (2) Russian sympathizers; (3) Fellow travelers. For some anti-communist liberals like John Dewey, Carl Becker, Charles Beard, Morris Cohen, Archibald MacLeish, or Elmer Davis, Soviet Communism involved a totally regulated life characterized by the absence of freedom and the use of terror. For other liberals like Corliss Lamont, Jerome Davis, or Louis Fischer, Russia remained a model and a beacon of hope.

Russian sympathizers, according to Warren, fell in between these two poles. George Soule of the *New Republic,* Roger Baldwin of the American Civil Liberties Union, and economist Stuart Chase were impressed by Soviet economic progress while minimizing their lack of political freedom. Perhaps in a decade of the greatest economic depression in American history, these liberals were willing to ignore Soviet excesses and bifurcate freedom into "economic democracy" and "political democracy" and consequently diminish in importance the lack of the latter.
The rise of Fascism provoked great changes in Soviet foreign policy and the policies of the American Communist Party, from the formation of the anti-fascist Popular Front in 1935 with emphasis on "collective security" to an isolationist stance following the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939. These policy reversals, along with the Spanish Civil War and the Moscow purge trials in 1936, divided liberals and certainly negated any idea of a monolithic liberal response even among left-liberals. Norman Thomas and Alfred Bingham did not support the Popular Front, while the New Republic, Max Lerner, and Roger Baldwin were supporters. The Nation supported "collective security," while the New Republic opposed it. The Nazi-Soviet Pact and Soviet invasions of Poland, Finland, and the Baltic States greatly increased liberal dissatisfaction with the Soviet Union. Anti-communist liberals felt vindicated in their position, fellow travelers divided, and Russian sympathizers responded in varying degrees of criticism.

Warren correctly attributes liberal rationalization of anti-democratic Soviet behavior to their automatic endowment of a left-of-center government with a progressive character that allowed the ends to justify the means. Less convincing is his assertion that the "liberal mind" is "congenitally unaware of the depths of human evil" and therefore predisposed to disbelieve the worst about the Soviet Union. This greater ignorance of human history by liberals was not proven by the author.

Warren has written a valuable study of a turbulent decade. It is an excellent work for a graduate class or advanced undergraduate class on the 1930s. However, the Byzantine nature of left politics and the turgid prose would make the volume unsuitable for high school or college-level American history survey courses. A serious gap exists in the failure to look at the position of the Communist Party, liberals, and the Soviet Union regarding the American race problem. Nevertheless, for those concerned with the historiography of ideology in the Great Depression, it is a necessity.

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Strom Thurmond has come more than full circle in his political career. From recalcitrant Democratic segregationist (prior to filibustering a civil rights bill, he spent three days in a sauna to dehydrate himself so he would not have to urinate) to Republican proponent of the Martin Luther King holiday; from fringe presidential candidate in 1948 to newly-empowered Senate leader today; the 92 year-old Thurmond has never been too far from the shifting cross-currents in the material and ideological winds that signal social change.

Thurmond’s political career path, however, began, and until relatively recently continued, on a course that veered very little from a consistent conservatism, particularly that brand of conservatism that insisted upon maintaining continuities with the South’s racial heritage. This career is highlighted in Nadine Cohodas’s well-researched, engagingly written, and important new biography, Strom Thurmond and the Politics of Southern Change. Combining rigorous use of primary sources with the journalist’s pen, Cohodas presents a picture of Thurmond as “the most energetic, vocal and consistent defender” of the white southern cause, though not its chief strategist or most astute tactician. But Thurmond also played a critical role in two transformative developments in the South and the nation, she argues: the revolution in race relations, seen most directly in black political strength; and the realignment of the two major parties in the South. In fighting tenaciously against the first transformation, he emerged as the “premier Southern Republican,” perhaps presaging the recent strength of the party at all levels in the South.

Race—as Ulrich B. Philips argued in 1918, W. J. Cash suggested in 1941, and Dan Carter, Dwight Billings, and Michael Goldfield have more recently observed—provided the central theme of southern life in the political arena. Thurmond often acted on the basis of this theme throughout his public career, from