In politics Steigerwald sees the 1968 defeat of Hubert H. Humphrey marking the end of the New Deal coalition based on the party machines, organized labor, the white working class, and southern conservatives. What emerged is the New Politics of left-leaning civil rights advocates, mainstream women’s organizations, academic remnants of the university revolts, and by 1972 gay liberation and environmentalists. The New Deal groups could not relate to the New Politics and the result was demonstrated in McGovern’s historic defeat when he captured only Massachusetts and the District of Columbia.

The chapters are nice summaries and analyses of the various movements of the sixties. These chapters could be a good source of lectures on a particular aspect of the decade. There is also a large annotated bibliography organized for each chapter. The paperback version would be worthwhile considering for supplemental reading for a more advanced course.

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Skowronek, a Yale political science professor, has conceived a new framework for examining the leadership of United States presidents in the past. He contends that there have been four different modes of governmental operations in which presidents have had to work. (1) The Patrician mode of 1789-1832 was one in which the characteristic presidential resource was his personal reputation among notables and his typical strategy was to stand as national tribune above faction and interest. (2) In the Partisan mode from 1832 to 1900, party organization and executive patronage constituted the characteristic presidential resource, and the typical strategy was to act as a broker for the national coalition by distributing patronage to party factions and local machines. (3) The Pluralist mode from 1900 to 1972 was a period when the characteristic presidential resource was the expanding executive establishment needed to attend to newly nationalized interests and America’s rise to world power; the typical strategy was to bargain with leaders of all institutions and organized interests as the main steward of national policy making. (4) In the Plebiscitary mode, from 1972 to the present, Skowronek maintains that the main resource the president had was his independent political apparatus and mass communication technologies, while the typical strategy was to appeal for political support over the heads of Washington elites directly to the people at large.

It is the author’s thesis that it is these changing modes of governmental operations that account for what he sees as recurring patterns in leadership characteristics throughout the history of the presidency. Consequently, he examines in considerable detail the leadership of Presidents Jefferson, Monroe, John Quincy Adams, Jackson, Polk, Pierce, Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, Hoover, Franklin Roosevelt, Lyndon Johnson, and Jimmy Carter, and winds up with a brief look at Reagan, Bush, and Clinton. His argument is that the presidents that we have seen as important leaders have been Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, FDR, and Reagan, who reconstructed the new modes. Skowronek calls Monroe, Polk, Theodore Roosevelt, LBJ, and, in a way, Bush, “faithful sons,” or “articulators,” of the new mode. Finally, he argues that presidents who have been seen as poor leaders had the misfortune of presiding at the point of disjunction for the old modes. In this category he discusses the leadership of John Quincy Adams, Franklin Pierce, Herbert Hoover, and Jimmy Carter. In the process of doing this the author comes up with many original insights. Most of them will have to be taken into account by political scientists and historians who study the matter of presidential leadership.

Although his book is not easy to read, once the reader gains an understanding of Skowronek’s framework and his thesis, reading is not at all a chore for anyone who has a good knowledge of United States political history. Skowronek knows his history and his broad generalizations about presidential leadership in different eras rest on his mastery of a mass of historical facts. If students or other readers
Nevertheless, of what White Collidic and I believe he gives too much emphasis to the 1975 investigation of the Central Intelligence Agency. John President with conflicting or absent historical evidence. 8. denied them the chance to finish what they had begun. In a way, these two men shared a single "presidential period" that was fated to be linked together, both in the popular mind and in historical interpretation. Most Americans would probably describe them as decent men who tried their best in difficult times, with modest if any success and few if any lasting accomplishments. In fact, most people might have difficulty differentiating between the two presidents. Oh, the occasional person would mention Ford’s pardon of Richard Nixon, and surely Carter’s role in brokering a framework for peace in the Middle East would not go entirely unnoticed. Certain details would also stick in the public mind: Ford’s occasional gaffes and errant golf balls, Carter’s sweater and reputed encounter with a crazed rabbit—and the gray, stricken faces of both men as they ultimately conceded the political defeat that denied them the chance to finish what they had begun.

In a way, these two men shared a single “presidential period” that was squeezed between the intensity and turmoil of the Nixon years and the polarizing impact of the Reagan years. Their seven years in the White House will inevitably be overshadowed by what came before and after; most interpreters will not be able to avoid the temptation to treat them, together, as a mere interlude between two more interesting eras. Unfortunately, in their case the whole will probably be seen as smaller than the sum of the two parts.

From the perspective of these two authors, the conventional view of Ford and Carter is actually pretty close to the truth: They did not succeed, and they left little to show for their work. They should be linked together, for both leaders shared an inability to make the political process—virtually unchanged between 1974 and 1980—function successfully. They also shared certain intractable problems—“stagflation,” the ups and down of detente with the Russians, energy shortages, the Middle East, and more. Both men, though certainly well-meaning, seemed captive to events, surrounded by ineffectual administrations (to say nothing of a fickle public), unable to develop or articulate clear plans for their administrations, and ultimately unsuited for the presidency—though for somewhat different reasons.

In Ford’s case, according to Greene, the problem was that he did not have “an executive mindset” and too often let political expediency rule his decision-making. In addition, the shift of power from the White House to Capitol Hill blunted Ford’s ability to govern and to lead. Greene’s strengths include his economic and political analysis, but in my opinion he pushes a bit too hard his argument that Congress was “the beneficiary of [a] Power Earthquake.” His writing shows tinges of 1960s rhetoric in places, and I believe he gives too much emphasis to the 1975 investigation of the Central Intelligence Agency. Nevertheless, Greene’s volume on Ford shows an impressive grasp of its subject and excels at dealing with conflicting or absent historical evidence.

In Carter’s case, according to Kaufman, the problem was, ironically, actually the opposite: The President continued to view himself as a political outsider, stubbornly followed his own mind (or sense of what was right), failed to galvanize his own administration, and unwisely held his course in the face of