drawn from the ranks!) made the war "not the last of the old order [as Piers Mackesy and others argue], but the first of the new." Thus this volume is an excellent choice to launch the publisher's "Modern Wars" series.

Conway demonstrates that the belligerents were more evenly matched than often depicted, even after other European powers entered the war against Britain. While those nations possessed larger populations, armies, and navies, Britain continued to have the stronger economy and a tax and credit system better able to sustain a world-wide struggle. Indeed, Conway devotes much more attention to operations in the Caribbean, Africa, and India than does Ward.

Historians have long assessed the impact of the War on American society, but Conway extends this analysis to Great Britain where the "war's impact was both wide-ranging and profound." It significantly altered the economy, made it possible for Ireland to gain greater independence, led to pressure for constitutional reform, and increased the popularity of the monarchy. The most important change it wrought in warfare in general involved not technology or tactics, but society: It was the first "people's war" not just for the new United States but also for Britain where "a higher proportion of Britons and Irishmen served as soldiers, sailors, militiamen or volunteers than in any previous war." It was for them, as well as for Americans "an ideological struggle . . . that divided the political nation." These conclusions, amply supported by extensive quotations from common people and leaders on both sides, make Conway's book a worthy companion to Piers Mackesy's *The War for America 1775-1783* (1964), the standard study of strategy and operations from the British perspective.

The books nicely complement one another. Very few quotations from primary sources appear in these works. Each offers clues to the authors' respective nationality–Ward's is betrayed, in one example, by his locating Whitehaven, the town raided by John Paul Jones, in Scotland rather than in England, an error few Britons would make, and Conway's by his reference to Jones as a privateer (Jones never held a letter of marque), rather than as a commissioned officer in the Continental Navy. Minor cavils aside, both books can be read for profit to refresh one's memory of events as a summary of the historiography concerning the war, and even to gain apt quotations for supporting points made in the classroom.

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Stanley Harrold. *The Abolitionists and the South, 1831-1861*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1995. Pp. x, 245. Cloth, $29.95. ISBN 0-8131-1906-5.

Doubtless the abolitionists and the antislavery crusade before the Civil War represented the most important reform movement in nineteenth-century American history. Harrold's work focuses on Southern abolitionists, the men and women who were the most outspoken opponents of slavery, and on their efforts within the South to do away with the institution altogether. In so doing, he attempts to modify some current considerations and understandings of abolitionists and of their role in the coming of the Civil War. To him, two older perceptions that need revision stand out, the first that, after Nat Turner's revolt in 1831, abolitionists pulled out of the South and concentrated on immediatism, mainly through Garrison's propaganda efforts, and, lastly, that they little influenced the coming sectional struggle, especially in the South.

Emphasizing analysis and not chronological summary, Harrold's chapters do not add up to a history of the antislavery movement or of abolitionists in the South. Instead, a topical arrangement points to the integration of southern antislavery efforts within northern immediatism during the three decades before the Civil War. Purely historiographical, his first chapter reviews the historical literature related to the antislavery movement. The next two highlight images of southern white emancipators and black liberators, thereby establishing that northern abolitionists did not lose interest in noninterventional efforts in the South after 1831 and, further, that blacks and whites in the South worked together in an effort that helped shape a more aggressive northern abolitionist reform culture as well. The last chapters dramatize

John Brown's forerunners, the personal price of preaching an abolitionist gospel in the South, attempts at forming antislavery colonies in the upper South, and, finally, from their direct role in the coming of the Civil War through efforts at transforming the South after the war, the legacy of abolitionist efforts in the South.

For those of us who teach history almost daily and who read *Teaching History*, what significance should be given to the additive or analytical value of Harrold's work? What does it add to the body of knowledge already extant on abolitionists and the South? In terms of analysis, what new insights or perceptions are revealed? Not much. Seemingly a reworked doctoral dissertation, the scholarly appendages, i.e., footnotes, bibliography, notes, indexes, and introduction, constitute more than thirty percent of the book. While a useful reference and bibliographical source on the antislavery movement, *Abolitionists and the South* should appeal more to upper-division research and seminar courses and less to general surveys of American history. Indeed, any teacher would do well to presuppose a class or a student's knowledge and familiarity with abolitionism before assigning Harrold's work. Moreover, even the recommendation of using *Abolitionists and the South* perhaps should carry with it the thought that its chief usage lies in its research and bibliographical value. Well written and graceful in style, broad-brushed and compendious in scope, Harrold's *Abolitionists and the South* has only marginal value for most teachers of history.

University of North Carolina - Asheville   Milton Ready

Craig M. Cameron. *American Samurai: Myth, Imagination, and the Conduct of Battle in the First Marine Division, 1941-1951*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Pp. xiii, 320. Cloth, $24.95.

Craig M. Cameron of the History Department at Old Dominion University has written an interesting, readable, well-researched examination of the First Marine Division during the Second World War, the occupation of northern China, and the Korean War. As a former Marine himself, Cameron brings a unique insight into this study of "the myth and imagination" displayed by the members of the First Marine Division. Indeed, Cameron sees some close similarities between the Japanese samurai and their Marine counterparts. His book explores how a variety of institutional and cultural ideas influenced and continues to influence the Marine Corps.

American Samurai is not a traditional work of military history, but rather an examination of the myths and the responses of First Division Marines to the stresses of war and organizational limits. This book grew out of Cameron's doctoral thesis and postdoctoral research. It reflects the wealth of primary materials available from the U.S. Army Military History Institute, the U.S. Naval Historical Center, and the U.S. Marine Corps Historical Center. *American Samurai* incorporates original material, oral histories, and combat art into an insightful, imaginative examination of the myth and magic of the Marine Corps.

Cameron starts his investigation into the "myth and imagination" of the Marine Corps in World War I and the banana wars of the inter-war period. The Marine Corps's search for a role in the American defense establishment and its cultivation of heroic images is described in a light that may ruffle feathers, but it does bring out a new view of this period and how the Marine Corps fit into it. Truly this book is not another description of battles and campaigns, but rather a description of the ideological background and influences that affected the wartime performance of individual Marines on the battlefield.

Cameron sees a close relationship between the integration of new weapons and technology, such as the flame thrower, and the "ideological fanaticism cultivated as part of the institutional self-image" of the Marine Corps. He traces how the Marines of the First Marine Division "harnessed their warrior ethos to this new technology and merged it with their individual identity as Marines." These images of total war, according to Cameron, would affect the conduct of operations for the next thirty years. While the author