of facts, statistics, and analysis provided (e.g., the availability of statistics made crime national and the criminal a national bogeyman). There are two mid-point chapters of assessment and a concluding one that ought to be studied attentively, while the rest can be devoured or picked at like cooked birds at a holiday feast, all depending on how hungry one is for each particular dish served. In the process, we come to understand what constituted the Victorian frame of mind, on both sides of the legal divide.

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In the absence of a new, all-encompassing interpretation of the French Revolution of 1789 to replace the seductively simple Marxist triumph of the bourgeoisie, its historiography has become kaleidoscopic. Hence, the Revolution provides the perfect training ground for building students’ analytical skills. When confronted with the multiplicity of perspectives on the Revolution, they quickly realize how present preoccupations bear upon our view of the past, as well as how our view of the past influences present attitudes and assumptions. The two books under review are a case in point: They could not vary more greatly in their conceptions of the Revolution’s significance. Whereas Lynn Hunt sees the debates of 1789-94 as the key to understanding current western notions of human rights, T.C.W. Blanning views the wars of 1787-1802 as having laid the foundation for Nazi Germany. Each is writing for a particular series so their approaches, of course, differ, but ironically so: Hunt seeks to stimulate argument while Blanning tends toward polemic.

Anyone who has required students to analyze primary sources will know how the task generates enthusiasm in some and causes paralysis in others. Course-readers tend to be intimidating in size and scope. Editors of the Bedford series have devised the perfect solution by soliciting short document collections, each organized around a specific theme. Hunt leads off by exploring the implications of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 being based on the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789. There is a 31-page introduction that frames the problem, explains the historical context, and introduces the forty documents. Debates on rights in revolutionary France concerned four marginalized groups: the poor and unpropertied, religious minorities and persons of questionable profession (actors and executioners), free blacks and slaves, and women. For Hunt, the period’s most revolutionary aspect consists in legislators having felt compelled to debate the rights of these groups in spite of society’s deeply ingrained prejudices. Indeed, the contemporary sources she excerpts convey the tension between long-held views, practical considerations, and abstract principles. For instance, she
invites students to determine how Pierre Gaspard Chaumette could so eloquently defend the rights of slaves, then become apoplectic at the thought of granting political rights to women.

Hunt by no means glorifies the Revolution or its principles. At the onset she confronts the implications of human rights’ vagueness as a concept and investigates the muddling of political with civil rights in the eighteenth-century. Yet she leaves students to decide for themselves whether the universalism of the Revolution’s “rights of man” was simply premature or inherently flawed. Hunt provides a clear and concise account of how natural-law and natural-rights philosophies evolved in the course of the eighteenth-century, how the events of the revolution unfolded (and appends a brief chronology), and the practical problems that dogged each. She includes study questions and a focused bibliography. So equipped, students will be encouraged to grapple with the arguments offered by the revolutionaries themselves, and evaluate their sincerity and practicality under the circumstances.

Blanning, on the other hand, dismisses revolutionary rhetoric: “The political culture created by the French Revolution—even in its very early stages—was radical, abstract, intolerant, and collectivist.” The supposedly universalist notion of national sovereignty actually excluded—indeed, constituted a declaration of war against—the privileged orders. Blanning does an excellent job of demonstrating how the Revolution must be viewed in the context of earlier eighteenth-century European conflicts and how war dictated its policies. Each chapter begins with a key battle—Frederick the Great’s humiliation of the French at Rossbach in 1757, Austria’s routing of the Turks at Belgrade in 1789, the French victory at Valmy in 1792, then Flures in 1793, and Lodi in 1796, the turnaround at Aboukir, and finally Bonaparte’s triumph at Marengo—then discusses its background and significance. Blanning argues that France’s humiliating military defeats brought a decline in national prestige and monarchical power. The resulting erosion of morale combined with the government’s clumsy attempts at reforming the army caused loyalty to deteriorate to the point of allowing the revolutionaries to capture the state’s agency of legitimate force.

Unfortunately, Blanning’s political agenda detracts from his assessment of the interplay between international relations and domestic policy. Revolutionary principles, for him, are epitomized in the atrocities of the mob and the soldiers who raped and pillaged their way through Europe under the pretense of liberation. He likens the speeches in support of the levée en masse in 1793 to Goebbels whipping up frenzy for total war in 1943 (and thumbs his nose at the historian who advised him not to let this analogy see print). Similarly, when discussing the Pope’s condemnation of the Civil Constitution of the Clergy and the Declaration of the Rights of Man, he indulges in a parenthetical observation: “And if one is tempted to ask Joseph Stalin’s sneering question: ‘how many divisions does the Pope have?’ one should remember the fate of the Soviet Union, doubtless observed without regret by a Polish-born pope.” Nothing positive came from the greedy, deluded, and frenzied French.
In his preface, Blanning rejoices at signs of the late-nineteenth-century diplomatic history tradition reviving. Hopefully this does not mean we have to endure neo-nationalist history along with it.

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Michael Broers, Lecturer in History at Leeds University and author of *Europe under Napoleon, 1799-1815*, has just published the succeeding volume in the same series, New Frontiers in History. The series intends to provide broad-ranging textbooks emphasizing historical methods and knowledge of sources in fields characterized by revisionism or substantial disagreement.

*Europe after Napoleon* contains 120 pages of text, twelve of document excerpts, and eight of bibliographical essay. Judging the standard textbook on this era for a generation, Jacques Droz’s *Europe between Revolutions, 1815-1848*, to be “far from adequate” for finding no new ideas in the era, Broers prefers the approach of P.W. Shroeder’s recent *The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848*. There was really no restoration, in this view, but there was a new system of international politics. As for domestic politics, however, Broers is dissatisfied with the conclusions of Droz, Shroeder, and Adolfo Omedeo. Instead, Broers contends that “the men of Restoration Europe forged their own, unique political culture, to confront the problems of their own times.” It formed quickly and lasted until the economic changes of the 1840s. “The Restoration,” he concludes, “must ... be treated on its own merits, and through the study of its own preoccupations.”

Broers is at his best carefully defining both the essence and nuances of contending political ideologies, confidently separating the strands of political thought and being careful to craft his definitions in terms of the era itself, not later eras using the same labels with different meanings. After a brief chapter setting the international context of the debates begun in 1814 over the future of Europe, his remaining chapters examine these ideologies in turn: Conservatism, Liberalism, Reaction, Radicalism (democracy), Socialism, and Nationalism. The final section studies Revolutions. Broers concludes that the traditional labels “right” and “left” are confusing because Conservatism and Liberalism had similarities as “the ideologies of those in power,” while Reaction and Radicalism were both romantic opposition movements, and Socialism and Nationalism were new forces more important to the future than to this era.

Broers’s book integrates Britain into the history of European great powers, which British studies often have not. But it is even more unusual in that it discusses ideological struggles in southern and eastern Europe, though Germany receives little attention. The