In his preface, Blanning rejoices at signs of the late-nineteenth-century diplomatic history tradition reviving. Hopefully this does not mean we have to endure neo-nationalist history along with it.

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Michael Broers, Lecturer in History at Leeds University and author of *Europe under Napoleon, 1799-1815,* has just published the succeeding volume in the same series, New Frontiers in History. The series intends to provide broad-ranging textbooks emphasizing historical methods and knowledge of sources in fields characterized by revisionism or substantial disagreement.

*Europe after Napoleon* contains 120 pages of text, twelve of document excerpts, and eight of bibliographical essay. Judging the standard textbook on this era for a generation, Jacques Droz’s *Europe between Revolutions, 1815-1848,* to be “far from adequate” for finding no new ideas in the era, Broers prefers the approach of P.W. Shroeder’s recent *The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848.* There was really no restoration, in this view, but there was a new system of international politics. As for domestic politics, however, Broers is dissatisfied with the conclusions of Droz, Shroeder, and Adolfo Omedeo. Instead, Broers contends that “the men of Restoration Europe forged their own, unique political culture, to confront the problems of their own times.” It formed quickly and lasted until the economic changes of the 1840s. “The Restoration,” he concludes, “must ... be treated on its own merits, and through the study of its own preoccupations.”

Broers is at his best carefully defining both the essence and nuances of contending political ideologies, confidently separating the strands of political thought and being careful to craft his definitions in terms of the era itself, not later eras using the same labels with different meanings. After a brief chapter setting the international context of the debates begun in 1814 over the future of Europe, his remaining chapters examine these ideologies in turn: Conservatism, Liberalism, Reaction, Radicalism (democracy), Socialism, and Nationalism. The final section studies Revolutions. Broers concludes that the traditional labels “right” and “left” are confusing because Conservatism and Liberalism had similarities as “the ideologies of those in power,” while Reaction and Radicalism were both romantic opposition movements, and Socialism and Nationalism were new forces more important to the future than to this era.

Broers’s book integrates Britain into the history of European great powers, which British studies often have not. But it is even more unusual in that it discusses ideologcal struggles in southern and eastern Europe, though Germany receives little attention. The
bibliographical essay, a very useful guide to the literature, rightly highlights works in English, though it also cites standard works in French, Spanish, and Italian—only one in German. The documents in the appendix are drawn from English, French, German, Spanish, and Italian sources, but they are very brief and add little to the value of the book. Better excerpts are easily available to most teachers and students. Broers discusses historical methods only by reviewing the historiography of his subject.

The topical approach of *Europe after Napoleon* is refreshing and remarkably clear, but be advised that its prose and analysis are sophisticated and assume a fairly detailed knowledge of events. This is the ideal book for the graduate student surveying the ideologies and historiography of the era in preparation for comprehensive examinations. Teachers, too, will find it a useful source on political ideologies. Advanced undergraduates of the highest caliber will find it stimulating. But the average undergraduate will probably get lost in this book.

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The year 1994 marked a century since the inception of the Dreyfus Affair, the sensational case that transfixed France and the Western world for a dozen years. The facts of the case are no longer in dispute. Alfred Dreyfus, a Jew and a captain in the French army, was falsely accused of spying for Germany, convicted by a military court, publicly degraded, and sentenced to life imprisonment on Devil’s Island. The general staff, all too willing to convict Dreyfus, ignored the paucity of evidence and adamantly insisted on his guilt, even when the real culprit, the unscrupulous Major Esterhazy, was exposed. The case became a *cause célèbre,* with enduring political consequences.

The honor of the army seemed at stake to the host of grand and petty rogues in the military—the vain aristocrat, the Marquis du Paty de Clam; the war minister, General Mercier, and the forger of evidence, Major Henry—as well as the worthy Colonel Piquart, who declined to sanction the cover-up. The cast of characters among the Dreyfusards, those who sought to rectify the error and expose the truth, is familiar—the indefatigable Matthieu Dreyfus who persisted in proving his brother’s innocence; the heroic Émile Zola whose article “J’accuse” in Clemenceau’s newspaper *L’Aurore* publicly exposed the army’s deceit; and, at a later stage of the Affair, the humane Jean Juarès who associated the cause of Dreyfus with the future of socialism, and ultimately agonized over the different strategies required to satisfy the grievances of the victim or to further the cause of an abstract justice.

Eric Cahm, lecturer in Contemporary History at the University of Tours, has provided a useful overview of the lengthy affair. While he does not tell the tale as vividly as Nicholas Halasz, whose *Captain Dreyfus* (1955) is now out of print, Cahm excels in