

emphasis on the era of Napoleon rather than the man and on continuity between that era and previous developments. Ellis has produced a study of Napoleon's concept of power reflecting both of these trends. He assumes a prior knowledge of key events in the Emperor's biography and regime. Even the section on army affairs chiefly examines matters of organization, recruitment, and supply, with only passing reference to Napoleon's battlefield prowess. Ellis's Napoleon had no ideological bedrock beyond ambition and manifested no preconceived plans for unifying Europe; he improvised, building on past achievements whenever military victories, patronage, or fortune presented opportunities.

Ellis has an excellent chapter on Napoleon's manipulation of the arts, struggle with prominent writers, and use of propaganda. Ellis judges the period as one of great aesthetic activity and sees Napoleon, however much he was interested solely in advancing his own cult of personality, as a "cultural catalyst." Also noteworthy is Ellis's review of recent work on the backbone of Napoleonic administration, the notables, nonaristocratic landowners who gained status from the Revolution and benefited from the looting of the Continent. Finally, Ellis marks the limits of Napoleon's power in astute examinations of the failure of the Continental System and of the repeated attempts to dominate Pope Pius VII, who emerged victorious despite repeated humiliations.

Almost 20 percent of *Napoleon* is occupied with bibliographical essays. One particularly rich chapter is a supplement to Pieter Geyl's legendary *Napoleon For and Against* (1949). To Geyl's roster of French commentators and historians, Ellis adds a tentative list of British, German, and Italian authors. Here is a topic deserving of more extensive treatment.

Ultimately, Ellis deems Napoleon's greatest impact to have been on French institutions, not on the rest of Europe. The Napoleonic legacy is one that Ellis assesses with clarity and authority. Students who already have some familiarity with the topic will welcome this skillful summation of where Napoleonic scholarship presently stands.

It is too early to predict the resolution of these intellectual skirmishes or to estimate which of the outlooks recounted in these two books will become part of some future, standard interpretation of the Revolution. In the meantime, the spirited conflict among historians does seem appropriate for the subject matter in question.

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**Robert Gildea.** *France: 1870-1914.* London & New York: Longman, 1996. Second edition. Pp. viii, 128. Paper, \$12.37; ISBN 0-582-29221-2.

**Robert Aldrich.** *Greater France: A History of French Overseas Expansion.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996. Pp. x, 369. Cloth, \$45.00; ISBN 0-312-15999-4. Paper, \$19.95; ISBN 0-312-16000-3.



Despite the outpouring of scholarly publications, it's not so easy to find books that can serve as analytically sophisticated and interesting short texts. Students and teachers of modern French history should find both in these two books, a new study of French colonialism and a second edition of the formative years of the Third Republic.

The complex history of the Third Republic, from its declaration in the wake of the humiliation of Sedan to the onset of the "Great War," is the subject of Robert Gildea's book in the Longman *Seminar Studies in History*. Incorporating current historiography into his study, Gildea follows a format that is common in writing about and teaching survey courses for this epoch. The 1870s witnessed the consolidation of the Republic in the face of various monarchical restoration schemes. During the 1880s social and economic questions arising from the experiences of "modernization" were largely side-stepped as the Republic punished its enemies--especially the Catholic Church by laicization of education--and then survived the decade in the face of scandal and renewed challenges from anti-republican forces.

Despite predictions, even from sympathetic observers, that the nineteenth-century French were incapable of maintaining a regime more than two decades, the Republic persisted into the 1890s, only to find constitutional and ideological issues blazing forth with new intensity at the end of the century, during the lengthy, turbulent national debate surrounding the Dreyfus Affair. Having once again survived, the Republic lurched into the twentieth century determined once more to punish its enemies on the right.

But threats from the left challenged *bourgeois* dominance of political and economic institutions. With the specter of socialism, anarchism, and syndicalism threatening the established order, midway through the first decade the political establishment turned away from constitutional issues in order to thwart economic and political challenges to the status quo. Reinforced by the rising nationalist fervor during the years immediately preceding the outbreak of war in 1914, the efforts to resist significant changes in the order of things were generally successful.

Essentially a political history of 1870-1914, Gildea emphasizes that a republican form of government for a country the size of France seemed a bold experiment indeed; in a monarchical European world France was an oddity, and a not very promising one considering the record of the First and Second republics. But, despite an often turbulent political history--and the occasional truly popular crisis, such as Dreyfus--the Republic survived, supported, Gildea argues, by an essentially stable society, one whose "very stability ... permitted the luxury of sharp political divisions."

In developing his analysis in a mere 85 pages, Gildea achieves a fine balance between his generalizations and summaries on the one hand, while, on the other, he provides sufficient detail to illustrate his analyses. He puts some flesh on the bare bones, raising this brief tome from the handbook category to a text that is interesting, clearly written, and thoughtful. While the short chapters on "Social Structure," "Socialism," and "The Dreyfus Affair" are satisfactory analytical reviews, his chapter on "Radicalism" stands out as an unusually comprehensible analysis of this difficult-to-explain--and understand--phenomenon within French thought and politics.



Faculty and motivated students will appreciate the up-to-date twelve-page bibliography, which is referenced from within the text, efficiently guiding the reader to additional reading. Two dozen pages of documentary excerpts, similarly keyed to the narrative, provide a flavor of contemporary primary sources; their pedagogical utility seems fairly marginal. Experienced history teachers will find Gildea's work a manageable and reliable source for preparing up-to-date lectures and discussions in survey courses. Students in upper-division courses should be able to develop an understanding of the Third Republic to 1914 through a careful study of this excellent synthesis--and still have sufficient time for collateral reading.

Synthesis is also the hallmark of Robert Aldrich's *Greater France*. After languishing during the 1960s and 1970s, renewed scholarly interest in French colonialism has fostered an outpouring of monographic literature. Aldrich brings the reader historiographically up-to-date in a relatively compact survey that begins with the French acquisition of its modern empire in the nineteenth century and concludes with its disintegration during the 1950s and 1960s.

Commencing with two chapters sketching the process of acquisition, the third one analyzes the variety of factors behind that development. Although the multiplicity of interacting factors is not a new idea--set out especially well in 1960 by Henri Brunschwig, *Mythes et réalités de l'impérialisme colonial français, 1871-1914*--Aldrich uses the scholarship of the last twenty years to continue the analysis, and to reaffirm that there was no comprehensive plan for imperial expansion. Indeed only very late in the nineteenth century could one speak of the development of governmental imperialist policy, skillfully propagated by a variety of colonial interest groups, and linked to European power politics.

Representative of Aldrich's weaving of summary and example, chapter 4, "The French Overseas," examines categories of French people on location: missionaries, soldiers and sailors, administrators, settlers, as well as a few specific individuals who were conspicuously important in the development of the French empire, such as Hubert Lyautey. Aldrich also examines more modest individual experiences as representative of the French overseas.

Chapter 5, "The Uses of Empire," analyzes the French insistence that colonies serve France, in terms of prestige, of economic, political, or strategic advantage. Chapter 6, "The French and the 'Natives,'" lays out the coercion that undergirded the whole colonial system. In Aldrich's straightforward prose the reader encounters the ugliness of that coercion. But in France most eyes were resolutely blind. Preferred were the ideological myths and the veneer of colonial culture that adorned their own, superior, French civilization. Aldrich argues in chapter 7 that colonialism did leave marked cultural legacies, especially in literature, art, and scientific research, culminating in the Colonial Exhibition of 1931. Yet, the "great" French empire was ephemeral. Aldrich's survey of French imperial experiences concludes with the rise of colonial nationalism and the dissolution of the French empire. At the end of the book is a fine bibliographic essay, reviewing many of the more recent monographs and scholarly articles.



Robert Aldrich admirably succeeds in presenting the reader with a manageable survey, albeit largely from the French perspective, of an enormous topic and literature. Although his efforts to include all the empire may make sections of the book seem a bit encyclopedic in tone, *Greater France* is a competent synthesis, a fine introduction.

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**Bruce F. Pauley.** *Hitler, Stalin, and Mussolini: Totalitarianism in the Twentieth Century.* Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1997. Pp. xvi, 290. Paper, \$14.95; ISBN 0-88295-935-2.

Much of the history of Europe in the twentieth century can be viewed from the perspective of the actions taken by or in opposition to the ideas, ambitions, and policies of Josef Stalin, Adolf Hitler, and, to a much lesser extent, Benito Mussolini. Bruce Pauley's *Hitler, Stalin, and Mussolini* is accordingly a salutary reminder of how a few determined individuals, when given almost unlimited power to impose their ideologies on others, have altered the fates of millions of ordinary individuals, not to mention the very nations they led. Stalin's economic policies between 1930 and 1937 caused the deaths of fourteen million Russians, forced the relocation of tens of millions more, and produced a chronically underproductive Soviet agricultural sector, no doubt a factor contributing to the collapse of the USSR. The war unleashed on 1 September 1939 by Adolf Hitler resulted, according to Gerhard Weinberg, in a world-wide death toll of approximately sixty million, of whom far more were civilian than military, and in the Holocaust, in which some six million Jews perished, and it left Germany and much of Europe in ruins.

Pauley, a much-published specialist in Austrian history, begins this comparative history with the Russian Revolution of 1917 and concludes with the collapse of communism in 1989. Each chapter within this chronological framework has a topical focus, and topics include: the ideological foundations of totalitarianism; the seizure of power by each dictator; the dictators' personalities and policies; totalitarian economics; propaganda, culture, and education; family values and health; totalitarian terror; pre-war diplomacy and the beginning of World War II; total war, 1941-1945; and the collapse of Soviet totalitarianism. Reflections on the totalitarian legacy conclude the book. Typical chapters offer a brief introduction, individual accounts of the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, and Fascist Italy, and a brief--often too brief--comparative analysis. Pauley opens with an analysis of totalitarian ideology, rightly stressing its overriding importance for Stalin, Hitler, and Mussolini. He also identifies one of the many inherent contradictions of twentieth-century totalitarianism by arguing that Stalin, Hitler, and Mussolini "enjoyed their greatest successes when they were not driven by ideological considerations and met their greatest catastrophies precisely at those times when they sought to put their most extreme ideological concepts into practice."