as an excellent tool to illustrate to students how the historical discipline works. For example, the first essay, "The Defeat of Germany in 1918 and the European Balance of Power" presents a very different interpretation of the Versailles conference. Most texts accept it as fact that Germany's treatment at the Versailles conference had a major impact in causing the Second World War. Weinberg, however, argues that the opposite is true and that the Germans got off rather easily at the Conference and escaped severe punishment. Arguments such as this help show students the value of interpretation in history and the nature of historical writing.

Another pedagogical use of the book is the manner in which Weinberg blends military history into wider historical trends. Sometimes regarded as a less important field than other areas of history, Weinberg integrates military history into a broad perspective. For example, in the essay "Hitler and England, 1933-1945," Weinberg uses the fact that increased production of German JU-88 bombers is illustrative of Germany's worsening diplomatic relations with England. Similarly, Weinberg demonstrates the connection between naval construction and foreign policy in several essays. Given that many students are interested in military history, Weinberg's essays offer a way to integrate this discipline into a wider curriculum.

Finally, teachers interested in presenting a balanced view of the Second World War would find Weinberg's book extremely useful. He presents the war from the point of view of the Germans and his accounts of German war plans, strategy, commanders, and the role of Hitler are all fascinating. The essay "German Plans for Victory, 1944-1945," for example, is an excellent account of how even when the outcome of the war appeared to be a foregone conclusion, the Germans still anticipated and had several plans to achieve victory. For students familiar with learning about the war from the Allied point of view, reading Weinberg's essays would be both interesting and beneficial.

Weinberg is a scholar of high order and his essays reflect this. While it would probably prove difficult for students to read the entire book, individual essays would be of great use to them. Similarly, for teachers interested in examining new perspectives on old material, Weinberg's book is an invaluable resource.

St. John's University

Michael Marino


British scholars of the empire seem much more obsessed with the decline of British imperial glory than their more dispassionate American colleagues. Indeed, some such as
John Charmley in a revisionist mode stridently point out the guilty parties--Churchill and the United States: Anne Orde, formerly of the University of Durham, offers a straightforward analysis of the displacement of Britain by the United States in the twentieth century. Because of the impact of the two world wars on Britain, Orde sees an inevitability about the eclipse of the British empire. By the end of the Second World War American military and economic power was at its peak. While the economic and military value of empire remained debatable, the prestige and influence of the British empire still generated an aura of greatness. Orde examines the American record as regards imperial power. To the American mind, expansion on the North American continent was “Nation-building,” not empire building, and despite the annexation of Hawaii, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico, Orde maintains that, “The American ethos remained anti-imperialist, the British Empire its chief bugbear.”

While Orde sees the United States as essentially displacing British power around the world, contrary to the writings of the American diplomatic historian William Appleman Williams, she sees no developed theory of imperialism or empire. She carries the story down to the final Suez humiliation in 1956, when Eisenhower simply told the British and the French what they had to do: Get out and hand over everything to U.N. troops. Anthony Eden protested and tried to hang on, even sending in additional reinforcements, but the American president was adamant. Eden caved in. Nothing had been achieved. Everything was lost. The author concludes that, “after 1956 the British knew that they could not act outside the Commonwealth without American consent, and that consent could not be counted upon.” Despite such toady behavior, much has been made of the so-called “special relationship” between Britain and the United States. Indeed, it was trotted out again when President Bill Clinton met the new Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair. At best this is a very nebulous term; and at worst it was downright detrimental for Britain during much of the Cold War, for it created the delusion that Britain remained a major player on the world stage, keeping too many Britons thinking about a Pax Americana, rather than European union. John Foster Dulles speaking about the Middle East said, “We must fill the vacuum of power which the British filled for a century--not merely to act in an emergency but day in day out presence there.” Beware lest such self-righteousness leads to imperial overreach.

It has been twenty years since the first edition of Bernard Porter’s The Lion's Share: A Short History of Imperialism appeared, and the third edition makes a good text even better. Porter has taken the opportunity of a complete typographical reset to revise and update the text for the first time. It still focuses primarily on the political, military, and economic aspects of imperial power told in a lively narrative style. But since the 1970s the entire field of imperial studies has deepened to include such subjects as the empire and women, preparatory schools, hunting, conservation, technology, medicine, games and sports, policing, the arts, freemasonry, and sex. While his coverage of some of these topics remains scant, it is important that they at least get a mention in a text designed for undergraduates. But Porter can only go so far in these new directions. There is no mention in the index of “orientalism,” Edward Said, or post-colonial theory. On the
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Economic side of imperialism, Porter incorporates the work of P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins whose theory of "gentlemanly" capitalist imperialism has "given a stimulating start to the first really post-imperial age of British imperial history." As the narrative unfolds, Porter views Britain as being as much a captive as a master of the ideal of imperialism, British freedom of action tempered by the need to hold onto the empire, which in the end they failed to accomplish. This reviewer found the new concluding chapter on the legacy of empire to be the most intriguing and clever, and wrapped in some faint whiffs of nostalgia for the empire. Porter quotes an article written by Lord Curzon in 1908 in which he predicts what will happen to Britain without the empire. According to Porter, Curzon had it right: "There we have it almost all: the economic decline, the narrowing of horizons, the loss of national identity, the tourists, consumerism, Americanism, Australian republicanism. It must have appeared a bleak prospect in 1908. But one can get used to such things." Porter argues that whatever happened to the formal structure of the empire "imperialism ... never did sink beneath history's waves." If somehow the empire supplied Britons with a belief that they belonged to something important, bigger than themselves, then that same spirit can be applied to a new Britain in the new European Union. Decline may no longer be the theme of British history.

Instructors should find both works useful for course adoptions. In particular it is important that the new research in imperial studies starts to reach textbooks. Hopefully, the new edition of The Lion's Share will be a harbinger of many more new studies.

Cameron University Richard A. Voeltz


This is a difficult book to review, because I am uncertain for whom it is intended. In 297 pages Philip Jenkins, Professor of History and Religious Studies at Pennsylvania State University, deftly and succinctly surveys the major bases of U.S. history—political, economic, social, and cultural developments. It is a small masterpiece of compression, and this, unfortunately, might be its weakness as far as high school and college classroom use is concerned. For students largely unfamiliar with this nation’s history, the sweeping generalities encountered here will come across as just that, generalizations with no human flesh and blood attached. Jenkins can turn a good phrase, as when he puts the Scopes trial in "a realm somewhere between high drama and low farce," but most topics are covered so briefly, even less than in standard textbooks, that readers will witness a passing blur of names and events.

Moreover, in other respects this work could not do as a textbook for a survey class, unless extensive additional reading were assigned. The Declaration of Independence is included as an Appendix, but, inexplicably, not the Constitution. There is not a single