Within these stated parameters, for example, the explanation of Austro-Hungarian multinationalism (concerning eleven nationalities) is excellent. Thus, this book might also prove a refreshing summary briefing for those better versed in Central European affairs as well.

The University of Texas at Arlington

Dennis Reinhartz


Even a freshman student of European history can make a list of crises that led up to World War I, including the two Moroccan confrontations, the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Balkan Wars. To read the Table of Contents in David Herrmann’s new book one might think that he had done no more than trace this familiar pattern as so many have in the past. Herrmann has, however, done much more. Studies of the outbreak of World War I have focused on the political and diplomatic maneuvering in the capitals of the major powers. This is certainly an appropriate focus, but Herrmann has added an important factor that has been underplayed in the past—military policy.

The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were a time of enormous and competitive technical innovation for soldiers. In hindsight, the most important changes were in artillery, but for the soldier of the day that was not so clear. Machine guns, neutral colored uniforms, and a variety of other changes were sweeping through the Great Powers. Increasing the numbers under arms and providing proper training and equipment also had to be considered. Herrmann does an excellent job of tracing these technical changes in all of the Powers and some of the lesser states such as Italy. In this the volume is fairly traditional military history. What makes the book unusual and deserving of the honors it has won (including the American Historical Association’s 1996 Paul Birdsell Prize) is Herrmann’s account of how military advisers influenced political decisions. In clear, effective prose, Herrmann shows that in each of the crises leading up to July 1914, a significant factor in decision making was the generals’ evaluation of military preparedness and the likelihood of success in war. In the final chapter, he suggests that by July 1914 German commander Helmuth von Moltke and his staff had concluded that militarily the situation was likely to worsen for Germany over the next few years. The other Powers were engaged in expansion and modernization that soon would reduce the German advantages in training, technology, and manpower. Russia was particularly a concern. In those other Powers the military staffs tended to believe that war was virtually inevitable in the foreseeable future and that their military improvements were far enough along to make success in an armed
confrontation likely. The generals gave the politicians no cause for major concessions over the assassination of the Archduke, as they had in the earlier crises.

Herrmann's marriage of military, diplomatic, and political history is superb, and it goes far to clarify the issues that led up to World War I. His research is extensive and multilingual. His writing is excellent, making his book desirable for anyone studying the background to the war from the upper division of undergraduate work through post-graduate researchers. The book is not, however, as the publisher seems to intend, particularly desirable as a general text. The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War is a superior work of historical scholarship, but it is too narrowly focused for use in any but an upper-level class emphasizing the background to World War I.

Fort Valley State University


The Spanish Civil War, once famed but now relatively forgotten at the end of the twentieth century, still attracts coverage. Harry Browne, a British professor of Spanish history and literature, has prepared for Longman's Seminar Series in History a narrative historical text of slightly over a hundred pages, accompanied by 27 pages of translated documents on key episodes and actors in the civil war. There is also a short section identifying key personalities, a glossary, and a short bibliography.

The work is synthetic, often based upon the historical work of Paul Preston, certainly one of the finest historians on the topic but also a blunt northerner who does not mince words. I long for more Spaniards writing their own history, since everyone in the UK has written a book about the Spanish Civil War, it seems.

Still, I was impressed by this series to such an extent that I looked over some of the other volumes. They are all of great use to classroom teachers, particularly if there is a need to select special topics to emphasize in survey courses on modern history. British issues predominate, Stuart and Tudor England in particular, but there are also volumes on Early Modern Europe and Europe, 1789-1918. Their texts are short enough to be read quickly, and their documents give some basic sense of the period or topic.

University of New Mexico

Robert Kern