

Interestingly, this is also a study of the development of a new field, from its inception through academic respectability, as measured in journals, conferences, an AP World History exam, and graduate programs. Manning has seen it all, and recounts the continuing challenges to World History, including getting students and faculty to commit to a program requiring multiple languages, interdisciplinary cooperation, shared information and research techniques, and creative funding acquisition. For those who did not come from World History training, this book offers a structure in which to teach yourself, and provides definitions of contentious terms like diffusion, fusion, paradigm, and syncretism. Perhaps the very best feature of this book is the extensive footnotes, most citing works from the last decade, and including articles and dissertations demonstrating the dynamic directions being taken in World History currently. The references even include syllabus websites and places to view key debates in the field on the H-World discussion list backlogs.

Anyone teaching a World History survey, advising students likely to be interested in World History programs, or planning reading lists for upper-level courses should have this book on his or her shelf as a starting point for ways in which we can connect our training to the larger world and plug into a new and exciting field in our discipline.

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Margaret Sankey

Sally Marks. *The Illusion of Peace: International Relations in Europe, 1918–1933*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. Second edition. Pp. 214. Paper, \$24.95; ISBN 0-333-98589-3.

Sally Marks's new edition of *The Illusion of Peace: International Relations in Europe, 1918–1933* is a fine book in a strong series, *The Making of the Twentieth Century*. This series bravely promises "sufficient narrative and explanation for the newcomer to the subject while offering, for more advanced study, detailed source-references and bibliographies, together with interpretation and reassessment in the light of recent scholarship." Marks, well known in the field, comes as close to reaching that goal as anyone is likely to do in so few pages.

The book has six chronological chapters, an index, a chronological table, and four clear maps, but no other illustrations. Twenty pages of excellent endnotes not only list primary sources from many countries but also cite both classic and recent secondary sources, mostly in English. Marks also examines a few historiographical debates in the notes, which contain some fascinating asides about diplomats.

To Marks, who does not hesitate to make her points boldly, the history of international relations is less the unfolding destiny of nation-states than the human product of flawed diplomats. At the heart of her analysis are both public opinion in the western democracies and troublesome Germans. Despite the central role she ascribes to public opinion, however, she examines it little beyond asserting its unitary nature, its

limitations on policymakers' actions, and its belief that collective security meant someone else would always shoulder the burden of defense. The Germans, she contends, believed their expansion would provoke no reaction, refused to acknowledge defeat and its consequences, and followed a consistently nationalist program that had the advantage over the contending and shifting aims of the other great powers.

Marks's central contention is that the postwar treaties provided only the illusion of peace because "the only effective means of enforcement was force and, after four years of war, nobody would risk the possibility of more war." As she sees it, "... the irreducible problem ... was that Germany demanded equality while France insisted upon security, but if Germany gained equality, France had no security since Germany was larger and fundamentally stronger." In that situation, she asserts, often Britain "would present an elaborately worded scheme to paper over the divide."

Marks's view of Gustav Stresemann, so often depicted as a "good German," is rather negative. To her he is a "great German nationalist dedicated to restoration of the Reich's power" who did more than any "man in the Weimar republic ... to destroy the Versailles Treaty," and whose accomplishment of the evacuation of the Rhineland "burst the bonds of pent-up German nationalism and paved the way for Hitler." But it is the public preference for illusion that arises in her conclusion: "It is not only ironic but also tragic that, aside from Hitler's aggressive aims and his single-minded pursuit of them, the major factor forcing Europe toward the Second World War was the intense yearning of the Western democracies for peace, however illusory."

Marks explains even confusing events clearly, and this book will be useful in many different courses. Occasionally, however, her vocabulary might puzzle some undergraduates. She uses a few German words, many French and Latin phrases, some British spellings, and a few uncommon terms. Indeed, graduate students seeking a brief review might be the ideal audience for this excellent book.

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Michael W. Howell

Keith Eubank. *The Origins of World War II.* Third ed., The European History Series. Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 2004. Pp. XI; 196. Paper, \$14.95; ISBN 0-88295-228-5.

The Origins of World War II is the third edition of a work that first appeared in 1969. The book is organized in a chronological fashion, beginning with the aftermath of 1918 and ending with a detailed chapter on 1939 and the outbreak of war. There is an informative chapter that introduces readers to the post-1918 European reality, with an explanation of what the major powers sought during and after Versailles. In his discussion of the interwar period, Eubank places emphasis on the importance of events such as the 1936 Rhineland reoccupation, British-German naval negotiations, and the 1938-39 crises over Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Danzig. He explains the policy of