This work is most suitable for students in a history of education course or in an upper-division economic history course. It is not an appropriate title for students in survey history courses. The authors' writing style does provide a readable context for the larger statistical picture they paint in this work. Some of the articles cited in the book's bibliography, however, might be more useful sources of classroom lectures. An October 2002 article in the *Journal of Labor Economics*, “Going to War and Going to College: Did World War II and the G.I. Bill Increase Educational Attainment for Returning Veterans,” is but one example.

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Apples and oranges might result in an appetizing fruit basket, but seeking to draw lessons from four dissimilar twentieth-century “insurgencies” makes for a less successful mixture. *Victorious Insurgencies* does little to distinguish differences among rebellions, insurgencies, and revolutions (much less among varieties of revolution), and so in examining this potpourri of upheavals we are led to believe those differences are insignificant. Nevertheless, the revolutions in China (1929-49), a civil war-cum-societal revolution, Vietnam (1945-54), an anti-colonial revolution, and Cuba (1956-59), a rebellion against an old-style caudillo, and the rebellion in Afghanistan (1980-88), an insurgency to keep out communism and Soviet influence, can, indeed, teach us something (e.g., about the problems of fighting a war based on the mistakes of previous conflicts and about successful and unsuccessful counterinsurgencies), but only if readers are prepared to do some of their own mental editing and reorganizing. Without Joes saying so explicitly, his primary concern is with developing a counterinsurgency doctrine. If this serves the goals of a course, then teachers will profit from reading his book—but a fair amount of prior knowledge is expected on the part of readers (e.g., in regard to people referenced), which would likely be a problem for students.

Each of the four main chapters is devoted to providing a short-course narrative—interspersed with periodic but useful analysis of military and guerrilla strategies—of the conflicts that are the book’s focus. These are clearly structured, easy to follow, and include ample quotations and references from participants, scholars, and journalists, but if teachers are looking for more, including more than scattered drive-by comparisons of these four insurgencies, or an analysis of what they have meant for insurgents and students of insurgency thereafter, or how those insurgencies shaped our world, they will be disappointed. That is, if Joes’ thesis is that his four conflicts “produced consequences that may justly be called world-historical,” it is a thesis not proven.
The pivotal and concluding chapter—with regard to the book’s subtitle and thesis—is the one titled “Lessons Learned—or Not.” Joes begins by devoting less than three pages to each insurgency wherein he highlights their most salient features. These function well as summaries, but the “useful lessons” are bite-size and hardly original. For example, “[L]ater efforts to imitate [the Maoist victory in 1949] in different environments and time periods should have been successful—and they were.” Or, “The withdrawal of the French from Vietnam ... suggests the reasonable hypothesis that democracies are disinclined, or perhaps unable, to fight a protracted war in circumstances where their interests are not clearly engaged or threatened.” Four succinct and useful pages analyzing the weaknesses and failures of the four insurgencies follow, i.e., the lessons learned. Thus, it is these relatively few pages that I would read first if I wished to use this book to prepare a lecture; the main body of the book has value, but primarily as background.

A few peeves: In writing Chinese names, Joes used the outdated Wade-Giles system of romanization instead of Pinyin in use at least since 1979, which, for example, renders China’s troubled northwest province of Xinjiang as Sinkiang, the Qing dynasty as Ch’ing, and Mao Zedong as Mao Tse-tung. The index is thin, as it fails to include any number of names that are mentioned in the narrative even as not all of whom are identified there, e.g., Khrushchev, Grivas, Ben Bella, Manchuria, Fourth Encirclement Campaign, IJA. And there are a few questionable locutions, e.g., interpenetrating and disfavored.

Finally, Victorious Insurgencies is best suited for a political science course on insurgencies and how to fight them, but not for a history course, not even one on revolutions, which I have taught. It is also characterized by a tone that perhaps suggests the author might like it to be his ticket to becoming a well-placed policymaker or even, if the gods are smiling, an advisor to a U.S. president.

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Whether it is via bookstore shelves, television miniseries, or the political protests of the Tea Party movement, references to the Founding Fathers are seemingly everywhere in contemporary American culture. In *The Whites of Their Eyes: The Tea Party’s Revolution and the Battle over American History*, Jill Lepore, a historian of colonial America and frequent contributor to the *New Yorker*, examines how Americans on both the political right and the left have appropriated the memory of the American Revolution for political gain. As Lepore illustrates through numerous vignettes of well-known figures such as Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, and Thomas