Moral Vegetarianism and the Philosophy of Mind
Most arguments for moral vegetarianism rely on the
premise that non-human animals can suffer. In this paper I evaluate
problems that arise from Peter Carruthers’ Higher-Order Thought
theory of consciousness. I argue that, even if we assume that these
problems cannot be overcome, it does not follow that we should not
subscribe to moral vegetarianism. I conclude that we should act as if
non-human animals have subjective experiences for moral reasons,
even if we cannot be certain that they do.
Copyright (c) 2016 Oswald
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