Moral Vegetarianism and the Philosophy of Mind

  • C.J. Oswald
Keywords: philosophy, vegetarianism, morality

Abstract

Most arguments for moral vegetarianism rely on the
premise that non-human animals can suffer. In this paper I evaluate
problems that arise from Peter Carruthers’ Higher-Order Thought
theory of consciousness. I argue that, even if we assume that these
problems cannot be overcome, it does not follow that we should not
subscribe to moral vegetarianism. I conclude that we should act as if
non-human animals have subjective experiences for moral reasons,
even if we cannot be certain that they do.

Published
2019-09-05
How to Cite
Oswald, C. (2019). Moral Vegetarianism and the Philosophy of Mind. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal, 9(1), 67-72. Retrieved from https://openjournals.bsu.edu/stance/article/view/1675
Section
Articles