Wittgenstein's Account of Rule-Following and Its Implications

  • Jonathan Langseth
Keywords: philosophy, wittgenstein, rule-following

Abstract

In this paper I present an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s account of rule-following, including what implications he suggests this account has for philosophy. The account suggests that neither one’s interpretation nor the rule itself are criteria by which we may conclude a rule was followed correctly or not. Rather it is through training, regularity, habit and social expectation-in short, by the consequences of action-that an action is considered in accord with a rule. I argue that even if we accept Wittgenstein’s account of rule-following, certain philosophically important implications follow.

Published
2019-09-06
How to Cite
Langseth, J. (2019). Wittgenstein’s Account of Rule-Following and Its Implications. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal, 1(1), 38-43. https://doi.org/10.33043/S.1.1.38-43
Section
Articles