To What Extent is Experience Like Belief?

Authors

  • Sam Hawke

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.33043/S.1.1.44-49

Keywords:

philosophy, experience, belief, representationalist theory

Abstract

In this paper, I argue that the connection between experience and belief is far closer than we might first suppose. In defending a broadly representationalist theory of perception, I argue that purportedly irreducible, non-physical entities such as qualia do not pose an intractable problem for physicalist or functionalist accounts of mind.

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Published

2019-09-06

How to Cite

Hawke, S. (2019). To What Extent is Experience Like Belief?. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal, 1(1), 44–49. https://doi.org/10.33043/S.1.1.44-49

Issue

Vol. 1 No. 1 (2008)

Section

Articles

License

Copyright (c) 2008 Hawke

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