To What Extent is Experience Like Belief?
In this paper, I argue that the connection between experience and belief is far closer than we might first suppose. In defending a broadly representationalist theory of perception, I argue that purportedly irreducible, non-physical entities such as qualia do not pose an intractable problem for physicalist or functionalist accounts of mind.
Copyright (c) 2008 Hawke
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