The Principle of Sufficient Reason and Free Will

  • Blake McAllister
Keywords: philosophy, leibniz, free will, sufficient reason

Abstract

I examine Leibniz’s version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason with respect to free will, paying particular attention to Peter van Inwagen’s argument that this principle leads to determinism. Ultimately I conclude that Leibniz’s formulation is incompatible with free will. I then discuss a reformulation of the Principle of Sufficient Reason endorsed by Alexander Pruss that, I argue, manages to both retain the strength of Leibniz’s formulation and remain consistent with free will.

Published
2019-09-10
How to Cite
McAllister, B. (2019). The Principle of Sufficient Reason and Free Will. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal, 3(1), 1-8. Retrieved from https://openjournals.bsu.edu/stance/article/view/1739
Section
Articles