A Substantive Revision to Firth's Ideal Observer Theory
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.33043/S.3.1.55-61Keywords:
philosophy, ideal observer theory, morality, motivation, decision-makingAbstract
This paper examines Ideal Observer Theory and uses criticisms of it to lay the foundation for a revised theory first suggested by Jonathan Harrison called Ideal Moral Reaction Theory. Harrison’s Ideal Moral Reaction Theory stipulates that the being producing an ideal moral reaction be dispassionate. This paper argues for the opposite: an Ideal Moral Reaction must be performed by a passionate being because it provides motivation for action and places ethical decision-making within human grasp.
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Copyright (c) 2010 Rankin
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