Beliefs and Blameworthiness

Authors

  • Liz Jackson

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.33043/S.7.1.7-17

Abstract

In this paper, I analyze epistemic blameworthiness. After presenting Michael Bergmann’s definition of epistemic blameworthiness, I argue that his definition is problematic because it does not have a control condition. I conclude by offering an improved definition of epistemic blameworthiness and defending this definition against potential counterexamples.

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Published

2019-09-10

How to Cite

Jackson, L. (2019). Beliefs and Blameworthiness. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal, 7(1), 7–17. https://doi.org/10.33043/S.7.1.7-17

Issue

Vol. 7 No. 1 (2014)

Section

Articles

License

Copyright (c) 2014 Liz Jackson

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All articles are licensed with a Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial No-Derivatives 4.0 International license.