There Are No Genuine Disagreements about Funniness

Authors

  • Eric Badovinatz

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.33043/S.8.1.29-37

Keywords:

philosophy, humor, funniness

Abstract

I argue that there are no genuine disagreements about whether something is funny. My argument rests largely on the premise that something is funny only if someone experiences it as funny. The bulk of this paper is spent supporting this premise, primarily through an analysis of the meaning of “funniness.” The rest of the paper is spent demonstrating how my conclusion follows from this premise.

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Published

2015-04-18

How to Cite

Badovinatz, E. (2015). There Are No Genuine Disagreements about Funniness. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal, 8(1), 29–37. https://doi.org/10.33043/S.8.1.29-37

Issue

Vol. 8 No. 1 (2015)

Section

Articles

License

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