Problems of Framing

Fatalism and Time

Authors

  • Augustus Wachbrit

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.33043/S.13.1.118-129

Abstract

In “Fatalism and Time,” Mark Bernstein argues against the notion that the B-theory of time is fatalistic. However, when he frames the differences between the A-theory of time and the B-theory of time, I argue that Bernstein imports some troublesome conceptual baggage in the form of what he calls “atemporal truths,” which, in the end, dooms the B-theory to fatalism, the consequence he sought to avoid. From my examination of Bernstein’s framing of the B-theory of time, I suggest that, given the proper framing of that theory, it is not doomed to fatalism.

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Published

2020-04-14

How to Cite

Wachbrit, A. (2020). Problems of Framing: Fatalism and Time. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal, 13(1), 118–129. https://doi.org/10.33043/S.13.1.118-129

Issue

Vol. 13 No. 1 (2020): Stance Volume 13

Section

Articles

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