Putnam's Problem of the Robot and Extended Minds

Authors

  • Jacob Berk

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.33043/S.15.1.88-99

Abstract

In this paper, I consider Hilary Putnam’s argument for the prima facie acceptance of robotic consciousness as deserving the status of mind. I argue that such an extension of consciousness renders the category fun- damentally unintelligible, and we should instead understand robots as integral products of an extended human conscious- ness. To this end, I propose a test from con- ceptual object permanence, which can be applied not just to robots, but to the in- numerable artifacts of consciousness that texture our existences.

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Published

2022-04-19

How to Cite

Berk, J. (2022). Putnam’s Problem of the Robot and Extended Minds. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal, 15(1), 88–99. https://doi.org/10.33043/S.15.1.88-99

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Articles