Not So Innocent

An Akratic Reading of Leibnizian “Judgment”

  • Oda Storbråten Davanger
Keywords: philosophy, leibniz, faith, reason

Abstract

Leibniz seeks to establish the tenability of faith and reason in his moral philosophy through a tripod of thought, consisting of 1) fundamental human goodness; 2) human error in judgment; and 3) that God is just. A difficulty arises concerning how God can justly punish human beings if they always will what is Good. By considering akrasia, which occurs when error is committed despite its clear nonconformity with the Good, and examining the Leibnizian concept of “judgment,” Leibniz’s tripod can be upheld.

Published
2013-09-17
How to Cite
Davanger, O. S. (2013). Not So Innocent: An Akratic Reading of Leibnizian “Judgment”. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal, 6(1), 79-86. Retrieved from https://openjournals.bsu.edu/stance/article/view/1869
Section
Articles